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Reference	IOR/L/PS/12/1955
Title	Coll 5/10 'Air Route to India: Persia; Arabian Coast Route; Negotiations with Arab Sheikhs'
Date(s)	25 Jul 1931-25 Sep 1932 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	1 volume (393 folios)
Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Copyright for document	Public Domain

About this record


The volume contains correspondence, memoranda, and minutes related to a proposal to relocate the Persian Gulf Air Route (linking Europe and India) from Southern Persia to the Arabian Coast. The proposal is related to difficulties between the British and Persian governments over securing an extension of Imperial Airways' concession to operate in Persia. The volume therefore also contains papers related to the progress of negotiations between the British Government and the Government of Persia. However, the majority of the volume relates to the examination of the Arabian Coast option; this includes potential route options, possible sites for facilities, estimates of expenditure, and progress reports on negotiations between the Trucial Shaikhs – primarily at Dubai and Ra's al-Khaymah – and Hugh Vincent Biscoe, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


The volume also contains minutes of the meetings of the Official and Ministerial Sub-Committees of Imperial Defence for the Consideration of Middle Eastern Questions: 2 November 1931 (folios 226-35), 5 November 1931 (folios 217-25), 17 November 1931 (folios 175-82), 17 December 1931 (folios 89-102), and 15 February 1932 (folios 28-31 and folios 22-5). Related notes and memoranda can also be found within the volume.


A number of extracts from reports (dated 24 March, 26 April, and 25 September 1932) from E C Denison and D S McGrath, Commanding HMS *Bideford*, on trips to the Trucial Coast can be found on folios 3-9; this includes details relating to the construction of the Sharjah Aerodrome.

The main correspondents are as follows: the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, officials of the Admiralty, officials the Air Ministry, officials of the Foreign Office, and officials of the India Office.

The file includes a divider which gives a list of correspondence references contained in the file by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.






























Previous File: ⁵⁹⁵/₂₇
 Next File: ⁵/₂₀

No. ^①5
 File 10

POLITICAL (EXTERNAL) DEPARTMENT.
 COLLECTION.

Aircraft & Aviation

GENERAL HEADING

Air Route to India: Persia.

SUB-HEAD

Arabian Coast Route: Negotiations with Arab Sheikhs.


Notes:

This File contains the following papers:—

YEAR.										
1931	P.Z.	5774	5797	5914	6078	5972	6226	6197	6260	6422
1931	P.Z.	6570	6555	6696	6841	6941	6788	7017	7112	7098
1931	P.Z.	7407	7392	7475	7486	7496	7506	7533	7595	7602
1931	P.Z.	7611	7685	7682	7920					
1932	P.Z.	109	177	210	152	298	404	443	453	452
1932	P.Z.	876	1048	1089	1236	1220	1251	1429		
1934	P.Z.	2547	2774	2954						
19	P.									

Papers may be removed from or placed within this File only by the Political Registry.

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


(2)

AIR ROUTE TO INDIA - (ARAB COAST) Collection 5.

Coll. 5/10. Negotiations with Arab Sheikhs 1931-32.

- " 5/11. Emergency landing ground at Qatar.
- " 5/16. Occasional landings at Koweit; Agreement between the Sheikh of Koweit and Imperial Airways, Ltd.
- " 5/17. Landing grounds at Kalba and Shinas.
- " 5/18. Use by foreign aircraft of Arab Coast landing grounds.
- " 5/20. Landing grounds: negotiations with Trucial Sheikhs, 1932-33.
- " 5/25. Landing ground at Bahrein.
- " 5/28. Air facilities on the Arab Coast.
- " 5/29. Air facilities in Koweit.
- " 5/30. Procedure in connection with provision of civil aerodromes, etc. Agreements between H.M.G. and local rulers along the Arabian Coast.
- 5/31. *Prohibition of private flights along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf.*





P.Z.903/1933.

Extracts from Enclosure No.1

17th October. 1932.

No.50/613.

25th September, 1932.

Sir,

x

x

x

x

2. H.M. Ship under my command arrived at Sharjah at 1800 on Thursday 22nd September. At 1808 I received following signal from s.s. "BANDRA" from Debai ... "Sheikh Debai refuses boats and coolies for Sharjah. Arriving 7 p.m. tonight. Can you arrange." I sent an officer ashore to bring Isa off. The latter was out at the Aerodrome and it was not till 2000 that he arrived on board. He (Isa) stated that they had been expecting the Mail Steamer since daylight and that the Sheikh of Sharjah had had ample dhows and coolies ready all day. As Mail Steamer had not arrived by sunset he had withdrawn his dhows into the creek and sent away the coolies. It was low water at 2200 and there was a strong north westerly wind blowing.

S.S. "BANDRA" arrived at 2015 and anchored about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the shore. I boarded her on arrival. It was the Captain's first visit to Sharjah. He told me his orders were to call at Debai and Sharjah. He arrived at Debai at 1600 and discharged what little cargo he had for Debai in a very short time. The B.I. Agent told him that as Sharjah had no dhows and no coolies it was the custom for the Mail Steamer to discharge any cargo she might have for Sharjah into Debai dhows and to two them full of Debai coolies to Sharjah.

The Residency Agent informed me that there was no truth whatever in this assertion and that Sharjah had plenty of dhows and coolies.

The B.I. Agent further informed the Captain of the "Bandra" that the Sheikh of Debai had now refused to allow any of his dhows or coolies to proceed to Sharjah to unload any Imperial Airways stores, hence his (the Captain's) signal to me.


S.S. "Bandra" had on board Mr. White (Camp Supervisor of Imperial Airways at Shaibah) one Iraqi W/T operator, rifles and ammunition for Guards, Tentage and various other Imperial Airways stores. On my return to my ship I sent Isa ashore to instruct the Sheikh that lighters and coolies must be sent off at once as the Mail Steamer was already 24 hours late.

This incident shows clearly, I think, the sort of attitude we may expect in the future from the Sheikh of Debai towards anything to do with the Aerodrome at Sharjah, despite the clear warning given to him by the Political Resident on 1st September.

3. Dhows and coolies were sent off at daylight and Mr. White, the operator, and all stores were safely landed. s.s. "Bandra" left for Henjam at 0900. I went ashore to

THE SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER,
PERSIAN GULF DIVISION.
(Copy to Staff Officer (I), Colombo).

visit/





(4)
- 2 -

visit the Aerodrome at 0700. Work on the Rest house is temporarily suspended owing to non arrival of cement. There was no news as to when it would arrive. Wireless masts are up and set is working. Captain Mackay was away at Basrah but is expected to arrive by flying boat on Thursday, 29th September. Flight Lieutenant Dalton-Morris and the three R.A.F. W/T ratings are still there. The large generator gave out and is beyond repair, but they have a small one which is working satisfactorily. A new generator is expected to arrive by Flying boat on 29th September, and when it is in working order F/L Dalton-Morris and his three ratings expect to proceed by flying boat to Bahrain to start erecting a Wireless Station there.

4. I duly handed over the 1400 rupees, which I had drawn at Muscat, to the Residency Agent in accordance with the Political Resident's request. The Residency Agent requested me to bring to the notice of the authorities concerned that it would be a great convenience to the Sheikh of Sharjah if a W/T Signal could be made a few hours before arrival of Mail Steamer, giving probable time of arrival, so that dhows and coolies should be ready.

5. Ship left Sharjah at midnight 23rd September and arrived at Basidu, a.m. 24th September. Both Platoons were landed for drill. I handed over to the Custodian the two Union Jacks and his pay for July. He informed me that Hussain had left for Bandar Abbas five days ago. His family is still at Basidu and he has not disposed of his property. The Custodian further informed me that a new Persian Collector of Customs arrived about six weeks ago who refuses to allow any commodities (such as tea, coffee, sugar, flour, rice, etc.,) to enter British Basidu.

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
I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sd.) E.C. Denison.

CAPTAIN.





P.Z.7399/32.

Copy Extract in Colonial Office covering letter dated
6th December 1932 (No.98014/32).


67. AVIATION.


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2. Pending an agreement for a permanent aerodrome the Bahrain Government have, as a temporary measure, permitted the machines of the Imperial Airways to land at Bahrain for a period of one month from the date of the arrival of their first machine at Bahrain.

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pp 775/32
6015/10





Extract from P.Z. 4725/32. Copy for Air Route file
From - The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Siderford at Renjan. (6)
Date - 7th April, 1932. No. 30/300.
To - The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S. Triad
(Enclosure No. 8 in Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf) at
Letter No. 67/887 dated 26th April, 1932. Bombay.
(Copy to Staff Officer (I) Colombo).

2. TRUCIAL COAST:-

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The Trucial Coast was again visited on 3rd - 4th April and, although a lesser 'shemal' blew on the night of 3rd April, Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah were both communicated with.

No news of importance from the Trucial Coast.

An outbreak of small pox (said to have been imported from Bahrain) started at Sharjah on 25th March. Ten tubes of lymph were landed at Sharjah for vaccinating the Residency Agent and his household.


From two separate sources it has been reported to me that on (or about) 22nd March a strange aeroplane described as a High-wing type Monoplane (Fokker?) painted red, landed for ten or fifteen minutes at Jeziret al Hamra (midway between Um-al-Qwain and Ras al Khaimah) and flew away again in a north westerly direction. This information has been passed to Group Captain Welsh.

At Ras al Khaimah the boat channel over the Bar was surveyed. This forms the subject of a separate report.

Sheikh Sultan of Ras al Khaimah, as usual during the visits of H.M. Ships, sent off word that he had to go and punish Bedawin and so would not visit on board.

3. IMPERIAL AIRWAYS' CONCERNS:-

Particulars of the recent tour of Lieutenant Commander Galpin and "Hadji" Williamson along the Oman Coast have been obtained from two different native sources. It appears that this party were well received everywhere except at the northern (Shihuh) town at Dibbah, and at Bandar Abbas (where their voyage was concluded). It is understood that Lieutenant Commander Galpin was impressed with the possibilities of Dibbah and Kalba as potential Air Stations, but his visit to Dibbah has caused complications





7
complications which are mentioned below.

Group Captain Welch was embarked in Bideford at Ras al Khaimah on 4th April and was taken round to inspect the two above-mentioned towns, 5th and 6th April. The flying boats (at Ras al Khaimah) were quite unable to take part in this survey owing to the very poor visibility caused by dust haze which has prevailed in all the Southern Area of the Gulf for the past week.


At Dibbah, Sheikh Raschid bin Hamid of the Southern (or Jewasimi) town was, as usual, very friendly but fearful! His constant plea is to be taken under British protection as a safeguard against his implacable and powerful neighbour Saleh bin Mohamed, the paramount Sheikh of the Shihuh. Raschid professed great willingness to have an Air Station at his town, but insists upon adequate protection if such a course should be decided. He stated most definitely that, as a result of the visit of Lieutenant Commander Galpin, the Shihuh had threatened him with instant extermination of his whole tribe if he consents to the establishment of an Air Station.

So frightened was Sheikh Raschid that he most regretfully but firmly declined to allow the Group Captain and myself to land (on 5th April), even to return his visit. Eventually it was arranged that BIDEFORD should leave Dibbah at once and return after dark in order that the Group Captain and myself could carry out our inspection ashore at dawn the following morning. This plan was carried through successfully.

At Kalba the Sheikh Saeed bin Hamed was most friendly and gave every facility but at the same time he made it clear to us that he had not yet decided whether he would permit the establishment of an Air Station in his territory.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

(Signed) D.S. McGrath
Commander in Command.





(8)

Enclosure No.7 in Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf
letter No.87/587 dated 26th April, 1932.

From The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Bideford at Henjam.

Date 24th March, 1932. No.50/274.

To The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.
(Copy to Staff Officer (1) Colombo).

Letter of Proceedings - Period 10th/23rd March (inclusive).

X X X X X X

2. SUR.

Since the dispersal of the Persian Gulf Division
(10th March) nothing of importance has occurred at Sur.

Sheikh Ali bin Abdulla, accompanied by Sheikh Khamis
bin Said and the Mullah Rawwaf, left Aiqa for the Ja'alan
early on 12th March, where, it is reported, they intend to
remain for some time.

H.M.S. Bideford examined the Beni bou Ali coast as
far south as Al Askhara (17th/19th March). Apart from scores
of fishing 'Berdans' met with, only one ocean-going Dhow -
a 'Ketieh' - was found and that at Al Ashkara.

The main Bou Ali Fleet is expected to start arriving
back from Africa at the end of April and until that date no
trouble is anticipated in connection with the functioning of
the new Customs Post at Aiqa.


On the last occasion of Bideford visiting Sur (19th
March) Captain Alban, who was spending three days at that
port taughtening up the Custom's organisation generally,
visited Aiqa. The Collector of Customs, Muscat State,
(the Egyptian, Sikander) refused to accompany Captain Alban.
Captain Alban reported he was well received by the headmen
and people of Aiqa who appeared most amenable and accepted
with complacency the State's dictates regarding Registration
of Dhows and Customs Regulations.

X X X X X

3. HQR FAKKAN.

Whilst on passage, Muscat to Henjam (23rd-24th March)

H.M.S.





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H.M.S. Bideford visited Her Fakkan for dog-watch recreation and bathing on 23rd March.


The Headman here reported having been visited, about a month ago, by two British Officers and Abdurahman bin Isa (Residency Agent's son) in a motor 'Jasalboat'. This undoubtedly refers to Lieut. Commander Galpin's tour of the Mussandam coast in February in connection with Imperial Airways.


It is stated this party examined Kalba as well as Her Fakkan in their search for a possible landing ground. (Note:- Some six weeks ago Lieut. Commander Galpin was informed by C.O. Bideford that all this area is Independent Territory).

The Headman, Her Fakkan, further reported that up to the present about 500 - 600 persians have emigrated to this coast to avoid the Census (conscription) and other irksome Persian measures. Amongst this number, a notable of Bashakird district, whose name was given as Ameer Kanbar (said to be related to Birkat Khan), with his four sons and families complete have taken up residence at Her Fakkan by permission of Sheikh Said of Kalba.

(Signed) D.S. McGrath,

Commander-in-Command.





Draft Paper.

P.2. 1429/32 Department.

Express Letter

11 MAR 1932

Foreign Secretary of State
to G. I. S. & P. Dept

copy by air mail
sent to Pol. Resident,
Bushire
11 MAR 1932

Treasury
copy to F.O.
Admty
A.M.
Major (H.K.)
11 MAR 1932

Sent
9/iii

Mr. Donaldson
? send.


Having the Air Mail
Bushire is not at
all safe from the
Persians, and it
best perhaps
to be too
explicit. The
ident. of 9/1
is understood.


Wife
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
Your telegram of 25th
Feby no. 621 and Resident's
telegrams of 23rd Feby 139
~~200~~ and 3rd March T. 44.


In present circumstances
Air Ministry do not
consider it necessary to
pursue the whole question at
the moment, but if later
developments make it
desirable to do so, careful
consideration will be given
to the Resident's suggestions.
The issue of the above has


been authorised
(Sd.) E. P. DONALDSON.













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PZ 1257/32

S.A. 2/3

U.S.S. 1. iii


Please see Col. Biscoe's letter of 23 Feb. & 25 Feb. in reply to the S.S.'s letter of 14 Feb.


I have consulted Group Captain Kew. Col. Biscoe's suggestion, in a modified form indicated in the draft letter below, might be considered as one possible alternative among others for a stop-jap arrangement if some stop-jap arrangement becomes necessary pending completion of arrangements for the Gas-Swader route, but it would not be as a permanent plan even in the summer months.


It thus does not affect the main scheme, & we may state our agreement with the conclusion of the meeting on 15 Feb. that we should work for the Gas-Swader route in case the Arab Persia route has to be given up. That conclusion will then be circulated to the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

A draft letter to Col. Sheikhs is submitted.

Gudallton
29.2.55








Bahrein-Gwadar stage (with I suppose some temporary arrangement for accommodation at Bahrein) could be adopted as a stop-gap if the Persian Government's decision is unfavourable and pending provision of the depot ship for Yas Island. The possibility of a stop-gap arrangement of this kind (if it is possible) might also perhaps obviate the necessity of embarking on expenditure on the depot ship until it is known that it will be required, ~~(which in view of Persian dilatoriness may not happen till the last moment).~~

*I am sending copy of this letter
to the representatives of the other Dept at
a meeting of 15 Dec.*

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) J. S. WALTON





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

Had you anything particular in
view on this? I suppose we shd write to
A.M.
~~the~~ (sending copies to the rest) suggesting
that Biscoe's points might be considered
by them in consultation with Imp. Airways?
Or do you prefer to have another meeting?

W.C.
2572






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for accommodation at Bahrein)
could be adopted as a stop-gap if
the Persian Government's decision
is unfavourable and pending pro-
vision of the depot ship for Yas
Island. The possibility of a
stop-gap arrangement of this kind
(if it is possible) might also
perhaps obvi
embarking on
depot ship u
it will be
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
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




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
- 2 -

Still be time to make arrangements at Yas before the winter if necessary, and it would seem worth trying.

4. I am arranging for Galpin (? to, omitted) visit the eastern side of (? Musandum) Peninsula in launch.









Telegram XX.
From Air Officer Commanding, Baghdad.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No 745
Dated and received 13th February 1932.

1236
1932

(20)

445.

Your No 85 of 4th February.


Even though aircraft are scheduled to fly direct to Bahrain and Gwadar it will still be necessary, as you recognise, to provide an emergency night stop on Trucial Coast. Night accommodation for passengers will therefore be essential. As matter is most urgent, request your views on following points.

(a) Is there any prospect that Sheikh of Um-al-Qawain would agree if approached? Um-al-Qawain lagoon could be used in conjunction with barge.

(b) Do you consider offer made by Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah to accept our proposals in return for half a lakh of rupees still holds good?

(c) Would not final personal appeal by you to Sheikh of Dibai possibly bring about a change of mind? We could fly you there at any time for an interview with Sheikh.

Air Officer Commanding.





Telegram XX.

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To Air Officer Commanding, Air Headquarters,
Baghdad.

No. 109.

Dated 14th February 1932.

1236
1932


(i) Since Umm-al-Qawain was considered unsuitable I did not sound Shaikh but have no reason to suppose that he would be any more favourably inclined than the others.


(ii) I do not consider that demand for half lakh was ever intended as offer at all, but was merely method of evading blunt refusal. It would seem undesirable to allow ourselves to be frankly blackmailed.


(iii) I do not think personal appeal to Shaikh of Debai would be of any use. Shaikh himself is quite ready to agree, but is weak man and terrified of his relations and would simply refer me to them. On occasions when emergency night stop is necessary, it should be possible to arrange emergency accommodation in Isa's house as good as that available for instance at Lingah. I am told that Shargah would be willing to grant facilities but presume this is no use.

Foregoing has reference to your telegram of 13th February, No. 745.

- Resident.









(23)

S.30656

SECRET.

Arabian Coast Civil Air Route.

Notes of a Meeting held in Room 24, Gwydyr House,
at 3 p.m. on Monday, 15th February, 1932.

Present:-


Lieut. Colonel Shelmerdine (In the Chair))	
Mr. Holloway)	
Group Captain Peirse)	Air Ministry.
Wing Commander McClaughry)	
Mr. Burkett)	
Mr. Grieve)	Treasury.
Captain Cunningham)	Admiralty.
Mr. Walton)	India Office.
Mr. Clauson)	
Mr. Baxter)	Foreign Office.
Major Hind)	Committee of Imperial Defence.
Mr. Andrews)	Air Ministry.

Colonel Shelmerdine enquired whether the Foreign Office had received a reply to their telegram No. 10 of the 10th February to Mr. Hoare (Tehran) asking for information regarding the prospects of an extension of Imperial Airways' permit. Mr. Baxter said that a telegraphic reply had been received in which Mr. Hoare reported his opinion that so long as the Minister of Court believed in the likelihood of a general settlement of the general treaty negotiations Imperial Airways Ltd. would probably be allowed to continue to function on the present route. In his telegram, Mr. Hoare also enquired what variations, if any, were desired in the agreement with the company. Mr. Hoare proposed to press, about the end of February, for a provisional permit if the Minister did not mention the matter in the meantime. The Foreign Office were in agreement with Mr. Hoare's proposed line of action.

Mr. Baxter in reply to Mr. Walton said that as M. Taimourache had only just returned to Persia from Europe Mr. Hoare probably thought it best not to try to force the pace by raising the question forthwith since it would quite likely arise naturally in the course of the negotiations for the proposed general treaty with Persia.

Mr. Grieve suggested that if a temporary extension of the present permit became necessary an extension of twelve months should be sought: he was anxious to avoid the purchase of a yacht for use at Yas Island unnecessarily. Colonel Shelmerdine said that a shorter extension (with the possibility of renewal) would be acceptable. Arrangements for the operation of the alternative route could probably be completed in two months.

Mr. Baxter thought that Mr. Hoare would first of all press for a provisional extension pending the conclusion of the general treaty negotiations; but the general treaty negotiations might not run as smoothly as we hoped, and might break down altogether, so that the Persian Government might refuse to give us a provisional extension of the Persian route. In such circumstances Mr. Hoare would probably try for a final extension of the present permit, in order to enable arrangements for the Arabian route to be completed. We could not, however, be sure that the Persian Government would be willing to give an extension





2.

of any kind, although the prospects now seemed more hopeful than they had appeared some months ago.

Colonel Shelmerdine said that he felt it would be an error in tactics to ask for a final extension as this would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to seek a further extension, even if the French and Dutch obtained one.

Mr. Baxter said that Mr. Hoare's telegram was being referred to the Air Ministry for observations and it was agreed that this question of a temporary extension as well as that of any variations desirable in Imperial Airways' agreement should be dealt with in the Air Ministry reply to the Foreign Office. The Air Ministry will communicate with Imperial Airways Ltd. on this latter point. (It was considered to be undesirable to put forward any request for amendments of a drastic nature).

The Air Ministry memorandum for the Meeting which had been circulated on the 12th February was then discussed.

Captain Cunningham remarked that the Admiralty observed that the Air Ministry considered alternative (2) in the memorandum as impracticable because the distance from Bahrain to Gwadar (770 miles) was too great to fly in one day, although a previous proposal had contemplated flying from Dabai to Karachi (a greater distance) in one day.

Group Captain Peirse pointed out that the possibility of a night stop on the Trucial Coast was the danger under the Bahrain-Gwadar proposal.


Captain Cunningham said the Admiralty thought that since an emergency refuelling and night stopping point would be required on the Musandam Peninsular the permanent refuelling point might be established there instead of at Ras-al-Khaimah. He suggested the possibility of using, according to the wind direction, one or other of two inlets on the Peninsular separated by a narrow neck of land.

Group Captain Peirse said that the information at present in possession of the Air Ministry indicated that air currents over those inlets were often exceptionally turbulent and made them unsafe for use by aircraft. Living conditions were worse on the Musandam Peninsular than at Yas Island and a regular stop there was not contemplated - only an emergency halt. Adverse winds were not the only source of forced landings, and the use of Yas Island, by shortening the journey by 2 hours, correspondingly reduced the risk of unforeseen landings and incidents on the Trucial coast.

Captain Cunningham said that the Admiralty did not come into the question of which of the two alternatives mentioned in the memorandum was the better; but so far as they were concerned they agreed to the use of Yas Island as contemplated in proposal (1) and to the use of Ras-al-Khaimah for daylight refuelling in view of the Political Resident's telegram of the 4th February.

Mr. Baxter said that there might be strong objection to basing the yacht on Henjam and if this were contemplated it would be necessary to consult Mr. Hoare and the Political Resident.

Mr. Walton said that the India Office would inform the Government of India and the Political Resident of alternative proposal (1) (i.e. to operate the service with night stops at Yas Island and Gwadar, with daylight refuelling at Ras-al-Khaimah and an emergency refuelling and night stopping point on the Musandam Peninsular) and ask for his observations. It would at





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the same time be intimated that alternative (2) entailing flight from Bahrain to Gwadar in one day was being ruled out. The question of informing the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi of the proposal to station the depot ship at Yas Island could be deferred until it was clear that the proposal would materialise.

Group Captain Peirse in reply to Mr. Walton said that no place had been definitely ear-marked for the emergency refuelling and night stop on the Musandam Peninsula; this would have to be decided after a further survey and in the light of practical experience. In reply to Mr. Grieve he said that accommodation on land would not be essential at the outset in order to operate the service and if necessary a refuelling barge could be anchored at a suitable spot in the first instance.

Mr. Baxter enquired whether a definite decision had been taken to operate the Basra-Bahrain section with landplanes. It would be necessary to fly outside the three mile limit off the Hasa Coast, and in previous correspondence it had been contemplated that flying boats would be used. There were at present no emergency landing grounds on the Hasa Coast, and although the Political Resident had recently had a satisfactory conversation with King Ibn Saud on the subject, it was uncertain when such emergency landing grounds would be established.

Colonel Shelmerdine replied that a definite decision had been taken to operate this sector with landplanes, and that the Air Ministry did not think that emergency landing grounds in the Hasa were essential from the point of view of Imperial Airways Ltd.


Mr. Grieve remarked that the cost of the present proposal was a substantial additional load on this air route. Mr. Holloway agreed but said that the estimates had been compiled on the "full" side.


In reply to Colonel Shelmerdine, Mr. Grieve said that Treasury acquiescence in the scheme could be assumed in the absence of any alternative and on the assumption that the Government would not be prepared to suspend the route purely on grounds of additional expense. The prospect of agreement with Persia appeared to be very much more hopeful. The scheme was still provisional and he did not think that formal sanction was necessary at this stage.

Group Captain Peirse did not think there was any need to refer the matter again to the Ministerial Sub-Committee at the moment.

Major Hind said that if an agreement were reached between the departments concerned it would suffice if he placed a note of this Meeting before the Chairman of the Ministerial Sub-Committee with a view to its being circulated to the members of the Sub-Committee.

Mr. Walton said that the India Office would like to obtain the remarks of the Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the scheme before this was done. This was agreed.





India Office,

Whitehall, S.W.1

19th February 1932.

P.Z.1089/32.

Dear Mr. Burkett,


I concur in the draft of the notes of the meeting on the Arabian Coast Civil Air Route on 15th February.


Yours sincerely,


(Sd.) J. C. WALTON.

W. Burkett Esq.

Air Ministry,
Gwydyr House,
S.W.1.







Drapt-

PZ.

1089

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(28)

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Notes of a Meeting held in Room 24, Gwydyr House,
at 3 p.m. on Monday, 15th February, 1932.

Lieut. Colonel Shelmordine (In the Chair)

Mr. Holloway.

Group Captain Peirce

Wing Commander McLaughry

Mr. Barkett

Mr. Grieco

Captain Cunningham

Mr. Walton

Mr. Clanton

Mr. Baxter

Major Hind

Mr. Andrews

Air Ministry.

Treasury

Admiralty.

India Office.


Foreign Office.

Committee of
Imperial Defence.

Air Ministry.

Colonel Shelwardine enquired whether the Foreign Office had received a reply to their telegram No. 10 of the 10th February to Mr. Hoare (Tehran) asking for information regarding the prospects of an extension of Imperial Airways' permit. Mr. Baxter said that a telegraphic reply had been received in which Mr. Hoare reported that if the Minister at Court believed in the likelihood of a general settlement of the general treaty negotiations Imperial Airways Ltd. would probably be allowed to continue to function on the present route. In his telegram, Mr. Hoare also enquired what variations, if any, were desired in the agreement with the company. Mr. Hoare proposed to press, about the end of February, for a provisional permit if the Minister did not mention the matter in the meantime. The Foreign Office were in agreement with Mr. Hoare's proposed line of action.

Mr.





-2-

(29)

Mr. Baxter in reply to Mr. Walton said that as M. Teymoutache had only just returned to Persia from Europe Mr. Hoare probably thought it best not to try to force the pace by raising the question forthwith since it would quite likely arise in conversation with the Minister.

Mr. Grieve suggested that if a temporary extension of the present permit became necessary an extension of twelve months should be sought: he was anxious to avoid the purchase of a yacht for use at Yas Island unnecessarily. Colonel Shelwardine said that a shorter extension (with the possibility of renewal) would be acceptable. Arrangements for the operation of the alternative route could probably be completed in two months.

Mr. Baxter thought that Mr. Hoare should first of all press for a provisional new permit and if this were refused ask for a final extension of the present permit to enable arrangements for the other route to be completed.


Colonel Shelwardine said that he felt it would be an error in tactics to ask for a final extension as this would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to seek a further extension, even if the French and Dutch obtained one.

Mr. Baxter said that Mr. Hoare's telegram was being referred to the Air Ministry for observations and it was agreed that this question of a temporary extension as well as that of any variations desirable in Imperial Airways' agreement should be dealt with in the Air Ministry reply to the Foreign Office. The Air Ministry will communicate with Imperial Airways Ltd. on this latter point. (It was considered to be undesirable to put forward any request for amendments of a drastic nature).

The Air Ministry memorandum for the Meeting which had been circulated on the 12th February was then discussed.

Captain Cunningham remarked that the Admiralty observed that the Air Ministry considered alternative (2) in the memorandum as impracticable because the distance from Bahrain to Gwadar (770 miles) was too great to fly in one day, although a previous proposal had contemplated

/ flying





-3-

(30)

flying from Dabai to Karachi (a greater distance) in one day.

Group Captain Peirce pointed out that the possibility of a night stop on the Trucial Coast was the danger under the Bahrain-Gwadar proposal.


Captain Cunningham said the Admiralty thought that since an emergency refuelling and night stopping point would be required on the Musandam Peninsula the permanent refuelling point might be established there instead of at Ras-al-Khaimah. He suggested the possibility of using, according to the wind direction, one or other of two inlets on the Peninsula separated by a narrow neck of land.

Group Captain Peirce said that the information at present in possession of the Air Ministry indicated that air currents over those inlets were often exceptionally turbulent and made them unsafe for use by aircraft. Living conditions were worse on the Musandam Peninsula than at Yas Island and a regular stop there was not contemplated - only an emergency halt. Adverse winds were not the only source of forced landings, and the use of Yas Island, by shortening the journey by 2 hours, correspondingly reduced the risk of unforeseen landings and incidents on the Trucial coast.

Captain Cunningham said that the Admiralty did not come into the question of which of the two alternatives mentioned in the memorandum was the better; but so far as they were concerned they agreed to the use of Yas Island as contemplated in proposal (1) and to the use of Ras-al-Khaimah for daylight refuelling in view of the Political Resident's telegram of the 4th February.

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Mr. Walton said that the India Office would inform the Government of India and the Political Resident of alternative proposal (1) (i.e. to operate the service with night stops at Yas Island and Gwadar, with daylight refuelling at Ras-al-Khaimah and an emergency refuelling and night stopping point on the Musandam Peninsula) and ask for his observations. It would at the same time be intimated that alternative (2) entailing flight from Bahrain to Gwadar in one day was being ruled out. The question of informing the Sheikh of Abu





-4-

(31)

Khab of the proposal to station the depot ship at Yas Island could be deferred until it was clear that the proposal would materialise.

Group Captain Peirse in reply to Mr. Walton said that no place had been definitely ear-marked for the emergency refuelling and night stop on the Musandam Peninsular; this would have to be decided after a further survey and in the light of practical experience. In reply to Mr. Grievs he said that accommodation on land would not be essential at the outset in order to operate the service and if necessary a refuelling barge could be anchored at a suitable spot in the first instance.

Mr. Baxter said that in view of past correspondence in regard to the landing grounds on the Hasa Coast the Foreign Office would like to know whether a definite decision had been taken to operate the service with landplanes between Basrah and Bahrain. Colonel Shelderdine replied in the affirmative.


Mr. Grievs remarked that the cost of the present proposal was a substantial load on the air service. Mr. Holloway agreed but said that the estimates had been compiled on the "full" side.

In reply to Colonel Shelderdine, Mr. Grievs said that Treasury acquiescence in the scheme could be assumed; the scheme was still provisional and he did not think that formal sanction was necessary at this stage.

Group Captain Peirse did not think there was any need to refer the matter again to the Ministerial Sub-Committee at the moment.

Major Hind said that if an agreement were reached between the departments concerned it would suffice if he placed a note of this Meeting before the Chairman of the Ministerial Sub-Committee with a view to its being circulated to the members of the Sub-Committee.

Mr. Walton said that the India Office would like to obtain the remarks of the Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the scheme before this was done. This was agreed.





(32)

Register No.
 PZ
 1048/32

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter _____ from _____ Dated _____ 19 ____
 Telegram _____ Rec. _____

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			<u>The Arab Air Route.</u>
Under Secretary	18. 1.	18	
Secretary of State...	18	18	Proposal to locate ^{depot ship for a} night stop for a depot ship off Yas Island.
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

Sent 36/19/2

Sir M. Sevon. 1/19/2

Copy of *Rely to India* to FC
AM
Admiralty
Treasury
C.O.
D.H.I.


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Draft telegram to Government of India and Political Resident informing and asking them to telegraph any observations which they have to offer.

19th Feb. 1932
Rely to Govt. of India No 561 R.H. Bunkin 6 562.

Previous Papers :—

4475a 1000 530





Minute Paper.

Department.

(33)

The Inter-departmental Meeting held at the Air Ministry on 15th February discussed the memorandum on the file below. It will be seen from the memorandum that, as it has not been possible to obtain an agreement with either of the Trucial Sheikhs who were approached, it is not considered advisable to proceed with the project of a night stop on the Trucial Coast. The remaining alternatives are to locate a night stop at Bahrein or at Yas Island. The former would give too long a stage to be relied on for a day's flight to Gwadar all the year round. It is true, as was pointed out by the Admiralty representative at the ^{meeting} that a stage from Debal to Karachi, as previously suggested, would have been even longer, but this would not have mattered as a good emergency stopping place would have been available at Gwadar which could have been used as frequently as desired; on the other hand, with a stage from Bahrein to Gwadar there would be no intermediate stopping place satisfactory enough to be used except for rare emergencies.

It was accordingly agreed that the Air Ministry's second alternative, viz. a night stop at Yas Island, with a stage from there to Gwadar, should be adopted. This is subject to any observations which the Government of India or Colonel Biscoe may make, but there is no reason to anticipate that they will dissent. The proposal to establish a night stop at Yas Island is a new one but it is obviously preferable to the risks and expenditure involved in a night stop on the mainland/

*done in an acceptable
7/ course (1) submitted
75/72, & therefore
it at the meeting.
18.2.*


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mainland in the absence of an agreement with the Sheikh concerned.

Yas Island belongs to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. A petrol tank and an oil tank have already been placed on the island in connection with the Military air route. The Sheikh did not give his consent to this but was informed by Colonel Biscoe in November 1930 that we should have to go ahead with the installation of the tanks. This Sheikh is a mere figure-head set up by his uncle who is believed to have been responsible for the assassination of the last Sheikh (the third Sheikh assassinated at Abu Dhabi in 1922). In the circumstances it is useless to expect the Sheikh to take any responsibility. He would probably not agree to anything which we proposed, but he would acquiesce in a de facto situation as he did in 1930. It should perhaps be stated that while the tanks were being installed in 1930 Captain Prior, the Political Agent ^{at} of Bahrain, visited Yas and met there a representative of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi who seemed to fear that we were settling down in the Island; Captain Prior thereupon wrote a letter to the Sheikh to the effect that it was intended only to instal some petrol tanks and that no buildings would be erected. It is not contemplated, however, that even in connection with the present proposal any buildings would be erected. The passengers would be accommodated on a depot ship off Yas Island, and the ship will not necessarily be stationed off the island permanently but may (as was explained at the meeting) move to and fro between there and Bahrain. The Political authorities may think it advisable, when the time comes,

Mir



comes, to inform the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi of our intention.

The flying boats would have to use Ras-al-Khaimah for refuelling; there is, of course, already a petrol barge at that place in connection with the Military air route. It will also be desired to have an emergency night stop somewhere on the east side of the Musandim peninsula but the best place for this has not yet been located.

The commencement and the rate of progress of the preparations depend on the Persian Government's attitude in regard to the South Persia permit. It will be seen from papers submitted concurrently on another file that the Foreign Office sent a reminder on this subject to Mr. Hoare on 10th February and that the latter has replied that he is sure that so long as the Minister at Court believes in the probability of a general treaty settlement, Imperial Airways will be allowed to function. Mr. Hoare intends to press, about the end of February, for a provisional permit unless Taimourtache makes a move meanwhile. The F.O. were asked at the meeting whether Mr. Hoare could not make a definite proposal before the end of the month, but they were of opinion that this is a question of tactics which is much better left to the Minister. Colonel Shelmerdine thought that it would be possible to get ready the depot ship in time at about a month's notice. If the Persians' attitude turns out after all to be against giving a permit provisionally pending the progress of the general treaty negotiations, then they could be pressed/


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


pressed for a short definitive extension of the permit sufficient to allow preparations on the Arab side to be completed (as suggested in the Air Ministry letter of 5th February at P.Z.796/32). If on the other hand, as seems now to be quite probable, we get a provisional extension of the permit (pending the treaty negotiations and a consequent permanent extension) such provisional extension might be without fixed limit of date, or it might be ^{for} a limited period which would be renewed from time to time so long as the treaty negotiations continued. In either event, if the Persians being dissatisfied with the progress of the general negotiations threatened to close the provisional permit, we should have some warning in advance so as to be able to complete preparations for the Arab route. Naturally it is not desired to embark on expenditure on these preparations until it is more or less certain that they will be necessary; in particular as regards the depot ship it will not be desired to purchase a vessel so long as it is probable that the South Persia permit will continue. The arrangements proposed are thus very contingent on what happens at Tehran, but we would be ready to complete final arrangements at short notice.

A draft telegram to the Government of India and Colonel Biscoe, in which the Air Ministry concur, is submitted.

It will be seen that the change from land planes to flying boats will be effected at Behrein. This may seem to raise the question of emergency landing grounds on the Hasa coast to which Ibn Saud has not yet agreed (though I understand/







(36)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN AND
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

*Copy to FO
H.M.
H.M.
H.M.
CO.
D.M.
Maj. Hind 25-32*

*Copy to
H.M.
H.M.
H.M.
CO.
D.M.
Maj. Hind 25-32*

Pr. 1.

SEEN BY	DATE	TIME
RECD. IN TEL. BCH.	19/2	5 p.m.
CODE, X or XX	xxx	
DESPATCHED	19/2	7h m
N. OF WORDS	154+154	
SENDER'S INITIALS	C.W.P.	

PZ 1048/32

Addressed to 'Government of India'

Repeated to 'Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf. No 562


561. -----

[Biscoe's telegram 4th
February 85. Arab air route.

H.M.'s Minister Tehran con-
siders that 'Imperial Airways' will
be 'allowed to continue to use'
South Persia route provisionally
so long as Taimourtache believes
in 'probability of a general treaty'
settlement. Hoare intends to
press about the end of February
for 'provisional permit if'
Taimourtache makes no definite
proposal meanwhile.

2. Nevertheless H.M.G. consider
it necessary to proceed with pre-
parations for an alternative route
against the contingency of failure
of Persian Government to give
provisional permit or of its with-
drawal at short notice. They have
considered the alternative of
operating the service with night
stops at either (1) Yas Island
and Gwadar or (2) Bahrein and
Gwadar. Alternative (2) involves
too long a stage to be practicable
in/

412 1000 10.31





(37)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P _____

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN AND
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Sol
Important

Second last
part.

in one day all the year round.
It is therefore proposed to adopt
alternative (1). This proposal
entails the provision of a depot
ship at Yas Island on which
passengers could be accommodated
over night.


Daylight
3. Facilities for refuelling
only would still be required at
Ras-alkhaimah. It would also be
necessary to establish an emergency
refuelling and night-stopping point
somewhere on the eastern side of the
Musandim peninsula but best location
for this point will require further
consideration.


4. Question whether Political
Resident should inform Sheikh of
Abu Dhabi of proposal regarding depot
ship at Yas Island (as was done in
the case of the petrol and oil tanks
in 1930) could be considered in due
course. matter is in any case not
of immediate urgency as provision of
depot ship will not be put in hand
unless and until position in regard
to South Persia permit makes it
probable that it will be required.


5. From point of view of protection
and of potential political reactions


a/


-12 1600 10.31













Whitehall, S.W.1

16th February 1932.


Dear Colonel Shelmerdine.


I enclose a draft of a telegram which we propose to send to Biscoe and the Government of India. We should be grateful if you could let us know whether the Air Ministry concur in its terms.


Yours sincerely,

Lieut:Colonel, F.C. Shelmerdine,
C.I.E., O.B.E.,
Gwyder House,
S.W.1.

(sa) J. C. Walton.









42
S E C R E T.

MEMORANDUM.

Persian Gulf - Civil Air Route.

1. At their second meeting held on the 17th December, 1931 the Standing Ministerial Sub-Committee for Questions Concerning the Middle East of the Committee of Imperial Defence agreed :-

- (a) to accept an estimate of probable expenditure involved in the establishment of an air route along the Arabian Shore of the Persian Gulf as follows :-
 - (i) an initial capital cost of £17,000 to £20,000;
 - (ii) a recurring cash expenditure for the first two years of £15,000 to £17,000 per annum on operating charges;
 - (iii) in later years an annual expenditure of from £25,000 to £30,000 per annum including allowance for extra obsolescence. (If the section Basrah to Karachi is closed to Imperial Airways the net compensation payable might amount to £30,000 per annum).
- (b) that the Air Ministry should be authorised to sanction the despatch by Imperial Airways of an officer to make a complete and detailed survey of a civil air route along the Arabian Shore of the Persian Gulf.
- (c) that as regards the proposals of the Air Ministry for the erection of a rest house, etc.,
 - (i) nothing should be done until further information is received from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.
 - (ii) on receipt of such information the Air Ministry should consult the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Treasury and the India Office, and when inter-departmental agreement has been reached immediate measures for the construction of a rest house should be put in hand.


2. (a) was based on proposals for operating the England-India air service with a night-stop at Ras-al-Khaimah.

On the 20th December, 1931 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf reported the failure of negotiations with the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah for the desired facilities and said that he thought it was useless to make further efforts there as the Sheikh, although himself showing some disposition to come to terms was powerless in face of local opposition.

Negotiations were then begun with the Sheikh of Dabai with a view to using Dabai instead of Ras-al-Khaimah as the night stopping place in the Gulf. The Political Resident has now reported, however, that the Sheikh of Dabai is unwilling to accept responsibility of affording the desired facilities to Imperial Airways Ltd.

It has consequently been necessary to consider further alternative proposals. The alternatives are to operate the service with night stops at either:-

/1.





1. Yas Island and Gwadar, or
2. Bahrein and Gwadar.

Alternative 1 entails the provision of a boat for use as a depot ship; the accommodation of passengers overnight at Yas Island; and the construction of a rest house at Gwadar. Its advantages are :-

- (a) a better division of stages between Basrah and Karachi, i.e.,

(i) Basrah - Yas Island (refuelling at Bahrein) - 595 statute miles;

(ii) Yas Island - Gwadar (refuelling at Ras-al-Khaimah) - 665 statute miles.

(iii) Gwadar - Karachi - 305 statute miles;

(b) the stage between Yas Island and Gwadar can be flown with a daylight refuelling halt at Ras-al-Khaimah and the possibility of having to spend a night on the Trucial coast is practically eliminated.

(c) maximum security since Yas Island is uninhabited.


Proposal 2. involves a stage of 770 miles from Bahrein to Gwadar in one day and is on that account impracticable all the year round. This long stage may involve over 10 hours' flying (on the assumption of a 20 miles an hour head wind). In winter the hours of daylight are insufficient for this, when allowance is made for the time spent in re-fuelling. Adverse weather conditions and the small margin of daylight would almost inevitably cause occasional night halts on the Trucial coast and the objections to this have already been pointed out.

Proposal 1. is, therefore, put forward as the more practicable scheme: though it shares the grave disadvantages of the other that it involves the loss of one day in the scheduled time for air mails between England and Karachi, apart from the additional mileage involved in any case in flying an Arabian coast route.

The change over from landplanes to flying boats would be effected at Bahrein as under the previous scheme.

Facilities for refuelling will still be required at Ras-al-Khaimah. The Political Resident does not anticipate that there will be any opposition to this. In addition, it will be necessary to establish an emergency refuelling and night stopping point where a petrol barge could be moored somewhere on the eastern side of the Mussandam Peninsular.

The provision of a boat to be moored at Yas Island represents additional expenditure as compared with the previous proposal to operate the service with one night stop in the Persian Gulf at Ras-al-Khaimah. The boat would have to be purchased from outside sources since the Admiralty have no suitable craft for disposal which could be fitted out for the purpose. It would not be an economical proposition to charter a boat on account of the high charges involved. If the route is abandoned the boat should, however, be a saleable asset.





(44)

Against this expenditure, however, the payment of £3,000 a year for protection at Ras-al-Khaimah would be saved; for the seven years which Imperial Airways' agreement has still to run this would represent a total saving of £21,000. The provision of a rest house at Gwadar can be regarded as roughly the equivalent of a rest house at Ras-al-Khaimah.

A revised financial statement showing the effect of the new scheme is attached.

3. As regards the second decision (b) of the Ministerial Sub-Committee (vide page 1 of this memorandum) Imperial Airways Ltd. sent Lieut. Commander R.W. Galpin, R.N. (Retd.) to the Persian Gulf to make the survey. On the advice of the British Resident, however, he did not attempt to continue this survey beyond Bahrain owing to the attitude of the Trucial coast Sheikhs to the service. He is now at Karachi.

4. The third decision of the Ministerial Sub-Committee concerned immediate measures for the construction of a rest house on the Trucial coast. The revised proposals contained in paragraph (2) above do not, however, envisage a rest house there, but a depot ship for use at Yas Island and a rest house at Gwadar.


It should be possible to procure and fit out a suitable vessel in a comparatively short time. The Company have made preliminary enquiries in this connection already. Arrangements can also be improvised without much delay at Gwadar to tide over the period while the rest house is being constructed.

But even if the necessary steps were taken immediately the arrangements for starting operations could not be completed by the 31st March when the present permit from the Persian Government expires.

In these circumstances the Foreign Office have been asked to instruct H.M. Representative at Tehran to apply forthwith for at least a temporary extension of the permit. It is understood that the Persian Government's attitude is now more reasonable and that there is some prospect that they will agree to a continuance of operations along the present route.

Until the position has become clearer it may be desirable not to incur the expenditure involved in the proposals in paragraph 2.

In any case, if permission for an extension of any description is refused by the Persians, the only means of preventing the service from being interrupted until the necessary arrangements under paragraph 2 have been completed will be to call upon the R.A.F. to operate the section Bahrain-Karachi. Their assistance to this extent would enable the mail service to be maintained but passenger bookings would have to be suspended.





(45)

REVISED APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL ANNUAL
COST OF OPERATING FROM BAHREIN TO KARACHI WITH
CALCUTTA FLYING BOATS FOLLOWING THE ARABIAN COAST.

1.	Additional cost consequent upon additional mileage	£2,860
2.	" insurance due to salvage difficulties	1,800
3.	" cost of crews and other staff due to the divided route	8,101
4.	" cost of premises at Karachi	500
5.	" cost of maintenance and repair of plant and equipment	825
6.	" cost of delivering fuel and supplies to Bahrein, Yas Island, Dibah and Ras al Khaimah	2,500
7.	Maintenance of Depot Ship at Yas Island (approximate)	7,000
		23,586
8.	Contingencies 10% on total	2,358
		<u>25,944</u>


say £26,000


It is assumed in the above estimate that the Valetta need not be insured. If the Valetta is to be insured add £2,300 per annum.


REVISED APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE OF INITIAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE.


1.	Delivery of Aircraft	3,500
2.	Delivery of Equipment and transfer of staff	1,500
3.	Motor boats, moorings and fuel barges	3,000
4.	Transfer of wireless from Bushire and Jask to Bahrein and Yas Island.	1,000
5.	Removal and re-erection of hangar at Karachi	2,000
6.	Slipways at Karachi and Bahrein	1,500
7.	Plant and engine repair and shop equipment	2,000
8.	(a) Temporary rest house at Gwadar with sleeping accommodation in tents, complete with furniture, lighting plant and equipment	2,000
	(b) Additional cost of permanent quarters	2,500
9.	Depot ship delivered Yas Island approximately	12,500
		<u>31,500</u>


Note: No allowance has been made in the foregoing estimates for the eventual replacement of the Calcutta Flying boats, which will have to be taken into account if the route is operated permanently.













Original No. P.Z. 876/32. (48)

Political 11/2 Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.
SESSION 1931-32.

	Date.	Initials.	
Under Secretary.....	9.2.	Sim	HOUSE OF COMMONS. Question by <u>Mr. Simmonds</u> For <u>Wednesday 10th July 1932</u>
Parliamentary Under Secretary.			
Secretary of State.....	9	Sim	

*45. Mr. Simmonds, — To ask the Under Secretary of State for Air, whether he will state the present position with regard to the negotiations with the Persian government for the continued passage of British civil aircraft over Persia; and whether he can make any statement upon alternative proposals in the event of the failure of the negotiations.

MINUTE ^{and} SUGGESTED REPLY.

Please see the Air Ministry letter below giving their draft reply to this Question for tomorrow. It ~~does~~ ^{did} not seem to be entirely satisfactory for two reasons -

(a) to say that we hope the negotiations with Persia will be successful before March 31st might give the impression that we are in the Persians' hands and are pathetically anxious to secure a renewal of the concession from them (we are, more or less, but do not want them to know it).

(b)

PERSIA.
27. Mr. SIMMONDS asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air the present position with regard to the negotiations with the Persian Government for the continued passage of British civil aircraft over Persia; and whether he can make any statement upon alternative proposals in the event of the failure of the negotiations?

Sir P. SASSOON: Negotiations with the Persian Government are still in progress. Alternative proposals are also under active consideration by His Majesty's Government, but at the present juncture my Noble Friend is not in a position to make any further public statement on the subject.



(b) for much the same reason, it would be definitely advantageous to imply that we have a second string to our bow in the event of negotiations with Persia breaking down and that we are not entirely dependent on Persian favour.

In addition the F.O.. want to omit the words "for the continuance of the civil air route over Persia" because in theory these particular negotiations are a part of the general treaty negotiations; this is purely a matter of words.

The draft answer being submitted to the Secretary of State for Air therefore runs as follows -

ANSWER.

" Negotiations with the Persian Govt are still in progress, and alternative proposals are under active consideration by H.M.G.. But at the present juncture My Noble Friend would prefer not to make any statement on the subject".

This seems quite satisfactory

W. Chamberlain


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
Mr. Chamberlain's suggestions, which have been adopted, are improvements. It has always been recognised that it is good tactics to let the Persians know that we have other views in the air.

Presidents

P.

M. J.







P.Q. 35/32.


Suggested reply :-


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
Negotiations with the Persian Government for the continuance of the civil air route over Persia are still in progress and my Noble Friend hopes that they will be brought to a successful conclusion before the present agreement expires on 31st March next; at the present juncture he would prefer not to make any statement regarding the last part of my hon. Friend's question.


Note :

Proposals for an alternative route which follows the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf to the Musandam Peninsula, via Bahrein, Yas Island and Ras-al-Khaimah and thence to Qwadar and Baluchistan are under active consideration. This route could be operated as soon as the ground organisation is ready, which would be a matter of one or two months. Flying boats would be used from Bahrein to Karachi. Considerable capital expenditure and increased operational costs would be entailed.












with Arab Sheikhs, cannot be completed in time for Imperial Airways to operate the Indian Air Service satisfactorily over this route by the 1st April or indeed for some months after.


In these circumstances they suggest that if the Persian Government make it plain that it is their intention to refuse any prolongation of the present agreements and it is decided that we have no option but to accept the situation, H.M. Minister at Tehran should be instructed to point out the shortness of the period available for the preparation of an alternative route and press for a final extension of the present agreements until such time as the Arabian coast route can be satisfactorily organised.


He could, the Council believe, so frame his request that it would be difficult for the Persian Government to refuse without a breach of ordinary international comity which it would be impossible for them to justify to world opinion. He could, for example, explain that H.M. Government have for some time been exploring the possibility of an alternative route and had actually started preparing the necessary organisation three months before the present permission for the use of the Persian route was due to expire.


He could, moreover, emphasise that his request is for a ultimate and final extension - simply and solely to enable H.M. Government to complete the organisation of the alternative route in the preparation of which unexpected difficulties have been encountered and that the compliance of the Persian Government would be recognised by H.M. Government as being entirely without prejudice to their insisting on the maintenance of their attitude regarding the issue of principle, viz. that they will not permit continued operation of the service along the Persian coast.

The Council suggest that if Sir John Simon concurs, H.M. Minister at Tehran should receive instructions in this sense against the contingency of the Persian Government maintaining their refusal to grant a normal extension of the present permit.











(55)

Minute Paper.	Department.
<p><i>Mr. Simon 11/8/32</i> <i>Mr. P. Arnold</i> <i>Ranking of Arab</i> <i>I agree with Mr</i> <i>Simon, but would need</i> <i>the Air Ministry's</i> <i>approval before</i> <i>making a proposal</i> <i>at the meeting</i> <i>should know all the</i> <i>facts in support of</i> <i>alternative (1) & show</i> <i>the reasons for</i> <i>accepting</i> <i>alternative (2).</i> <i>(Mr. Simon to receive the</i> <i>observations of the F.O.</i> <i>and, after I shall</i> <i>report to him on the</i> <i>above lines, before the</i> <i>meeting.)</i> <i>6.11</i> <i>I approve the</i> <i>action proposed.</i> <i>He should</i> <i>support action (1)</i> <i>→ declare our</i> <i>intention to accept</i> <i>action (2) if (c)</i> <i>is unworkable.</i> <i>Sgt</i> <i>9/2</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>The Arab Air Route.</u></p> <p>U.S.S. P.S.</p> <p>Please see the minutes at P.Z.452/32 below. We have now received the Sheikh of Debai's final reply and Colonel Biscoe's recommendations.</p> <p>The Air Ministry are holding a preliminary meeting with Imperial Airways and will then call a meeting of the Departments concerned in accordance with conclusion (c) of the Ministerial Subcommittee's meeting of 17th December.</p> <p>We might ask the C.I.D. Secretariat to circulate to members of the Ministerial Subcommittee the Political Resident's telegram of 4th February for information in continuation of the previous telegrams which were so circulated.</p> <p>The position in regard to the South Persian route is not, I think, so definite as Colonel Biscoe understands. Para. 3 of his telegram is probably based on the assurance given by Taimurtache to Sir J. Simon that he would try on his return to Tehran to arrange a provisional extension (pending negotiations on all outstanding matters). The F.O. instructed Mr. Hoare to open the matter with Taimurtache a fortnight after the latter's return. We have not heard anything later from the F.O., and it will be proposed at the interdepartmental meeting that the F.O. should send definite instructions to Mr. Hoare to raise the question.</p> <p>If the provisional extension of the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">South/</p>

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


South Persian permit is after all not obtained there appears to be the following possible alternative courses of action as regards the Arab route:-

(1). The course submitted by Colonel Biscoe; that the night stop should be established at Bahrein and that the next day's stage should be from Bahrein to Gwador, Ras-al-Khaimah being used as a re-fuelling station; there would then be a short stage from Gwador to Karachi. The day's flight from Bahrein to Gwador would not be so long as that previously proposed from Debal though slightly longer than ~~that from~~ Ras-al-Khaimah ~~to Karachi~~ to Karachi. An actual non-stop flight from Bahrein to Gwador might be too long but this difficulty may be removed if a re-fuelling station can be established at Ras-al-Khaimah; the other difficulty about the establishment of a night stop at Bahrein is that it lengthens the schedule by the addition of the short day's flight from Gwador to Karachi; but this may be a small matter compared with the difficulties of the alternative courses of action.

(2). The only other alternative as regards the Arab route which appears to be really practicable is to establish ^{at} a night stop on the Trucial Coast (preferably Ras-al-Khaimah) and take adequate measures to protect it ourselves, since the Sheikh, though he says that he will not interfere, declines absolutely to accept any responsibility. In view of the Sheikh's attitude it appears that no measures of protection are likely to be adequate short of garrisoning the place either by a small force of Assyrian levies as

Colonel/



Minute Paper.

Department.

Colonel Biscoe suggests, or by some other means. Colonel Biscoe points out, however, that a garrison would arouse considerable resentment along the coast.

Nevertheless, if we establish a night-stop at Ras-al-Khaimah, it seems essential to have a garrison as the only means of ensuring the safety of the passengers. With the Sheikh and his people maintaining an attitude of sulky non-co-operation, it is impossible to overlook the risk of acts of sabotage or hostility by the local population; apart from this, moreover, the Sheikh will take no responsibility (and it is obviously impossible to enforce it on him) for protection against attacks from outside his jurisdiction, and the danger of such attacks appears to be very substantial; the Shihuh of the neighbouring hills have already threatened to attack Ras-al-Khaimah if facilities are granted; besides these there are the Bedouin tribes of the interior (e.g. Manasir and 'Awamir) who are constantly raiding and attacking the Trucial Sheikhdoms; a recent report from the S.N.O. dated 12th October, 1931, states that the Trucial Coast has been much troubled by these marauders last year, and that there is little or no security.

(3). The alternative of establishing a night-stop at Ras-al-Khaimah without taking measures to protect it by any sort of garrison seems too risky to be seriously considered. The R.A.F. might be able to deal effectively with the parties responsible for a raid or attack on the establishment after it had occurred, but the damage/

2148 3060 831



damage would by then have already been done. If passengers on the air route should be killed, injured or kidnapped, as a result of an attack on the night rest establishment, the effect on the reputation of Imperial Airways and of the air route to India would obviously be serious. It is not sufficient to be able to punish the parties responsible for such an attack after it has occurred, but it seems essential to take all practicable steps to prevent the risk of any such incident occurring.

It is submitted that at the Inter-Departmental Meeting the I.O. representative, subject to the course of the discussion, should support alternative (1) or, failing that, alternative (2) above, or any other practicable proposals which may be brought forward and which would provide for the safety of the air route.

It seems out of the question to be content with simply telling the Sheikh that we shall hold him responsible. Apart from the fact that he is an independent potentate, it would be futile to use coercion in the sense of trying to force on him responsibilities which he declines to accept, especially responsibility for protecting our establishment from attacks by his own enemies from outside his jurisdiction.

Walton
5. 2. 31



INDEXED

FILE COPY

P.Z.
775
1932

SECRET

4/2/32

ETP/CWP/IT/FHB/DH. (318 groups) 743.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

From Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Foreign Secretary to Government of India, and repeated by former to Secretary of State for India.

(COPIES CIRCULATED)

Dated Bushire, 4th February, 1932.

Received 11 a.m., 4th February, 1932.

XXX

85. Addressed to Foreign and repeated to Secretary of State for India, copy by mail to Tehran, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, and Air Officer Commanding, Baghdad. My telegram of the 20th ultimo, T-18. Arab air route.


2. I have received letters from Sheikh of Dabai saying that he is unable to obtain acquiescence of ~~his~~ ~~relative~~ to establishment of air station and asking it should not be established.

3. I understand that Persian Government have agreed to ~~(sic, I agreed to)~~ provisional maintenance of Persian route pending result of negotiations. In these circumstances, is it necessary to pursue the question of civil air route on Arab coast further at present? If it is, then I earnestly submit the following proposal for consideration.

4. Ras Al Khaimah is much preferable from technical point of view. I suggest, therefore, that civil aircraft should stop night at Bahrein and fly thence to Gwadar, using Ras Al Khaimah (? simply) as re-fuelling (? point) except in extreme (? emergency). At Bahrein, Imperial Airways would be welcome and could obtain all facilities they (? omission) and passengers would be much more comfortable. While nothing short

453 - Wm 11/2

RECEIVED IN
4 FEB 1932
POLITICAL RESIDENT






(58)


- 2 -


Short of armed forces can guarantee absolute safety on Trucial Coast, I do not think that if Airways used Ras-Al-Khaimah simply for re-fuelling, as Royal Air Force constantly do at present, they would meet with any opposition. Residency Agent, who already keeps a few armed men for personal protection, could be told to increase their number slightly. This (? involves) slightly longer schedule and arriving at Karachi next morning instead of previous evening, but Officer Commanding Flying-boats informed me that, if Airways had gone to Dabai, ~~only~~ only in the middle of the summer ~~they~~ they could have made Karachi same night.

5. Airways representative recently asked me about the possibility of using land craft all the way. Flying-boats would land in front of the Residency Agent's house and near the sea. Land craft would have to land some way inland on exposed plain. I regard their use beyond Bahrein as out of the question at present.

6. Only alternative I can suggest is that the Residency Agent should be told to construct block-house at Ras Al Khaimah which could be garrisoned by small force of Assyrian levies. This would have wide repercussions and arouse considerable resentment throughout Oman. Sheikh informed me that he would not oppose anything we might do, but would not accept responsibility.









60

6

the file attached when received in 1932

Draft Paper.

PZ 452/32

Department.

Cypher xxx

374

No. 7/18

Has been of Sheikh of Debari per


Received

3 FEB 1932

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REGD. IN TEL. SCH.	2/2/32	1.45 PM
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DESPATCHED	2/2/32	2.45 PM
NO. OF WORDS	26 + 26	
SENDER'S INITIALS	37	

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Minute Paper.

72. 452
32

Department. 308
21/1

U.S.S.

P.S.

The Arab air route.

The present position is as follows.

In accordance with the conclusion of the Ministerial Middle East Sub-Committee on 17 November 1931, and after correspondence regarding a subsequent suggestion of the Air Ministry, instructions were sent on 28 November to Colonel Biscoe to endeavour to secure an agreement with either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain. Subsequently the A.O.C. found Umm al Qawain unsuitable, but Debai feasible. Instructions were sent to Colonel Biscoe on 3 December to include Debai in his negotiations. Colonel Biscoe first sounded the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah, who asked for time to discuss the matter with his relations. He then sounded Debai whose attitude was friendly. He then went back to Ras al Khaimah who refused to enter into an agreement; he said that if the Government liked to establish a station neither he nor his people would interfere but that he would accept no responsibility. After continuing his tour (Muscat and Sur) Colonel Biscoe returned to Ras al Khaimah on 19 December and found that the opposition there had strengthened among the leading men and that the Shihuh (of the mountains of the Musandim Peninsula) had also threatened to attack the place if facilities were accorded. Colonel Biscoe accordingly had to give up the prospect of obtaining any agreement at Ras al Khaimah and went (20 December) again to Debai; unfortunately the Sheikh of Debai was seriously ill (I understand that the R.A.F. Doctor who examined him was satisfied that this was so) and negotiations had to be suspended for


Major to
the course
proposed.
I should have
thought that
a non-stop
flight in a
regular service
from Bahrain
to Guadalupe
was too far.

S.A.
21/1

Major Hind
informed accordingly
S.A.
22/1

2148 3000 831

a/





Minute Paper.

Department.


a fortnight.

On 12 January Colonel Biscoe telegraphed that he had spent four days at Debai; the Sheikh's unfortunate illness had prevented his discussing the matter properly with his relatives and much opposition had meanwhile developed among a faction who two years ago were strong enough almost to force the Sheikh's abdication and whose views he can hardly ignore; the Sheikh therefore asked for time to try to overcome this opposition and promised an interim report on 16 January and his final reply on or soon after 23 January.

If Colonel Biscoe receives the ^{final} answer by the date promised we ought to have a report ~~early~~ next week; the interim reply is given in Colonel Biscoe's telegram of 20 January (copy attached).

The procedure for the further consideration of the question of the location of the night stop has been discussed with Major Hind of the C.I.D. Secretariat. It will be remembered that conclusion (c) of the Ministerial Sub-Committee's meeting of 17 December (flag B) was that on receipt of the necessary information from the Political Resident and the A.O.C. the Air Ministry should consult the Departments named and that when interdepartmental agreement has been reached immediate measures for the construction of a rest house should be put in hand.

A good deal depends on whether the Sheikh of Debai's reply is favourable or not. If it is favourable matters will be simple. The terms of the agreement (sketched in the enclosure to Colonel Biscoe's despatch of 20th December - see flag A) will have to be considered, but this involves matters of detail which can probably/





Minute Paper.


Department.


probably be settled by discussion between the Departments concerned.

If, on the other hand, the Sheikh's reply is unfavourable, the question of the course of policy to be pursued as regards establishing a night stop on the Trucial Coast or adopting some other alternative will arise and after the interdepartmental discussion it will probably be necessary to bring this question at an early date before the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

It will be observed that the agreement which we have endeavoured to negotiate with one of the two Sheikhs would fix on the Sheikh responsibility for the safety of the establishment so far as he and his dependants and subjects are concerned and further for ~~their~~ protection so far as possible against marauders from outside his jurisdiction. It is clear that, if we have no such agreement and assumption of responsibility by the local ruler, the danger to passengers etc. both from attacks from outside the Sheikhdome and from unruly elements within it, will be very much greater, and it seems very probable that it would be necessary to provide for protection by the permanent entertainment of an armed guard if it is decided to establish the night stop at Ras al Khaimah or Debai. This, which would amount practically to occupation, would presumably involve much greater expense than has hitherto been contemplated. The two fundamental questions of defence and of expenditure thus arise at once if the Sheikh of Debai's answer is unfavourable. On the question of defence a very wide divergence of view between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty has already manifested itself. In view of the urgency it will probably be desirable that

the/





Minute Paper.

Department.


the matter should be brought as soon as possible before a meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee, but a meeting of the Departments named in conclusion (c) of 17 December will be held before the matter is submitted to the Ministerial Sub-Committee in order that clear cut issues may be placed before the latter.


In regard to the connected question of the South Persian route, the position is that Taimourtache on 23 December (the day on which he left London) assured Sir John Simon that he wished on his return to resume negotiations on all outstanding matters, including the air route, and that if a settlement of other questions were not reached in time he would try to arrange the provisional extension of Imperial Airways' permit as circumstances might require. The F.O. on 15 January instructed Mr. Hoare that he might broach the matter with Taimourtache if the latter does not himself take the initiative within a fortnight of his return.


It will thus be seen that if we can rely on Taimourtache's assurance, there is a prospect of the South Persian route continuing provisionally pending negotiations for a general treaty with Persia. Nevertheless, it is obviously necessary to make alternative arrangements for the continuance of the air service to India in case the South Persian permit is not extended. Failing an agreement with the Sheikh of Debai, the best interim arrangement might possibly be a night stop at Bahrein and a "long-hop" from Bahrein to Gwadar.

Meanwhile in order that Ministers may be kept/


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












DEXED

1226. (M.O.2).

P.Z.
453
1932

(67) P.B. on
file
and

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

20th January, 1932.

Mr 210 - W/S/s

The Director of Military Operations & Intelligence
presents his compliments to the Secretary, Military
Department, India Office, and would be glad to receive
two copies of Bushire Despatch No. C-51, dated 20th
December, 1931, referred to in correspondence ending
with telegram No. 113, dated 9th instant, from the
Government of India (India Office No. P.2/210).

109/32


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
29/1 W/S/s 20/1


2 copies sent to DM1

21/1/32

RECEIVED
21 JAN 1932
ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENT









(69)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P 7 404/32

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Repeat to Pol. Dept. in P. 9.

Cypher X

Send
19/1/32

Copy to Ministry 20/1/32


249. Blashire Despatch 20 Dec? No. C 51


Arab air route. Admiralty report that
Biscoe should send copy of his & later
reports to Senior Naval Officer in the Persian
Gulf who may later be entrusted in defence
of establishment for any observations which
he may desire to make.
Please ask Biscoe to act accordingly.


Adm. 2 of 1. 249, Reported to
P.R. in P. 9. 250.


SEEN BY	19/1/32
READ IN T. S.	6-10 p.m.
CODE, X or XX	X
DESPATCHED	19/1/32 9-5 p.m.
No. OF WORDS	26+26
SENDER'S INITIALS	25

4405 1000 3.30











agreement ^{can} will have to be considered;
if on the other hand the answer is
unfavourable the question what
steps will ^{should} have to be taken next
will have to be discussed.


The Foreign Office may be able
to give information of the prospects
of obtaining an extension of the
South Persian route.

I also enclose copy of the
following telegrams which state the
G. of I.'s objections to any question
of employing forces from India for
the protection of establishments
on the Trucial Coast:-

From G. of I. dated 25th July, 1931
" S. of S. " 15th Novr. 1931
" G. of I. " 8th Decr. 1931, No 2963 - 5

It seems best to have a meeting
as soon as we have Colonel Biscoe's
report after his receipt of the
Sheikh of Debai's final answer. We
ought with luck to have this about
the beginning of next week. Perhaps
if convenient to the other
Departments represented on the
Committee, a meeting could be
suggested for the afternoon of
Tuesday 26th January. If Colonel
Biscoe's report is not received by
the preceding Monday, the meeting
could perhaps be postponed for a
day or two.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) J. C. WALTON.



JRL/FCN/JGS/MM

(167 groups)

241

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

(COPIES
CIRCULATED)

From Resident in the Persian Gulf to
the Foreign Secretary, Government
of India, Foreign & Political
Department, and repeated by the
former to Secretary of State for
India.


XXX

Dated H.M.S. Fowey, Henjam Radio, 12th,
January, 1932.

Received 7.45 p.m. 12th January, 1932.

T-15. Addressed to Foreign and repeated to the Secretary
of State for India. My telegram of the 7th instant, T-10.
Arab air route.

I have spent 4 days at Dabai. Sheikh's illness
has had unfortunate effect. On medical advice, he left
Dabai and lived in house some miles from the town. He
was not well enough to return till the day before I landed
and had hardly any opportunity to discuss matters with his
relatives. Meanwhile, all sorts of rumours to the effect
that he was entering into secret engagements with British
etc., gained credence, encouraged by stupid article in
Arab newspaper. I found, therefore, much opposition
amongst faction who two years ago were strong enough almost
to force the Sheikh's abdication and whose views he can
hardly (? ignore). Sheikh himself is genuinely (? anxious
to) (? afford) necessary facilities, but has pleaded in these
(? special circumstances) for further time to overcome
opposition and has promised to send me interim report (? as to)
how matters are going through warship on 16th January and
final






(73)

" 2 "

final answer by wireless through mail steamer due at
Dabai, 23rd January. I spoke to one of the leaders of
the opposing faction yesterday and hope it will have
effect as he has since approached Residency agent in
more conciliatory tone.





(74)

PZ 152/32

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

ICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Refer to P.R. in P.S.

Warship "Forney"

Hong Kong Radio

Cypher XXX

Sum 12/32

Copy to AM } 12/1/32

- AM }


112.


Arab air route & Representatives of Imperial Airways' Lieutenant Commander B.W. Galpin will arrive shortly to investigate in detail their requirements for operation of the service and will if necessary be flown to the various bases proposed to be used & will please afford him such assistance as may be practicable in connexion with his survey.


Added to S.O.I. No 112 Replied to P.R. in P.S. No 113

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RECD. INTEL. SCH.	9/1/32	3.15 PM
CODE, X or XX	XXX	
DESPATCHED	9/1/32	4.15 PM
No. OF WORDS	60 + 63	
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
4400 1000 330













(77)

P P2177/32

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

TO
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO
19
ICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

Repeat to
Pol. Res. in P.S.
Warship "Fowey"
Hemjan Radio

Cypher xxx
Sent 9/1/32


Through
Vichy
Sent 8/1/32


Cm & AM
Dir.
Adm. 11/1/32
70.
Co.
Hemjan

SEEN BY F.
REGD. IN TEL. BCH. 9/1/32 3.15 PM
CODE, X or XX xxx
DESPATCHED 9/1/32 4.10 PM
No. OF WORDS 66
SENDER'S INITIALS 842 P

4485 1000 3.30
2nd tele
Sent xxx 9/1 4.10 pm
69 groups
842 P

109
Bisbee's Despatch 20 Dec, M.C.S.
paragraph 4. Wireless station would
be necessary at Dehai + Imperial Airways
doubt whether this could be maintained +
operated successfully at any rate for some
time without a European operator.
2. While therefore it might be possible
in the last resort to dispense with
keeping a European permanently at Dehai
Imperial Airways consider that it would
be almost impossible to do so on their
present scheme at any rate at the
opening of the service.
Addendum S.V. No 109 Replied to
P.R. in P.S. No 110





Tel. No. 1
:TORIA 1216.

(78)
AIR MINISTRY,
GWYDYR HOUSE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Ref:- S. 30656. (Part II).

9th January, 1932.

Dear Walton,

I understand from Peirse that you would like to have from us our views so that you can reply to paragraph 4 of Biscoe's despatch of 20th December concerning the possibilities of Imperial Airways being able to use Debai without a European staff.


I have been in touch with Colonel Burchall of Imperial Airways and enclose a copy of his reply.

With his reply I agree.

Yours sincerely,

F. P. Suter

C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
S.W.1.





79

C O P Y.

IMPERIAL AIRWAYS, LTD.,
Airway Terminus,
Victoria Station,
S.W. 1.

8th January, 1922.

Dear Bertram,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your confidential and urgent letter of today's date on the subject of European staff at Debai.

As I told you on the telephone, I think it is almost impossible on our present scheme to eliminate white staff from this night halt - at any rate at the opening of the service.

Colonel Biscoe lays great stress on whether we could, in the last resort, operate without a white staff and, put in this way, one can only answer that it is possible - just as we operated through Lingeh without any white staff. The difference, however, is that at Debai there would necessarily be a wireless station, while at Lingeh there was none, and Lingeh has never been a night stop.

I doubt if this Station can be maintained and operated successfully, at any rate for some time, without a white operator, and if we were to get a Eurasian operator I am not sure that he would be any more acceptable to the locals than a pure white.


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
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
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
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) H. Burchall.


F.G.L. Bertram, Esq.,
Air Ministry, S.W.1.













AIR MAIL.

Confidential.

No.C.51 of 1931.

Office of the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf,

S.S. "Chakla",

At sea, dated the 20th December 1931.

From - The Hon'ble Lt.Colonel H.V.Biscoe, I.A.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
New Delhi.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No.T/108 of today's date, I have the honour to forward herewith a rough note which I left with Khan Bahadur Isa bin Latif, Residency Agent on the Trucial Coast, as a guide to him in any discussions he might be able to have on the subject of the projected air station with the Shaikh of Debai, as I thought it would be just as well if he could pave the way for subsequent discussions between the Shaikh and myself should the Shaikh's health permit.

2. The Royal Air Force doctor who examined the Shaikh informed me that he had a temperature of 101 and was suffering from acute bronchitis, which, unless he was careful, would develop into pneumonia, and that in any case he would certainly not be fit to transact any business for a fortnight.

3. I informed Khan Bahadur Isa that the note was in no way final and was not to be shown to the Shaikh and that he was not to offer the Shaikh the sums which I had inserted in it, which were intended to be figures to which I was ultimately prepared to go and in the neighbourhood of which I hoped to effect ...





-2-

effect a settlement.

4. I am inclined to think that the only point which the Shaikh will demur at is the presence of a European staff in the rest house, and I would be glad to be informed whether it is considered by the Imperial Airways to be absolutely essential to keep a European ground engineer at Debai or whether in the last resort it would not be possible to keep permanently at Debai only 'Iraqis or Indians to look after the rest house, refuelling, etc., and for the machine to bring down its own European mechanic from Bahrain or Gwadar.

5. After discussion with the Air Officer Commanding I have come to the conclusion that it would be better to have a rest house on the shore than a barge or ship moored in the creek. In the event of disturbances such a building with a substantial wall round and a wire entanglement outside that could be defended for some time, whereas a barge could be fired at by any stray Bedouin in the vicinity.

6. The Shaikh's illness at this juncture is particularly unfortunate as I had every hope of effecting a final settlement before I returned to Bushire, and I fully realise that a speedy settlement is essential: in the circumstances however it cannot be helped, as when I saw the Shaikh this morning he was quite incapable of transacting business.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

sd/- H.V. Biscoe,

Lt. Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





Copy of
Note left with Residency Agent,
TRUCIAL COAST.


Shaikh agrees to accord to Imperial Airways facilities that they require for the establishment of an air station at Debai.

The Company shall be accorded the following facilities.

- (1) Their aircraft shall be entitled to land in Debai Creek.
- (2) The Shaikh will build a rest house for them on the bank of the creek outside the Town at the place desired by the Company, and in accordance with plans drawn up by them.
- (3) The Company shall be authorised to send their employes to Debai to reside in the rest house, and passengers arriving by aircraft will spend the night there.
- (4) The Company shall be entitled to import free of duty petrol, spares for the use of aircraft, provisions for passengers, and anything else that they may need for the maintenance of their service, security of their aircraft, and comfort of their passengers.
- (5) The Company shall be entitled to instal a petrol tank on the banks of the creek from which their aircraft may refuel.

The Shaikh accepts full responsibility for the safety of the Company's aircraft, personnel, passengers and establishments on shore so far as he and his dependents and subjects are concerned, and further for their protection, so far as possible, against marauders from outside his jurisdiction.

In ..





In return for the above His Majesty's Government agree to make the following payments to the Shaikh.

- (a) Wages of 30 guards with 2 Chiefs, at Rs.20/- per man and Rs.40 for the chiefs, i.e. Rs.680 per mensem = Rs.8,160 per annum.
- (b) Rent of house Rs.200/- per mensem = Rs.2,400 per annum.
- (c) Rent of creek Rs. 500/- per mensem = Rs.6,000/-
- (d) A landing fee of Rs.5/- for every civil aircraft that alights in the creek.
- (e) A subsidy of Rs.300/- per mensem in return for the responsibility which he has assumed = Rs.3,600/-

If the Shaikh so desires His Majesty's Government will advance to him the money requisite for building the rest house, recovering the advance from the rent.


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
20.12.1931.

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Minute Paper.

Register No.
P.Z.
7920/31.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Telegram from P.R.

Dated 20th Dec, 1921.
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			Arab Air Route.
Under Secretary	22-12	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Secretary of State...	24	<i>[Signature]</i>	Negotiations with the Sheikhs of
Committee.....	29	<i>[Signature]</i>	Ras-el-Khaimah & Dibai.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

35
24/12

Copy to

FOR INFORMATION.

Col. Biscoe's previous telegram (P.Z. 7582/31) had prepared me for a complete breakdown at Ras-el-Khaimah. The Sheikh's personal "disposition to come to terms" is, presumably, a belated attempt to rehabilitate himself in our favour, now that he sees that the matter has been taken out of his hands & that a less intractable attitude on his part will make no difference. (The Sheikh's & whom reference is made in the telegram, are a tribe, estimated to number about 21,000 souls, inhabiting the Oman promontory: a section of the tribe, known as the Beni Ibrahim, frequent the hills above Ras-el-Khaimah. So far as this Office is concerned, there is now nothing to be done but to wait until the Sheikh of Dibai is fit to transact business. Copies of the telegram have been sent to the interested Depts. & to the C.I.D.


[Signature]
22/12/21.

and position may be from the drafts of the Persians' but see below the telegram.

Previous Papers:—
L. Biscoe.

3287 2000 1228

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
11 JAN 1932





INDEXED

FHB/ETP/DH. (206 groups) 7920 1931 7053.

SECRET

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

(COPIES CIRCULATED)

From Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, and repeated to Secretary of State for India.

Dated Chakla, Henjam Radio, 20th December, 1931.


Received 12.5 p.m., 20th December, 1931. XXX



Addressed to Foreign and repeated to Government of India, Secretary of State for India. My telegram T.98, December 11th. I visited (? Rasel-Khaimah) yesterday and found that during my absence strong opposition had developed among leading men to grant of any further air facilities, and some of them visited ship with brother sheikhs and begged to be excused from additional responsibilities, also Shihuh had sent 20 men to (? Raselkhaimah) and threatened to attack the town if facilities accorded. Residency Agent reported that Sheikh himself was showing some disposition to come to terms, but was powerless in these circumstances. It is I think useless to make further efforts there.


I have therefore come to Dabai. Unfortunately Sheikh is seriously ill and R.A.F. Doctor, who has examined him, states that it will be at least fortnight before he is in any way fit to transact business. Brother of Sheikh informs me (that) (2 corrupt groups) Sheikh (? sounded) other members of family and anticipates that their agreement will ultimately be obtained but final settlement must await Sheikh's recovery. In these circumstances I am returning to Bushire and proceeding with my programme and will visit Dabai by air or ship in (? fortnight).

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21 DEC 1931









THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

E. (M) 2nd Mtg.

NAL COPY.

COPY NO. 17

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

MINUTES of the Second Meeting of the Sub-Committee held at
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., on Thursday,
December 17th, 1931.

P R E S E N T :-

The Right Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister,
G.B.E., M.C., M.P., Secretary of State
for the Colonies. (In the Chair.)

The Right Hon. Viscount Hailsham,
Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir John Simon,
G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., O.B.E.,
K.C., M.P., Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of
Dunderry, K.G., M.V.O.,
Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Bolton Eyres-
Monsell, G.B.E., M.P., First
Lord of the Admiralty.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Mr. Walter Elliot, M.C., M.P.,
Financial Secretary to the
Treasury.

Air Chief Marshal Sir John Salmond,
G.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.,
Chief of the Air Staff.


L.D. Wakely, C.B.,
Assistant Under-Secretary of
State, India Office.


Sir Sigmund Dannreuther, C.B.,
Deputy Secretary,
Air Ministry.

G.W. Rendel,
Counsellor,
Foreign Office.

Mr. R.A. Grieve, O.B.E.,
Assistant Secretary,
Treasury.

Mr. N.G. Hind, M.C., Secretary to the Sub-Committee.





THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them the following
Papers on the subject of the Eastern Air Route -

M.E.(M.) 10. - Memorandum by Major W.E. Elliot,
M.C., M.P., Financial Secretary to
the Treasury, dealing with the
probable cost involved in the
establishment of the Eastern Air
Route on the southern shore of
the Gulf.



M.E.(M.) 11. - Memorandum by the Secretary of
State for Air giving the Air
Ministry's estimate of cost, and
asking for authority to undertake
a preliminary survey of a civil
Air Route along the Arabian coast,
and for such items of capital
expenditure as require a long time
for execution, e.g. the erection of
a rest house.

THE CHAIRMAN in opening the meeting, stated that
the estimates as given by the Treasury and the Air Ministry
did not agree. It would, therefore, first of all, be
necessary to determine as far as possible, the probable
cost involved.

MAJOR ELLIOT said that the figures given by the
Treasury had been obtained from Imperial Airways. He
had not had an opportunity of examining the figures now
submitted by the Air Ministry, in which, however, he
noted no allowance had been made for depreciation.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY stated that the figures
as subsequently given by the Air Ministry represented the
maximum expenditure which they considered was likely to
be incurred.

SIR SIGMUND DANNEBERGER also considered that the
estimates now given by the Air Ministry would probably
not be exceeded. The question of depreciation would not
arise should it be possible to renew the service along
the Persian route, as it was covered in the existing
agreement with Imperial Airways, and in any case would
not have to be considered for the first two years.
It was impossible to / - 1 -





(96) (97)

tell what the situation would be in two years' time when some expense to meet the cost of renewals would be necessary. Meanwhile, a capital cost of, at the most, £17,000 would be involved, plus an annual recurring cost which should not exceed £15,000 a year. He stated that as long as Calcutta Flying boats, provision for depreciation of which was already made under the subsidy agreement, were used no new expenditure as regards depreciation was anticipated. It was possible that in two years' time Imperial Airways might ask either for a capital grant or an increase of subsidy if new machines were to be employed.


SIR JOHN SALMOND wished to point out that the route along the Arabian coast was essential for strategic reasons and had already been partially developed.

THE CHAIRMAN said that it was obvious that for the first two years an expenditure of £15,000 a year was probable, and that after this period we must contemplate an increased cost should it be impossible to resume the service along the Persian coast.

MR. GRIEVE said that on this basis no depreciation was allowed for during the first two years for the additional machines in use. He considered that the Air Ministry must take account of depreciation during this period as a normal business measure. Compensation might for accounting purposes be paid under another head of the subsidy agreement, but actual wear and tear would take place on the Persian Gulf route.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that it appeared that the estimated expenditure would be as follows:-

- (a) An initial capital cost of £17,000 - £20,000.
- (b) A recurring cash expenditure for the first two





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years of £15,000 - £17,000 per annum on operating charges.


- (c) An annual expenditure of about £30,000 per annum in later years, including allowance for depreciation of extra machines.

These figures were accepted by the Sub-Committee.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that he had recently had a conversation with Teymourache, the Persian Minister of Court, on this question. In his view we had no effective means of compelling the Persian Government to extend Imperial Airways present concession to fly over their territory, and to pursue negotiations in the absence of any alternative would be to invite a rebuff. He considered it probable that as soon as the Persians realised that we were independent of them, they would prove more accommodating. So long as we could not show clearly that we were prepared to adopt an alternative route, the Persians were in a strong position and could really blackmail us. He therefore felt strongly that it was essential to press on with the preparation of the alternative Arabian route.

It had been suggested that negotiations should be pursued in London. He regarded this suggestion as objectionable in principle. If we did not deal with the Persians through our Minister in Tehran, our Minister would lose all his authority.

He had informed Teymourache that if the Persian Government should refuse to allow this international air route to continue and not renew the present permission His Majesty's Government would have to consider "other measures". It was for consideration whether the time had not now come to be more precise and tell the Persians that we were definitely arranging to adopt the /





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
Arabian route on the expiration of the present concession if it were not renewed.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY asked whether the Persian Government had shewn any discrimination in favour of the French or Dutch air lines now operating along the route. He wished to know what would be the position as regards these lines if our permission were discontinued. Would they not make other arrangements to continue their services, to which it was known they attach considerable importance?

M^r. RENDEL explained that the French and Dutch concessions, although they had been renewed, were now due to expire simultaneously with ours at the end of March next. There was no definite information as to the intentions of the French and Dutch, but the Foreign Office considered it probable that if the South Persian route were closed to Imperial Airways, it would be equally closed to the French and Dutch, and that the French and Dutch would probably accept the situation.

THE CHAIRMAN then referred to the point raised in paragraph 3 of the Air Ministry's Memorandum to the effect that should the air service between Basra and Karachi be allowed to lapse, His Majesty's Government would incur a commitment of some £30,000 per annum for the next seven years, as compensation to Imperial Airways under the terms of the existing contract. Should this be correct, it would appear that the cost of continuing or suspending the service would be the same in either case.

SIR SIGMUND EMMREUTHER produced a copy of the contract for inspection.





23 94
SIR JOHN SIMON thought that it appeared evident from the Contract that the Government was liable for compensation for direct loss, but not for loss of profit.

SIR SIGMUND DANNREUTHER replied that only a small profit had hitherto been made by Imperial Airways.


MAJOR ELLIOT considered that it might be more economical to suspend the Basra-Karachi service temporarily and pay compensation rather than take a hasty decision involving undefined expenditure and liabilities on the hypothesis that no deal could be made with the Persians.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that it was obvious that the liability for compensation did exist and would have to be borne in mind.

SIR SIGMUND DANNREUTHER said that all the Air Ministry immediately required was authority to incur expenditure, if, and as soon as, the Political Resident can arrange satisfactory terms -

- (a) On preliminary survey by Imperial Airways, who have an officer ready to go out and make all preparations, and
- (b) On such items of capital expenditure as require a long time for execution, such as the rest house. This rest house would, in any event, be of use to the R.A.F. for purposes of the strategic air route.

MAJOR ELLIOT said that the fact that a survey was being made would be bound to come to the notice of the





Persians and might prove sufficient inducement for them to change their attitude. The Treasury would offer no objection to a detailed survey being undertaken at once. (94) (95)


SIR SIGMUND BAUMBUTLER pointed out that a general survey had already been made. What was actually contemplated was a more detailed survey and the drawing up of the plans necessary for the establishment of a civil air route.

In reply to a question from Sir John Simon, he stated that even if the Persians change their attitude and renew permission to fly, some arrangements on the Trucial coast were necessary for R.A.F. service machines using the strategic route. He wished for authority for the erection of a rest house to be given at once in order that Colonel Biscoe, Resident in the Persian Gulf, might be informed and negotiations, which were now in progress, completed.

SIR BOLTON BYRES-MONSELL considered that an armed guard would be necessary for the protection of a rest house as it was impossible to guarantee its safety from a naval vessel anchored off the shore. He pointed out that on the 25th July last, the Government of India had disclaimed responsibility for the protection of any shore establishment on the Arabian coast.

SIR JOHN SALMOND stated that the Resident in the Persian Gulf was now investigating the most suitable site and was negotiating with the Sheikhs concerned. He had not yet settled whether Ras al Khaimah or Dibai was the most suitable location.

MAJOR ELLIOT asked whether the Service Departments could guarantee the protection of a rest house, and, if





so, what expenditure would be incurred.

LORD HAILSHAM stated that the War Office could not entertain this question, which would involve the location of an isolated detachment at a place where its support in the event of trouble would be most difficult.


SIR BOLTON EYRES-MONSELL said that while the Admiralty would co-operate in any defence measures required, it was very difficult for ships to defend a shore establishment. The best solution, he considered, would be for Henjam to be adopted as an alternative rest stage, which, being an island, could easily be defended by the Navy.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that the Foreign Office had already ruled out this proposition on the grounds that a continuance of the existing air route would be more acceptable to Persian amour propre than the retention of Henjam.

MAJOR ELLIOT considered that it might be worth our while to pay a substantial rent for the permanent lease of Henjam.

MR. RENDEL explained that the Persian Government would object just as strongly to the establishment of an air stopping station at Henjam as to the continuance of the air route through South Persia. The whole difficulty had been caused by the Persian objections to our utilisation of the Persian coast of the Persian Gulf. This difficulty would not be met by any proposal to transfer to another point on Persian territory.

SIR JOHN SALMOND pointed out that the R.A.F. have used this route along the Arabian coast for some time and service aircraft have/





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
frequently halted at Has al Khaimah. Hitherto there has been no trouble nor any question thereof. He asked whether, in the event of the Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq being satisfied as to the security of the proposed rest house, the other Services would withdraw their objections.

LORD HAILSHAM agreed. He had voiced his objections in order that it might be recorded that the War Office could not accept responsibility.

SIR SIGMUND DANNEBREUTHER in reply to a question by Lord Hailsham, stated that as the rest houses and other ground equipment which had been established by Imperial Airways on Persian territory would necessarily be evacuated, the Government would have to assume liability for those required along the alternative route.

LORD HAILSHAM expressed the view that from a brief perusal of the Imperial Airways Contract it did not appear that the Government was responsible for such a charge under the "force majeure" clause.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that until further information becomes available it would be impossible to begin the erection of any rest house. The immediate despatch of an officer by Imperial Airways to make a complete and detailed survey met with the general agreement of the meeting, and the Foreign Secretary would then be in a position to inform the Persians that an alternative route was being prepared. On receipt of this Officer's report and further information from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, the question of erecting a rest house could be discussed by the departments concerned, and, should agreement be reached, measures should be put in hand for its immediate erection.






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SIR JOHN SIMON reverted to the question whether it would not now be desirable to tell the Persians plainly that His Majesty's Government were greatly disappointed at their attitude and had now definitely authorised the necessary steps for the establishment of an alternative route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf which would omit Persian territory altogether.

LORD HILSHAM considered that it would be preferable so far as possible to leave the Persians in doubt as to our precise intentions. This might make it more difficult for them to call our bluff, and would in any case be preferable in view of the uncertainties which still existed in regard to the Arabian route - e.g., the doubtful attitude of the Sheiks revealed in the latest telegrams from the Political Resident, defence difficulties expense, etc.

It was agreed that in these circumstances it would be better not to be too precise to the Persians at this stage regarding the actual measures which we were taking to establish the Arabian route.

In reply to a question MR. RENSEL explained that the position on the Arabian coast was somewhat peculiar as we had treaties with the various rulers concerned which gave us a definitely predominant position. We should be under no legal obligation to extend permission to the French and Dutch to use the Arabian route used by British aircraft though it might be desirable to do so on grounds of policy.






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SIR JOHN SIMON stated that a telegram dated December 15th had now been received from our Minister at Tehran (but not yet circulated to other Departments), showing that the position was a little more hopeful as the Persians now seemed prepared to deal with the question of the air route apart from the general negotiations and in return for some quid pro quo such as the re-opening of the Duzdap railway. He did not regard this development as justifying any relaxation in our efforts to establish an alternative route, since he felt that it was only by establishing such an alternative that we should be able to deal satisfactorily with the Persians. But at the same time he considered that no opening should be neglected to attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Persian Government should one be possible. He understood, however, that the question of the Duzdap Railway was one falling mainly within the sphere of the India Office.

MR. WAKELY said that the India Office and Government of India had already agreed to offer both the re-opening of the Railway, and if necessary its permanent transfer, to the Persians if we could thereby secure the continuance of the South Persian air route. There would therefore be no difficulty about renewing this offer. The India Office would however like to see drafts of any instructions sent to Mr. Hoare on the subject.

SIR JOHN SIMON then suggested that if any negotiations for a bargain over the continuance of the air route were to be entered into with the Persians, it should be made clear that the air route must remain open so long as the negotiations were in progress.






It was agreed that this point ought to be safeguarded.


SIR JOHN SIMON then suggested that Mr. Hoare should be instructed in reply to his telegram of December 15th to take up with the Persian Government the suggestion of linking up the Duzdap Railway with the continuance of the trans-Persian service "on the understanding that both sides will pursue both matters concurrently and actively and that the temporary extension of the concession should be agreed to in the meantime".

CONCLUSIONS.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE agreed -

- (a) To accept an estimate of probable expenditure involved in the establishment of an air route along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf as follows:-
 - (i) An initial capital cost of £17,000 - £20,000.
 - (ii) A recurring cash expenditure for the first two years of £15,000 - £17,000 per annum on operating charges.
 - (iii) In later years an annual expenditure of from £25,000 - £30,000 per annum, including allowance for extra obsolescence. (If the section Basra to Karachi is closed to Imperial Airways, the net compensation payable might amount to £30,000 per annum).
- (b) That the Air Ministry should be authorised to sanction the despatch by Imperial Airways of an officer to make a complete and detailed survey of a civil air route along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.
- (c) That as regards the proposal of the Air Ministry for the erection of a rest house etc. -
 - (i) Nothing should be done until further information is received from the Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.





(c) (11) on receipt of such information
the Air Ministry should consult the
Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the
Treasury and the India Office, and
when inter-departmental agreement
has been reached immediate measures
for the construction of a rest
house should be put in hand.





PROCEDURE.

THE CHAIRMAN then drew attention to a note on procedure that had been prepared by Mr. Parkinson, Chairman of the Official Sub-Committee, and circulated as M.S.(H) 12. The Official Sub-Committee has from time to time to deal with questions on which they are unanimously agreed, but which may involve a major issue which is of sufficient importance to go somewhat beyond the ordinary sphere of interdepartmental discussion. In such cases, even though the subject is of intrinsic importance, it might be thought a waste of time that Ministers should be summoned to a meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee to endorse, as a body, the course of action which is proposed by their representatives on the Official Sub-Committee, and which they have individually approved either before or after the meeting of the Official Sub-Committee. It was therefore suggested that in these cases the Chairman of the Official Sub-Committee should be authorised to take instructions from the Chairman of the Ministerial Sub-Committee, i.e. the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as to whether or not reference to the Ministerial Sub-Committee should be made.


CONCLUSION.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE agreed to the procedure suggested in M.S.(H) 12 to the effect that -

"In cases, where the Official Sub-Committee are unanimous, but which may involve major issues or implications of policy, the Chairman of the Official Sub-Committee should be authorised to take instructions from the Chairman of the Ministerial Sub-Committee (i.e., the Secretary of State for the Colonies) who will decide whether or not the matter is of sufficient importance to render a formal meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee necessary".

Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

17th December, 1931.





AIR MINISTRY,
GWYDYR HOUSE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

16th December, 1931.

Dear Clauson,


As promised, I send herewith an advance copy of our paper M.E.(M) 11 for the meeting of the Middle East Ministerial Committee tomorrow.

The view of my Secretary of State is that in its political aspects the whole question has already been settled, and it is, therefore, only a question of the financial points raised by Capt. Walter Elliot's Memorandum M.E.(M) 10.

Yours sincerely,

L.G.S. Reynolds

M.J. Clauson, Esq.,
INDIA OFFICE,
S.W.1.



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Rephotographed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, December, 1931.

SECRET.
M.E.(M) 11.

Copy No. 11/55


STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air.

1. Since the last meeting of the Sub-Committee at which the question of the Eastern Air Route was discussed, a memorandum (M.E.(M)10) by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, dated 10th December, has been circulated. This memorandum is necessarily a bare outline and may, I fear, unintentionally have a somewhat misleading effect, unless it is supplemented by some further observations which I will endeavour to make as short as the somewhat complex issues permit.
2. Firstly, I think too gloomy a picture is painted of the probable expense. The figures quoted, based on a request by the Treasury for outside maximum figures, are in the opinion of my advisers and of the Managing Director of Imperial Airways, not likely to be reached. On the capital side the probable maximum cost may be put at £17,000, or at £12,000 if the main item, a rest-house, is, as has been suggested by the Political Resident, built by a local Sheikh and leased to Imperial Airways. Here I should like to interpolate, in the light of further investigations, a definite recommendation that the Resident should be instructed to negotiate on a basis of a rest-house rather than a rest-vessel. Evidence is accumulating that a rest-house would be more convenient and safer, whilst it would undoubtedly be cheaper. As to recurrent costs (apart from any subsidy to the Sheikh - for the payment of which approval has already been given in principle), these will probably not exceed £15,000. The question of extra obsolescence on the two additional machines involved in a mixed land-plane and flying-boat route (perhaps £12,000 per annum) does not arise for at least two years, and only then if, when the boats it is intended to divert to this service become obsolete, a land-plane service is still impossible.
3. Furthermore, my colleagues should be made aware of an important point that is not referred to in the Financial Secretary's memorandum. If Imperial Airways are not allowed to fly over the Basra-Karachi section of the Indian Route, the 'force majeure' clause of their Agreement, which runs to 1939, will come into operation and entitle the Company to compensation for all direct loss (excluding loss of profit) sustained by them. Judging by past experience when an earlier service terminated at Basra, there would be practically no mail and no passengers for India by the Air Service, and the compensation payable to Imperial Airways during the period of interruption of flying between Basra and Karachi might, it is estimated, involve a net charge on the Exchequer of £30,000 per annum, or possibly more, after allowing for the non-payment of the subsidy (£38,500 per annum) allocated to that section of the India Route.
4. The use of a sea link between Basra and Karachi is, therefore, I suggest financially impracticable. I need hardly emphasise how damaging a blow would be struck at British prestige in the Middle East, if we were forced to resort to sea carriage in the Gulf by Persian intransigence coupled with fears as to the attitude of an isolated petty sheikh on the Arabian coast. Local native opinion would be under no illusion as to the motive causes underlying our abandonment of the use of aircraft on this section. I would again, in this connection, remind my colleagues that this is the key trunk air route of the Empire, which will sooner

* The Resident has reported that the attitude of the Sheikh of Dibal (a possible but not altogether satisfactory) alternative is "very friendly and helpful".





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later carry the Australian as well as the Indian air mail. I may add that already no less than $4\frac{1}{2}$ million letters are being conveyed annually by the existing Indian service.


5. Naturally I should be delighted if it were possible to induce Persia to extend the permit to use the Persian coast route, but the Foreign Office have repeatedly advised that this is not practical politics, and accordingly urged upon us transference to the Arabian coast. I must, moreover, enter a caveat against the suggestion that the inducement might take the form of a "substantial" rent, if by that is meant a payment out of all proportion to the charges normally ruling in the case of Powers who are members of the I.C.A.N., and therefore partaking of the nature of blackmail. The facts would soon be known, and other Powers - petty or great - might seek similarly to blackmail us; and, apart from grave reactions on our prestige, the future for international civil aviation would be black indeed. Our prime object, viz. to work towards the establishment of civil air transport on a commercial basis, would be frustrated; and the Exchequer would in all probability be faced before long with a far heavier expenditure than anything involved in the Arabian Coast route.


6. Finally I would recall to my colleagues the strategic importance of an air route following the Arabian coast, a route already in existence in embryo and one that must be developed and maintained even if the Civil air route remains on, or reverts to, the Persian coast. It follows, therefore, that any expenditure on the Arabian route, even if Persia were ultimately to acquiesce in the continuation of the use of the Persian coast route by Imperial Airways, will not be wasted, or of a nugatory nature - quite the reverse. For instance, a rest-house at Ras-al-Khaimah, or in the vicinity, is clearly a future, if not an immediate, requirement of the Royal Air Force. In this connection I may point out that, even if some other arrangement were made with Persia and, as has been suggested, Henjam became available, that might possibly serve Imperial Airways' immediate purpose well enough, though the financial saving as compared with using the Arabian Coast would be of the smallest, since the greater cost of having to use flying-boats for part of the route instead of using land-planes throughout between Egypt or Palestine and India would remain. The strategic route, however, must be one that is organised for use by land-planes as well as seaplanes and in order to avoid infringing Persian neutrality, can therefore only follow the Arabian Coast.


7. Discussion on this matter has been so protracted and action so long delayed that I cannot but concur in the Financial Secretary's view that no substitute route can be adequately planned so as to be in final readiness by 1st April, 1932; but even if Persia remains intransigent and insists on the abandonment of the Persian coast route, I do not think it unreasonable to expect that, if we are already at work organising the Arabian route, Persia may be prepared to allow us (say) 6 months' grace in which to complete our preparations. Even so, it will be necessary to proceed with the utmost expedition, and in my view the Air Ministry should be authorised to incur expenditure, if and as soon as the Political Resident can arrange satisfactory terms with the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah or some other sheikh (a) on preliminary survey (e.g. by Imperial Airways, who have an officer ready to go out and make all necessary preparations), and (b) on such items of capital expenditure as require a long time for execution, e.g. the rest-house, the cost of which is difficult to estimate, but should certainly not exceed £5,000 or £6,000, and a marine base at Karachi. I would again emphasise that whatever happens, this expenditure will not be nugatory, but will be of direct utility to the military route which the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet have accepted as a vital strategic necessity.

(Intd.) L.

r Ministry,
ember 16th, 1931.










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The Departments concerned are (I suppose) the Treasury and the Air Ministry; the estimates quoted would be presumably for compensation and additional subsidy to Imperial Airways etc. The India Office naturally has not been brought into these discussions. The matter was referred to by Lord Londonderry at the Ministerial Committee's meeting of 17th November.

It is understood that a further meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee is being held at 11.30 to-morrow the 17th December to consider Major Elliot's memorandum and a reply which is being prepared by the Air Ministry.

The position in regard to the selection of a station for a night-stop on the Arab coast is as follows:-

The Secretary of State's telegram of 28 November authorised Colonel Biscoe to open negotiations with the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain (these being the two places thought to be suitable from a flying point of view). A further telegram of 3rd December authorised him to include the Sheikh of Debai in his negotiations if the creek at that place was found suitable. Colonel Biscoe's telegrams of 6th and 7th December reported that after an exhaustive examination the/







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
the Air Officer Commanding considered Debai feasible, Ras-al-Khaimah a good deal better and Umm-al-Qaiwain definitely unsuitable from a flying point of view; Colonel Biscoe had sounded Ras-al-Khaimah who had asked for two days to discuss the matter with his relatives, and Debai, with whom he thought there should be no great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory agreement. Colonel Biscoe thought that we should concentrate on obtaining an agreement at Ras-al-Khaimah if possible, and, if the Sheikh of that place proved entirely unyielding, fall back on Debai. The latest telegram of 12th December ^(copy attached) reports that the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah refuses to accept any responsibility (though he says that if Government like to establish a station neither he nor his people would interfere). Colonel Biscoe will return to the Trucial coast at the end of this week and meanwhile has left the Residency Agent to continue conversations with Ras-al-Khaimah; there is just a chance that the latter's people may bring pressure to bear on the Sheikh to consent to an agreement.

Unless the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah enters into an agreement by which he assumes responsibility
the/





the risk of establishing a station at that place will clearly be very great unless we take steps for its permanent protection, which would naturally be more expensive than a subsidy to the Sheikh. It thus at present seems likely that the choice will lie between what is the best place from a flying point of view but far inferior in respect of safety and economy, and the second best from a flying point of view but without these disadvantages.





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
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Memorandum by Major W. E. Elliot, M.C., M.P., Financial Secretary
to the Treasury.

1. The question of the Persian Gulf section of the Eastern air route which was considered by the Committee at its meeting on Tuesday the 17th November, 1931, has been further considered by the Departments concerned in conjunction with the Managing Director of Imperial Airways.
2. The cost of transfer to a flying boat service, which will use the Arabian Side of the Gulf, will be very much greater than was at first indicated. The new estimate provides for approximately £20,000 capital outlay plus recurrent expenditure of £30,000 a year. It further appears that there are several elements in the estimate figures which cannot yet be taken as final.
3. Considerable uncertainty still exists as to what Stations on the Arabian Coast should be used.
4. The question of using a sea link has been further explored and it seems that there is not sufficient advantage in diverting the fast mail steamer to Bahrein and Gwadar to counterbalance the expense involved and that if a sea link is to be used at all it will have to be for the full distance, Basra to Karachi.








5. As I understand it, the Foreign Office view is that the Persians will prove obstinate over the use of the South Persian Coast unless faced with the fact that a substitute route can be made available. It seems to me, however, difficult to believe that this substitute route can be adequately and economically planned so as to be in readiness by the 1st April 1932.
6. I fear, therefore, that we must face the possibility of using temporarily the sea-link Basra-Karachi as from that date. In the meantime the substitute route would have to be carefully planned with due regard to considerations of time-table economy and defence. It might well be that it would prove cheaper to pay to the Persian Government a substantial rent rather than to become involved in an expensive and risky substitute on the Arabian coast, which might well imperil the whole credit of our Eastern air services.
7. The Treasury would not be justified in sanctioning immediate commitments on the strength of the Estimates now submitted.


(Intld.) W.E.


Treasury Chambers,
December 10th, 1931.




















Air mail
Confidential.

No. 775-B of 1931.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Bushire, the 20th November 1931.


From - The Hon'ble Lt. Colonel H.V. Biscoe, I.A.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To - The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
New Delhi.

Sir,

I have the honour to invite attention to the correspondence ending with telegram No. 3329 of 14th November 1931 from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, regarding the Arab air route.

2. In their telegram No. 2583-S of 24th October 1931, the Government of India stated that if trouble was to be avoided later on endeavour should be made in each case to secure something definite and tangible and not mere good-will as quid pro quo.

3. I should like to explain that it was not my intention to offer the Shaikh concerned a large sum of money simply for his good-will or tolerance towards the establishment of a refuelling base in his territory. The establishment of any such base will impose a very definite and heavy responsibility upon the Shaikh concerned, for he will have to undertake liability for the protection of the yacht or barge that Imperial Airways may locate on his lagoon ...






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lagoon and the Imperial Airways' staff who may be permanently stationed in it and of passengers who may spend the night there. This responsibility will certainly be no light one. The Trucial coast is an exceedingly primitive and wild part of the world, and the Shaikhs themselves are small men and are not supported by tribesmen who give them unswerving loyalty and obedience. The Beduoin in the interior levy constant blackmail upon them and they are compelled either to buy them off or to resist them by force, and few things would be easier than for these gentry, or indeed any one who wishes to get the Shaikh into trouble, to fire shots at the Imperial Airways' craft. It will be necessary therefore for whichever Shaikh undertakes this responsibility to maintain a substantial number of well armed guards to prevent incidents of this kind occurring, and in addition he can fairly ask that some rent should be paid for his lagoon, etc., and that he should receive something for the responsibility which he undertakes.

4. When I was in London I suggested the possibility of establishing a base at Khassab, but it was negatived by the Air Ministry on the ground that downward currents had been experienced and the landing was frequently difficult. On my way through Basrah, however, I discussed the matter with Group Captain Welsh who has flown down that coast several times, and he did not altogether share these views, and considered that, having regard to the enormous advantages of Khassab from the political point of view, which I pointed out to him, it would be well worth while carrying out a further exploration of this bay. The advantages of Khassab, from the point of view of security
over






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over any place on the Trucial coast, are of course very great. Firstly it belongs to the Muscat State and the State would readily accord any facilities that might be required. Eighteen months ago His Majesty's Government took drastic steps to re-establish the authority of the State at Khassab, and the situation there is now quite. It would probably be necessary to post a guard of Muscat levies there and the Muscat State would be entitled to ask for a small subsidy to cover the expenditure of this guard, but the expenditure would probably be less than it would be necessary to offer to one of the Trucial Sheikhs, and the degree of security obtained would be infinitely greater.

5. Before therefore approaching any of the Trucial Sheikhs I intend to proceed to Khassab. Air Vice Marshal Ludlow-Newitt, Air Officer Commanding in 'Iraq, is accompanying me on tour and a flying boat will also be present, and I consider that we should first of all carry out a thorough examination of the possibilities of Khassab, and it seems to me probable that if the Air Officer Commanding and Group Captain Welsh are of opinion that a suitable refuelling base can be located at Khassab, the Air Ministry will probably accept their views as conclusive, and Imperial Airways will probably agree to the establishment of a base there instead of on the Trucial coast. In that event I will at once telegraph their views to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Government, and in the event of the latter accepting them it will be unnecessary to approach any of the Trucial Sheikhs. From Khassab I propose to go to Abu Dhabi and then ...






-4-

then spend three or four days visiting the Shaikhs along the coast before arriving at Umm-al-Qawain. This will give time for a reply to be received from His Majesty's Government should a suitable base be discovered at Khassab.

6. If, however, Khassab definitely proves unsuitable, then I propose in the first instance to approach the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qawain in preference to Ras-al-Khaimah. I was informed by the Manager of the Eastern Section of Imperial Airways, whom I met at Tiberius and who has surveyed the Arab coast some months ago, that he considered the lagoon at Umm-al-Qawain much preferable from their point of view than that at Ras-al-Khaimah. Further the Shaikh of Ras-al-Khaimah has proved exceedingly intractable and difficult to deal with in the past, and the Senior Naval Officer informs me that, though ships have visited Ras-al-Khaimah occasionally, no real progress has been made in inducing him to adopt a more friendly attitude. The only slight advance made has been when the Royal Air Force recently took a doctor down to Ras-al-Khaimah and some of the Shaikh's more cantankerous relatives hastened to avail themselves of his services. This however does not really mean very much. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qawain is a stout and somewhat lethargic individual who should be easier to deal with. When Royal Air Force flying boats recently visited Umm-al-Qawain, he expressed his regret that they came to see him so seldom. Only therefore if I cannot obtain a concession from Umm-al-Qawain do I propose to approach the Shaikh of Ras-al-Khaimah.

7. ...






-5-

7. In this connection and with reference to despatch No.423 of 10th August from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Tehran, to the Foreign Office, I may mention that the French Consul at Bushire recently came to see me to enquire whether I could give him any information regarding the extension of the Imperial Airways concession. I professed ignorance and contented myself by saying that to the best of my belief the matter was still under discussion at Tehran. M. Cassin then went on to ask me whether, if the French concession was extended, we should claim similar rights. I countered by asking him how he would regard the action of the Persian Government if they accorded permission to French and Dutch companies but refused ^{it} to a British company; he said that it would certainly seem to him somewhat unfriendly. I replied that, speaking purely personally, it struck me in the same light. I merely mention this because M.Cassin has just come from Tehran and had probably discussed the matter with M. Maugras, the French Minister there, and it would seem to indicate that the French consider that one of the chief obstacles to the extension of their concession is the reluctance of the Persian Government to allow a British Air company to operate along the Persian coast, and that if this obstacle can be overcome there is a reasonable prospect of the French and Dutch companies obtaining an extension of their concession.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

sd/- H.V.Biscoe,
Lt. Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.

12th December, 1931.


Dear Walton,


Our conversation of a few minutes ago
about the Persian Gulf air route. I enclose
a copy of a personal telegram from Air Vice-Marshal
Ludlow-Hewitt to the Chief of the Air Staff.


Yours sincerely,


Arthur

J.C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
S.W. 1.











Telephone message from Air Vice-Marshal Burnett
11th December.


Air Ministry have a telegram from the Air Officer Commanding that Colonel Biscoe has telegraphed to the Government of India that house is best at Ras-al-Khaimah but rest vessel at Debai, and that Colonel Biscoe is due back on Trucial coast on 17th December.

Air Vice-Marshal Burnett suggests a telegram to Colonel Biscoe that Air Ministry now say that, from point of view of defence, convenience, etc. they would prefer if possible to obtain a rest house rather than a rest vessel and hope that he will aim at the former. Air Ministry will draft such a telegram and try to obtain concurrence of other Departments concerned without a Ministerial meeting.





122
123
Pl. send copy of
S. 1/12 - 7 25 / July 21
S. 1/12 - - 14 / Nov - (Reg A)
S. 1/12 - - 8 Dec (P2 7602)
✓ AM ✓
DMI ✓
R. 1/12 ✓
F. 1/12 ✓
CO ✓
Treasury ✓
11.12.31
S. 1/12
10.12.





7th letter about the
use of Indian forces
might be 90.6 the
air ministry & any one
else concerned

Register No.
P.2.
7611
31.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from *S.S.S.* Dated 19
Telegram *9/12* Rec.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			
Under Secretary.....	9.12.	<i>guy</i>	Arab air route
Secretary of State...	9	<i>guy</i>	
Committee.....			(1) Progress of negotiations
Under Secretary.....			(2) S.S.I. is moving in to employment of troops
Secretary of State...			from India for protection

Copy of _____ to _____

And *8/12*
9/12


FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Draft letter to S.S.I. + Col. Biscoe informing that
if a rest-house on shore is decided on there would be no
objection to its being built by the Arabs & rented by us.

9th Dec 1931. Felt to Genl. of India no 3574
Replied to Col Biscoe no 3575.

Previous Papers :—

4407a 750 3.30





Minute Paper.

Department.

Colonel Biscoe's negotiations seem to be making good progress up to date. He has sounded Ras-al-Khaimah (who asked for 2 days to discuss the matter with his relations) and Dibai (who was friendly and helpful) and is now going back to Ras-al Khaimah. Umm al Qawain is technically unsuitable, Dibai feasible, but Ras-al Khaimah better from the technical point of view.


As regards the rest house on shore, if this is decided on, the Air Ministry agree that there would be no objection to the course suggested at the end of the telegram of 7th December.

The Government of India's telegram at P.Z.7602/31 is in reply to the Secretary of State's telegram at P.Z.7017/51 (flagged A). In their opinion there would be a danger of unfavourable reactions in India (they said "among Indian Moslems" before) if troops from the Indian Army were employed to protect the establishment on the Trucial Coast, and also (though possibly less so) even if European troops from the army in India were so employed. But the Government of India do not directly answer the Secretary of State's particular enquiry whether there would be this danger even if such European troops were temporarily borrowed to cope with a sudden emergency; one might certainly assume that they mean the answer to be "Yes", were it not that their reference to "garrison" in the last sentence of the telegram seems to be beside the particular point that was put to them.

No doubt it is
all a question
of degree, &
they would hold
the army employ-
ment of troops
from India is open
to some measure of
objection. *Wm*

*justified
... 9.12.31*

2340 2000 5/31





(125)
(126)

PZ. 7611/31

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Report to P.R.
X Chakla
Hengam Radio

Cypher xxx


3574 Addressed to S. A. Repeated to Political
President in Persia Sub No 3575
Yours telegram of Dec No 2974-5


Air route. If house on shore is
~~decided~~ decided on presumption in
last sentence of Bisco's letter of 7 Dec?
is made


SEEN BY	DATE	TIME
REGD. IN TEL. BOH.	9/12/31	6:10 (M)
CODE, X or XX	xxx	
DESPATCHED	9/12/31	M
NO. OF WORDS	26	128
SENDER'S INITIALS	DM	


Com & AM ✓
DM ✓
Athen ✓
Co ✓
E.O. ✓
Hengam ✓


4404 1000 3,30


























INDIA OFFICE,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

4th December, 1931.

7486/1931.

~~URGENT~~.

Dear Sirs

We telegraphed to Biscoe as arranged in regard to Debai.
The Admiralty agreed.

Meanwhile we ~~have~~ had the enclosed telegram from the
Government of India suggesting that Khassab should be examined.
dated 3rd December No.2935-S.) Their reference to Biscoe's


arguments are I think an allusion to an old suggestion made
by Biscoe last July that Khassab should be considered as an
alternative to Ras-al-Khaimah. This suggestion was put in
a letter from Laithwaite to Bertram of 14th July (No.P.Z.4469/
31) copy of which was sent to the Government of India.

Bertram replied on 16th July, after consultation with Air
Vice-Marshal Burnett, that Khassab would not be suitable, and
sent extracts from a report by Squadron Leader Keith dated
January 28th. The Government of India were informed
accordingly by telegram of 18th July. There was a further
letter from Bertram of 20th July replying to a further

Group Captain R.E.C.Pearse, D.S.O., A.F.C.

enquiry

AIR MINISTRY, W.C.1.






enquiry as to whether Khassab would be suitable in any circumstances.

Since I began writing this letter we have had Biscoe's telegram of 4th December, of which copy is enclosed. This makes it unnecessary to reply to the Government of India's telegram.

I am sending copy of this to Bertram.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) J. & WALTON





P.Z. 7486/31.

Whitehall, S.W.1.

4th December 1931.

Dear Bertram

I enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India and of a letter which I have sent to Peirse. You will remember the correspondence referred to ending with your letter

Dated 3rd December No. 2935-3

of 20th July in reply to Laithwaite's of 18th July


(P.Z. 4549/31).


Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) J. G. WALTON

F. G. L. Bertram Esq., C.B.E.

AIR MINISTRY.





FILE COPY

P.Z.
7506

1931

134 133
SECRET

LJC/DH. (25 groups)

6705.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM

From Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for India.
(COPIES CIRCULATED)


Dated Chakla, Honjam Radio, 4th December, 1931.

Received 12.30 p.m., 4th December, 1931.

XXX

Your telegram 2935-S, 3rd December. Khassab has been examined by flying-boat and has been found to be unsuitable technically.

Addressed to Foreign and repeated to Secretary of State for India.





P.Z. 4637/31. (135) (134)

AIR MINISTRY,
Gwydyr House,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

20th July, 1931.

Dear Laithwaite,


With reference to your letter of the 18th instant, P.Z.4549/31, I think we can definitely say that Khassab would be unsuitable in any circumstances as a landing place for flying boats on the Arabian coast. If no other possible place could be found, we should then have to consider whether it was so unsuitable that it could not be used for the purpose. With the information at present that we have, our answer would be in the affirmative.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Rendel.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) F.G.L.BERTRAM.

J.G.Laithwaite, Esq.,
India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.





P.Z.4549/31.

India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
18th July 1931.

Dear Bertram,


Many thanks for your letter of 16th July about Khassab. We note what you say, and it seems clear from Squadron Leader Keith's report that the lagoons on the Trucial Coast are probably preferable as bases for flying boats to Khassab. We are not, however, quite clear from your letter whether, in the opinion of the Air Ministry, Khassab would be unsuitable in any circumstances, and as the point may be of some importance in connection with the forthcoming discussion on the question of the air route generally, we should much appreciate an expression of your opinion on this point.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Rendel.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) J.G.Laithwaite.

F.G.L.Bertram Esq., CB., CBE.,
Gwydyr House,
S.W.1.





4549/31.

(B) 136
137
AIR MINISTRY,
Gwydyr House,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

16th July, 1931.

Immediate.

Dear Laithwaite,


With reference to your letter of the 14th instant P.Z.4469/1931 containing a suggestion made by Colonel Biscoe that Khassab might be a suitable alternative to Ras-al-Khaimah, I have consulted Air Vice Marshal Burnett, D.C.A.S. and he says that Khassab would really not be suitable. As you know he has a personal acquaintance with the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf as he has himself flown along it several times and he is certain that from a practical point of view either Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Kuanwain are the best places for flying boats.

He sent me extracts from Squadron Leader Keith's report of January 1928. I send you a copy of these extracts which deal with the three places. I am sending a copy of this letter to Rendel of the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) F.C.L. BERTRAM.

J.C. Laithwaite, Esq.,
India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.





(127)
(138)

Extracts from S/Ldr Keith's Report of
January, 1928.

Khassab.

Suitability for Aircraft

Behind the date gardens of Khassab village is a level stretch of pebbles of varying size, amongst which a certain amount of aluvium has washed down. The approach of three sides is distinctly bad, but high powered aircraft of the single seater fighter type might be worked from this ground in case of extreme urgency. Not fit for civil aircraft of any description.


Climate.

.In summer the inhabitants of most of the villages at sea level find conditions unsupportable and have to live on the high ground above their villages. The main exception to this is the village of Khassab, where the inhabitants reside throughout the year. Conditions improve with height, which probably indicates a falling off of the humidity. White personnel cannot live at surface level during summer, and it is probable that even living on the high ground with every possible modern comfort, Europeans would require frequent relief periods.

Flying Conditions.

Violent distortions of the normal air flow of wind occur due to the presence of mountains, to excessive evaporations from the sea and to heat reflections from areas of barren rock. The resulting 'bumps' render flying at low altitudes anywhere except over the central portion of the larger bays extremely hazardous. Lieut. Villiers F.A.A. flying a 'flycatcher' from H.M.S. Enterprise reports that when flying behind Khassab at 2,000 feet at full throttle, he unavoidably lost 1,000 feet in five seconds. Under cliffs and at the foot of ravines winds have a considerable downward component, which would be extremely dangerous to aircraft attempting to take off or alight.

Alighting





(138)
(139)
Alighting & Taking Off Area.


From a consideration of the general conditions already set out (sheer cliff sides and flying conditions) it follows that though the small well sheltered bays offer calm waters for alighting they may be dangerous for use by aircraft. This rules out of consideration both Malcolm and Elphinstone inlets, which are further rendered unsuitable by unsupportable summer conditions.


Umm-al-Kuwayn.

The lagoon here - see attached rough survey - is excellently sheltered and of sufficient size for use by aircraft. The entrance is comparatively deep and the approaches low.

Ras-al-Khaimah.

The lagoon is ideal for use by seaplanes. See attached rough plan. It is excellently sheltered from the sea, and of ample size. The approaches are low on all sides. A convenient site for any necessary buildings would be near the Residency Agent's summer residence, i.e. on the east side of the lagoon. Here the shore shelves conveniently steeply, and boats can come alongside at all states of the tide. The spring rise is about 7 feet. The entrance from the lagoon from the sea is long and narrow and rather shallow. The sea anchorage is open and anchors are liable to draw in strong winds. The mountains here are some distance inland. Local water is contaminated with magnesium salts but said not to be unhealthy. This lagoon offers possibilities of an excellent seaplane harbour for alighting, taking off and mooring out. The climate is trying, but less so than the more northerly parts of 'Oman.





P.Z.4469/31.

IMMEDIATE.

India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

14th July 1931.


Dear Bertram,

With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday, I write to say that Colonel Biscoe, to whom we sent a note of the proceedings at the conference on 8th July about the Persian air route, writes privately to suggest consideration of Khassab as an alternative to Ras al Khaima. You will remember that Rendel referred to the possibility of using Khassab in the course of the discussion, but that I was then inclined to think that, climatic conditions apart, difficulties would be likely to arise owing to the slender degree of authority exercised in that region by the Sultan of Muscat.

The Resident says: "Admittedly it is not as satisfactory as a creek that is entirely landlocked and calm in any weather. On the other hand, it is definitely a very sheltered bay, and there is not only the actual bay of Khassab itself but a couple of little bays on the west. It is open to the north, but I doubt if you would ever get much of a sea inside. I see Woods Humphrey spoke of the possibility of a refuelling point off Ras-al-Khaimah. Khassab would be infinitely more protected than this, and as a matter of fact . . . with a north-westerly gale blowing a flying boat could not land off Ras-al-Khaimah, but would be quite protected off Khassab. There would be no political objections, since Khassab belongs to Muscat, and all that would be necessary would be to have a . . . detachment of the Muscat Levy Corps for whom H.M.G. or Airways might reasonably pay. I suggest that you should sound the Air Ministry about this and anyway before the matter goes to the Cabinet put it up as an alternative that should be explored

F.G.L. Bertram Esq., CB., CBE.
AIR MINISTRY.

further






(140)
(141)
further and adopted if possible, in view of the very serious objections to the Trucial Coast."



We are telegraphing to the Government of India on the question generally, with a view to clearing the ground before consideration by the Cabinet. We are telling them that Biscoe has suggested consideration of Khassab, that this is being examined, and that we will let them know the result as soon as possible. Would you be so kind as to let me know as soon as you conveniently can what the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways would think out it? The political complications involved in the use of the Trucial Coast are so substantial that we think this alternative is one which should be very seriously considered. The expense involved is not likely to be greater than would probably be necessary on the Trucial Coast; the political situation would be definitely much easier since protection could be afforded by Muscat levies, and it would not be necessary to despatch British or Indian troops, while if it was necessary to make a display of naval or other force, the difficulties of doing so would be less since we should be acting with the approval and on the behalf of the legitimate sovereign. Finally we should have the great advantage of having our refuelling point or resthouse on the territory of a friendly ruler who has in the past been extremely anxious to co-operate with us in matters such as this.



I am sending a copy of this letter to Rendel.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) J.G.Laithwaite.









142
143

Register No.
 P2.
 7486
 31

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from
 Telegram

Dated
 Rec.

19

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			
Under Secretary	3. 12.	<i>my</i>	Arab air route
Secretary of State...	2	<i>W</i>	
Committee.....			Proposal to include Dubai in the
Under Secretary.....			negotiations.
Secretary of State...			

And
 Set
 3/12

Copy of _____ to _____



FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

 Draft letter to S. G. V., regarding to Col. Biscoe, approval.

3. 12. 55.
 Ref. to Govt of India No 3514
 Ref. to Col. Biscoe No 3515

Previous Papers :—

4407A 750 3.30





Minute Paper.



Department.


(143) (144)

Please see Col. Biscoe's letter of 1 Dec? & the P.O. letter
to the Admiralty of 2 Dec? & the P.O. letter from the A.H. of
that date. In my conversation with Group Captain Preece I
suggested that we might reply to Col. Biscoe on the basis of the
draft now submitted & be answered. The Admiralty
telephoned ^{to day} that they see no objection & in fact think it
an excellent idea so far as they are concerned; they
suggested that it was perhaps a question whether the terms of
negotiations with this Sheikh is not one for the Ministerial del. etc.
but they do not press this suggestion as they regard it as
a matter for us. I explained that there was not time
to refer this preliminary question of including the Sheikh of Dubai in
the negotiations to the Ctee, & they said they were quite content
that we should telegraph as proposed. The question whether
Dubai should be finally selected as the site is of course another
matter which would have to be submitted to the Ctee with
other questions such as the terms of any agreement.

Justation

3.12.31





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Cypher xxx

Sent 3.12.

Copy to FO
DMI
AM
ADM?

5/12/31.

C.O. } with copy to
Fleming } Col. Biscoe's letter
of 10th.

Ann 2/3

SEEN BY	DATE	TIME
RECD. IN TEL. RM	3/12	4.40 PM
CODE, X or XX	XXX	
DISPATCHED	3/12	6.20 PM
NO. OF WORDS	745	76 Signs
SENDER'S INITIALS		


PZ 7486
31.


C. Immediate


No 3574


3574. Addressed to S. 7. 1. 7. Replied -
Political Resident Chakla Hanyam Radio
+ 49/10/31. 3 Dec No 2735-5
Biscoe's letter 1 Dec. No 807 (Air route)

If Dubai creek is found suitable
Biscoe may include Sheikhs of Dubai
in his negotiations & His endeavour
should be to ascertain at which of the
three places concerned there is in all the
circumstances the best prospect of obtaining
a really satisfactory agreement of the kind
indicated in paragraph 3 of my telegram
of 28 Nov. 1930. He should
ask before committing himself to any of the
three Sheikhs report by telegraph










Phillips
admitted
Question whether
(146)
(147)
Dibari said he understood
is one for me! Ctn. but so
far as off and 7 are
consequently object to proposal
we best have 7 waiting
by in fact they think
it an excellent idea
3/12
I telephoned later to Capt.
Phillips - see my note above
Dib
2.12





AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.

2nd December, 1931.


Dear Walton,

Reference our conversation on the telephone about the cipher telegram from Biscoe which you sent over. We have had a similar enquiry from A.O.C., Iraq, and our reply to him is to the effect that neither we nor Civil Aviation^x have objections to Debai provided that, in his opinion, it is operationally suitable, bearing in mind the type of boats Imperial Airways will be using, and also if, in his and Biscoe's opinions, ^{the} other facilities required could be afforded and ~~that~~ the security offered is at least equal to that likely at Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain. We are also drawing A.O.C.'s attention to the earlier experiences of H.M. forces at Debai, notably the ~~success~~ ^{ambush} of a party of British seamen before the war and the more recent truculent and unfriendly attitude adopted by the Sheikh to our aircraft on visits in March 1930 and again in January 1931.

Yours sincerely,

R. E. C. Daise

J.C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
S.W. 1.





(148)
(149)
INDIA OFFICE,


WHITEHALL, S.W. 1.

2nd December, 1931.

I enclose copy of a telegram received to-day from Biscoe. We understand from the Air Ministry that they and Imperial Airways see no objection to Biscoe negotiating with the Sheikh of Debai as well as with the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qawain, provided that the Air Officer Commanding is satisfied that the facilities for operating aircraft and for defence, etc., are no worse at Debai than at the other places.

I hope you will agree that there is no objection to Biscoe including Debai in the scope of his negotiations. Indeed, there is probably one important reason why Debai would be preferable to either Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qawain, viz., that the Sheikh of Debai is the most influential and intelligent, ^{in the Gulf} as Biscoe says, and has been helpful in the past. You may remember/

Captain J.H.D. Cunningham, M.V.O., R.N.
ADMIRALTY,
S.W. 1.






149
150

remember that in a letter from the Political Resident of 31st July last (copy of which was sent to the Admiralty with an India Office letter of 8th September, No. P.Z. 5710/31) it was stated that the Sheikh of Debai "has served British interests well on the Trucial Coast, and at times has been of great assistance to us", and he was referred to as "a friendly Sheikh - something of a phenomenon on the Trucial Coast". The incident of an affront offered to some men of the British India Steam Navigation Company's Agent to which the letter referred was satisfactorily settled owing to the good offices of the Sheikh. He was also of some assistance to us last year at Ras-al-Khaimah. It is quite probable, therefore, that we should be on firmer ground if we had an agreement with the Sheikh of Debai than we should be at either of the other places.

What we would propose to do is to telegraph to Biscoe informing him that, if Debai creek is found suitable, he may include the Sheikh of that place in his negotiations, and that his endeavour should be to


ascertain/






ascertain at which of the three places concerned there
is the best prospect of obtaining a really
satisfactory agreement, and that he should then report,
of course without committing himself to any of ^{the Arab Sheikhs} them.
I think this rather falls in with the Admiralty view,
which has always been that other alternatives besides
Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qawain ought to be explored.

(Sgd.) J.C. Walton.





FHM/FRB/MM

(121 groups)

SECRET

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

(COPIES
CIRCULATED)

From Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire, to Secretary of State
for India repeating telegram
addressed to Government of
India.

XXX

Dated Chakla, Henjam Radio, 1st December,
1931.

Received 8.45 a.m. 2nd December, 1931.

IMMEDIATE.

Addressed to Foreign and repeated to
Secretary of State for India 80 T.


With reference to correspondence ending with
Government of India's telegram dated 29th November, 1907.
I have discussed the question of the air route with the
Air officer Commanding. We are examining Dibai creek
tomorrow and he considers there is likelihood that it will
be found suitable. If so, would Imperial Airways agree
to go there, and may I negotiate with Sheikh for facilities
there? Advantages are


(1) mail steamers call there fortnightly, which
would facilitate supplies, despatch of spares, etc;


(2) it is relatively large trading centre with
settled population, and greater measure of security would
be obtained;

(3) Sheikh is the most influential and
intelligent on the coast, and has been helpful in the past.
Disadvantage would be that it is 50 miles further from
Gwadar. Air Officer Commanding has signalled the Air
Ministry in the same sense. I should be grateful for very
early reply.

2 DEC 1931









(153)
(154)

Register No.
7407
1931

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from _____ Dated _____ 19 ____
Tele. sm _____ Rec. _____

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			
Under Secretary	29. 11.	<i>W.H.</i>	<u>Arab air route</u>
Secretary of State...	29		Negotiations with Ras al Khaimah ^{and}
Committee.....			Umm al Qawain
Under Secretary....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy of *Leg* to *Exd.*
to P.O. Adm. Secy
Mr. Co.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Draft letter to Exd. (repeated to Mr. Biscoe) being final
instructions.

28/11/11. Tel to Exd of India No. 3466
Replied to P.O. No. P.G. 3467

in h. from 12/25/11

Previous Papers :—

4407a 750 3.30





Minute Paper.


PZ.
7407
1931

Department.

The draft submitted on 21 November was shown demi-officially to Mr. Rendel of the Foreign Office at his request on 24 November, and he suggested the two small alterations shewn in pencil thereon. These may be accepted. On the same day I heard from Mr. Bertram, Deputy Director of Civil Aviation, that the Air Ministry would like to see the draft. It appears that subsequently to the decision of the Ministerial Committee on 17 November, the Air Ministry had a meeting with Imperial Airways at which the superiority, for various reasons, of a rest house on shore over a rest vessel was pointed out. The Air Ministry accordingly suggested an additional paragraph (marked A in the Air Ministry minute of 25 November attached) which varies ~~with~~ the statement of requisite facilities contained in paragraph 4 of the Secretary of State's telegram of 16 October (flagged in the file below). The Air Ministry discussed this demi-officially with the Admiralty but the latter objected to its inclusion, and also to an alternative draft which was subsequently discussed, as constituting a gloss on the decision of the Ministerial Committee. Finally the Admiralty agreed to the insertion of the words shown in the margin on the second page of the draft which is now submitted.

The effect of this is that the instructions as to the facilities to be aimed at stand; but if Colonel Biscoe finds that it may be possible to obtain the Sheikhs consent to a rest house on shore instead of a rest vessel in the creek, he will doubtless ^{ask instructions as to} take the opportunity of seeking the facilities now considered preferable/

4434A 2000 5/30





P.Z. 7407/31.

responsibility for safety of establishment, so far as he

Cypher telegram from Secretary of State, addressed to Government of India, 3466; repeated to Political Resident, Chakla, Hamjam Radio, 3467, dated 28th November, 1931.

119 and 121 words; report by telegram of his agents X X X and

IMMEDIATE.

prospect of obtaining object in view. The possibility that it may eventually be found that it is not practicable to do without a port.

My telegram 14th November No. 3328 repeated to Bushire as 3329 Air Route. While leaving open, pending further consideration of wider financial and other questions, final decision as to actual establishment of route, Ministerial Committee have approved proposal that Biscoe should be authorised immediately to open negotiations with Arab rulers concerned, viz. Ras al Khaimah and Umm al Qawain, and to endeavour to secure an agreement (to be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government) with one of them whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £3000 a year he and his tribesmen will provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees. Please instruct Biscoe to act accordingly on his forthcoming visit to Trucial Coast.

Second and last part.

X X X

1 and 163 words.

2. Biscoe should bear in mind suggestions made in paragraph 3 of your telegram 21st October 2583-S and also a suggestion made by Air Ministry and Treasury that part of the subsidy should take the form of landing fees to be paid separately for each visit of a seaplane. This is practically universal method of payment for facilities and it would give Sheikh a close and continuing interest in the arrangement.

3. Object to be aimed at is formal agreement with His Majesty's Government providing that in return for payment by latter under various heads Sheikh grants requisite facilities and undertakes effective responsibility/

COPIES SENT TO

F.O.

D.M.


A.M.

Adm. Secy.

C.S.

Treasury


30 NOV 1931








(156)
(157)
responsibility for safety of establishment, so far as he and his dependents and subjects are concerned, and further for its protection, so far as possible, against marauders from outside his jurisdiction. Biscoe should if possible report by telegraph progress of his negotiations and prospect of obtaining object in view. The possibility that it may eventually be found that it is not practicable to do without a rest house on shore instead of a rest vessel should also be borne in mind.

4. If successful Biscoe should before committing His Majesty's Government report proposed heads of agreement for approval.










separately for each visit of a seaplane. This is practically universal method of payment for facilities and it would give Sheikh a close and continuing interest in the arrangement.


3. Object to be aimed at is formal agreement with His Majesty's Government providing that in return for payment by latter under various heads Sheikh grants requisite facilities and undertakes effective responsibility for safety of establishment, so far as he and his dependents and subjects are concerned, and further for its protection, so far as possible, against marauders from outside his jurisdiction. Biscoe should if possible report by telegraph progress of his negotiations and prospect of obtaining object in view. He should also bear in mind that a rest house on shore would be even better than a rest vessel and it is likely that future developments will turn in this direction. If successful he should before committing H.M.G. report proposed heads of agreement for approval.


The possibility that it may eventually be found that it is not practicable to have a rest house on shore instead of a rest vessel should also be borne in mind.


Part 2


RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
XXV	28/11/55	8.40A
161 and 163		
IX		














PD.03934/31.

27th November, 1931.


Dear Walton,

Attached is a copy of a letter which
I have to-day sent to Group Captain R.E.C. Peirse,
Air Ministry.

Yours sincerely,

H. G. James

C. Walton Esq., CB., MC.,
India Office, S.W.1.





PD.03934/31.

27th November, 1931.

Dear

In answer to your letter of the 26th November enclosing copy of India Office draft telegram with an addition marked 'X' in paragraph 3.

The Admiralty cannot regard this addition as falling within what was approved by the Cabinet Sub-Committee. The substitution, however, of the following would be free from that objection and acceptable so far as the Admiralty is concerned:-

"The possibility that it may eventually be found that it is not practicable to do without a rest house on shore instead of a rest vessel should also be borne in mind."


The Admiralty assume that the phrase "Necessary facilities" contained in the draft telegram will be understood by the Political Resident from other instructions received by him which the Admiralty have not seen, since by itself the telegram seems insufficient.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Walton in order to save time.

Yours

Captain R.E.C. Peirse,
DSO., AFC.,
Air Ministry,
W.C.2.

X Yes. I have seen Capt. Cunningham's letter & a
Sgt's letter of 16 Dec & a Sgt's letter of
24 Dec which stated that they had sent copy of
the former to the Resident. But these letters
were circulated to M.F. Office & I sent Captain
Cunningham further copy of them yesterday
27th





(163)
AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.
(164)

26th November, 1931.


Dear Walton,

Our telephone conversation earlier this afternoon. I enclose a copy of a letter which I have sent to Cunningham at the Admiralty, together with a copy of the amended draft telegram. I think it is possible the Admiralty may wish other interested departments to see the revised draft, though I hardly see the necessity myself, but I have no doubt you will consider whether this is desirable or not.

Yours sincerely,

R. S. C. Dine

J.C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
S.W. 1.





26th November, 1931.


My dear Cunningham,

As a result of our conversation, I send you over a copy of the India Office draft telegram. The paragraph on the lines we discussed I have inserted in paragraph 3 of the draft where marked X. I have spoken to the India Office who have no objections to raise and am sending them a copy of this redraft^{of the} so that as soon as I hear from you, as I hope I shall, that the Admiralty are in agreement, I can at once let India Office know so that they can get on with the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) R. E. C. PEIRSE.

Captain J.H.D. Cunningham, M.V.O.,
Plans Division,
Admiralty,
S.W. 1.





S.30656

166

The Secretary.

In minute 44, D.D.C.A.'s suggested Addendum A/ in paragraph 1 of the draft of 44 B would be strengthened, I feel, if it is turned round, so that the requirements of the rest-house which is what we really want, figures in the most prominent position in the telegram. I would, therefore, suggest the following:-


A
✓ 2 Facilities now required would be a site on land where Imperial Airways could erect a protected rest-house, together with anchorage for refuelling barge. Failing agreement to this, facilities would be required for anchorage in lagoon for rest vessel provided by Imperial Airways, for use as W/T. station, and for accommodation of passengers during night stops, also a refuelling barge. The rest-house is preferable alternative on grounds of practicability, smaller initial cost, more comfortable accommodation and greater security.¹

3 Phase ✓

You will remember that the suggestion of a rest-house was subsequent to both the Middle East meetings and the Ministerial meeting, and that, therefore, the Admiralty know nothing about it. I feel, therefore, we are bound to inform the Admiralty of the alternative we are now suggesting to Bis coe, as otherwise we should lay ourselves open to a charge of bad faith. Meanwhile, if you agree, I think D.D.C.A. should obtain the consent of the India Office to the telegram amended as suggested, and as soon as this has been done, I will get in touch with the Admiralty.

25/11/51.

W.C.F.S.
D.D.C.A.





WHITEHALL,

S.W. 1.

24th November, 1931.

I enclose copy of the draft telegram to the Government of India and Biscoe about the Air Route. We shall of course be glad to have any suggestions from your side or the Air Staff. I am sending another copy to Peirse direct.

As I explained to you on the telephone we refrained from circulating the draft officially to all the Departments concerned, as there seemed no necessity for this and it might have involved undue delay.


W


F.G.L. Bertram Esq., C.B.E.,

Air Ministry,

Gwydyr House,

S.W. 1.





WHITEHALL,
S.W. 1.


24th November, 1931.

I enclose copy of the draft telegram to the Government of India and Biscoe about the Air route. We shall of course be glad to have any suggestions. I am sending another copy to Bertram direct.

As I explained to Kirby on the telephone we refrained from circulating the draft officially to all the Departments concerned, as there seemed no necessity for this and it might have involved undue delay.

(1) *final*

Group Captain R.E.C. Peirse, D.S.O., A.F.C.,
Air Ministry,
Kingsway.





Register No.		167 169	
		SECRET. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.	
Letter from	Dated	19	
Telegram	Rec.		
Formally acknowledged			
	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			
Under Secretary....	21. 11.	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Secretary of State...	23	<i>[Signature]</i>	Arab air route
Committee.....			Negotiations with Ras al Khaimah <i>[Signature]</i>
Under Secretary....			Umm al Qaywayn
Secretary of State...			
Fund Li. No. 1000 11/11		Copy of to FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY. Draft let to S. G. (referred to British) finally instructing Col. Biscoe.	
It was made clear at the meeting of the Committee (in presence of the members) that the authority to Col. Biscoe to open negotiations was intended to be subject to the final decision as to the actual establishment of the Arab coast route. It seems only right to make this clear to			
Previous Papers:— The Sec. of State & Col. Biscoe, as I have added some words at the beginning of the draft telegram, L. H. S.			





Minute Paper.


Department.

I have now added
a copy of the minutes
of the meeting (below
the draft telegram)
(L.H.S.)
22.11.21

I understand from Raja that the final approval of the
Ministerial Order of para 13 (a) of the Middle East Order memo. (flying)
has been received.

In telegraphing we might refer to the V's negotiations
in their letter of 21.10. (flying) & to that contained in
Mr. Buxton's letter of 6 Nov. (flying). I have sent
a copy of this to Col. Biscoe by air mail so that he will
be aware of the additional reason for the negotiations viz that
if & when foreign aircraft are admitted we shall not have to pay
extra for the Sheikh's extra responsibilities.

Col. Biscoe's letter of 3 Nov. below is of some interest
regulation
21.11.21





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P _____

+++
SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

*While leaving open for further
consideration of the
a later question of final
decision as to actual establishment
of route,*

Cop. to F.O.

D.M.

A.A.

Admiralty

Treasury

C.O.


Addressed to G of I repeated to
Political Resident, Bushire.

My telegram 14 November No. 3328

Air Route. Ministerial Committee
have approved proposal that Biscoe
should be authorised immediately to
open negotiations with the Arab rulers
concerned, viz. Ras al Khaimah and Umm
al Qawain, and to endeavour to secure
an agreement (to be subject to the
approval of His Majesty's Government)
with one of them whereby in return for
a payment not exceeding £3000 a year
he and his tribesmen will provide
Imperial Airways with the necessary
facilities and guarantees. Please
instruct Biscoe to act accordingly on
his forthcoming visit to Trucial Coast.

4. Biscoe should bear in mind
suggestion made in para. 3 of your
telegram/

4400 1000 3.30





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

telegram 21 October 2583-S and also

a suggestion made by Air Ministry and

Treasury that part of the subsidy

should take the form of landing fees

to be paid separately ~~by Imperial~~

~~Airways~~ for each visit of a seaplane.

This is practically universal method

of payment for facilities and it

would give Sheikh a close and continuing

interest in the arrangement.

§. Object to be aimed at is formal

agreement with His Majesty's Government

providing that in return for payment

by latter under various heads Sheikh

grants requisite facilities and under-

takes effective responsibility for

~~safety of establishment,~~

~~protection~~ so far as he and his

dependents and subjects are concerned,


Biscoe will no doubt as he finds


should if possible report by telegraph
necessary report progress of his

negotiations/

and further for its protection,
so far as possible, against marauders
from outside his jurisdiction.

4100 1000 3.30





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.


(Retamilla)


negotiations and prospect of obtaining

object in view. If successful he

^{before committing H.M.S.}
should report proposed heads of agreement

for approval of His Majesty's Government.





(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

M.E.(O) 42.

COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

CONCLUSIONS of meeting of the Ministerial Sub-
Committee.



Note by Secretary.

The Ministerial Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East at its first meeting on Tuesday, 17th November, 1931, considered the question of the Eastern Air Route (M.E.(O) Paper 33), when the following conclusions were recorded -

- (a) That the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf be authorised immediately to open negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned and to endeavour to secure an agreement, to be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, with one of them, whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £3,000 a year, he and his tribesmen would provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees, and
- (b) That the Air Ministry be invited -
 - (i) To consider, in conjunction with the Treasury and the Board of Trade, the financial liability likely to be incurred by His Majesty's Government in the institution of a service of flying boats from Basra to Gwadar or Karachi via the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf; or alternatively of a shipping service between Bahrain and Gwadar.
 - (ii) Subject to Treasury sanction being obtained to make the necessary provisional arrangements with Imperial Airways for the institution of such a service to be ready to begin operations at the end of March, 1932.

(Signed) G. HIND,

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
23rd November, 1931.





(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

M.E. (M) 1st Mtg.

FINAL COPY.

COPY NO. 17

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

MINUTES of the First Meeting of the
Sub-Committee held at 2, Whitehall
Gardens, S.W.1., on Tuesday, November
17th, 1931, at 12 Noon.

P R E S E N T:-

The Right Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister,
G.B.E., M.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(In the Chair).

The Right Hon. the Viscount Hailsham,
Secretary of State for War.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of
Londonderry, K.G., M.V.O.,
Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Bolton M. Eyres-Monsell,
G.B.E., M.P., First Lord of the
Admiralty.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major Walter E. Elliot, M.C., M.P.,
Financial Secretary to the
Treasury.



Air Chief Marshal Sir John M.
Salmond, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
D.S.O., Chief of the Air
Staff.

Mr. L.D. Wakely, C.B.,
Assistant Under Secretary
of State, India Office.

Mr. G. W. Rendel,
Counsellor, Eastern Depart-
ment, Foreign Office.

Mr. W.H. Hancock, M.B.E.,
Principal, Admiralty.

Major N.G. Hind, M.C., Secretary to the Sub-Committee.





THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them the following papers -

M.E. (M) 8 - EASTERN AIR ROUTE -
Proposed establishment of an Arabian route, in view of the impending closure of the Persian section.


M.E. (M) 9 - SYRIA.
Possible establishment of a Monarchy by the French in Syria and future policy thereon.


1. EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY said that in view of the impending closure of the air route along the Persian coast, immediate steps were essential in order to establish an alternative route and thus maintain the existing air service to India. Various proposals had been explored, the only feasible one, in the eyes of the Air Ministry, being to establish a flying boat service from Basra to Gwadar via Bahrein and Ras al Khaimah. This would entail a vessel, for use as a rest boat, being moored in the lagoon at Ras al Khaimah, where machines and their passengers would have to stay the night. The main point with which the Air Ministry was concerned was that this service must be continued. They did not regard the dangers involved as so serious as to render the alternative now proposed impracticable.

SIR BOLTON LYRES-MONSELL said that while the Admiralty agreed that the air route should be continued, they considered that all other alternatives had not been fully explored. He suggested that the use of Henjam as a rest station, in lieu of Ras al Khaimah, should be considered. This island was preferable to Ras al Khaimah, both for climatic and strategic reasons, as well as having a better

1.








175
177

water supply. If the present objections to the continuance of our occupation of Henjam as a naval depot could be overcome the Admiralty would ask the Air Ministry whether this island would not be equally convenient as a rest station on the Eastern air route in lieu of Ras al Khaimah. The Admiralty have had under careful consideration the possible alternative naval bases and in view of the high cost, some £35,000 to £40,000, of removing to Bahrain and the inferiority of this place as a base, they consider that the possibility of remaining at Henjam should be carefully reconsidered, and they will shortly raise this question with the other Departments concerned. He considered that a rest vessel, moored in the lagoon at Ras al Khaimah, would be exposed to risk and would be very difficult to defend, as owing to the shallow depth of water off the shore His Majesty's ships have to lie at about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the lagoon. Consequently some landing force would be necessary for its defence in the event of trouble. He would like to suggest that the possibility of rearranging the time table to avoid a night stop at Ras al Khaimah should be further considered, another point to be borne in mind was that international difficulties might arise later as a result of foreign aircraft using the Arabian coast route.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he understood that we had no legal grounds for our occupation of Henjam, and security of tenure was necessary for any air station that might be established. Difficulties would arise should evacuation become necessary and we might find it more difficult to obtain an alternative site on the Arabian shore.

MR. RANDEL said that in the Foreign Office view it would be no less difficult to obtain permission for the use of Henjam than to obtain continued permission to fly over the present South Persian air route. Our position at Henjam was anomalous and precarious. At present the Persians resented our position in the Gulf, and/






(174)
(178)
were determined to try to reduce our political pre-dominance in that region. This appeared to be one of their main reasons for refusing to allow us to continue to use the South Persian air route, and applied with even greater force to our position at Henjam. The reasons which made it necessary to seek an alternative to the South Persian air route equally ruled out any question of utilising Henjam.


THE CHAIRMAN considered that from a general point of view the establishment of a route along the Arabian shore was desirable on diplomatic grounds. He had found from recent experience that the Persians were getting more and more recalcitrant in their dealings with us.

MR. WAKELY said that the Government of India preferred the existing Persian route and had always regarded the Arabian route as a "pis aller".

MR. RENDEL explained that the Foreign Office did not wish definitely and finally to exclude all possibility of an arrangement being come to with the Persians for the continued use of the South Persian route. Such an arrangement might still be arrived at, and in a recent interview with Sir Robert Vansittart, the Persian Minister of Court had hinted that Persia might agree to the continuance of the route if a sufficiently high price were paid; but in his previous interview with Sir John Simon, Teymourache, the Minister of Court, had not shown any signs of weakening on this question, and the Foreign Office definitely could not guarantee that the route would remain open after next March. They considered that we could not continue to gamble on such a possibility, and that, unless we were prepared to face the interruption of the Air Service to India, an alternative route should therefore be prepared without further delay.

THE CHAIRMAN agreed and stated that an alternative route must be found. In view of the new service having to function by the 1st April next, immediate measures were/






(172)
(179)
necessary. If there was any further delay an interruption of the service to India was inevitable.


SIR JOHN SALMOND agreed and considered that if a decision was now taken it would be practicable to establish an air route via Ras al Khaimah by the end of March next.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY recognised that the protection of the proposed rest station at Ras al Khaimah would be difficult. He considered, however, that the danger could be adequately provided for were an armed guard made available for the immediate defence of the rest vessel.

SIR JOHN SALMOND, in reply to a question by Sir Bolton Byres-Mensell, stated that the Air Ministry had considered the possibility of substituting a steamer borne link for the air service between Bahrein and Owadar. Though this would entail a delay of only six hours it had been found impracticable on commercial grounds.

MAJOR ELLIOT stated that the Treasury were not yet satisfied as to the ultimate expenditure that would be involved in the establishment of the new route. For purposes of comparison it was not sufficient merely to take the figures given. There was a serious element of risk, and if that risk were to be taken into account the potential cost of the Ras al Khaimah air route might prove much greater even than that of an uneconomic - but safe - steamer service. He recognised the desirability for the air route to continue but wished to remind the Sub-Committee that the liability involved, which was indeterminate, might prove financially impracticable and eventually lead to the abandonment of an air service over this section of the route.






178
180

While the Treasury wished to raise no objection to the opening of negotiations, they would like further information as the cost that would be involved, both as regards any recurring expenditure, such as subsidies, as well as any immediate capital payments to Imperial Airways. He therefore wished to enter a caveat that the Treasury could not agree to the establishment of this new air route until more information is forthcoming as to the estimated cost. He thought it important that we should not definitely commit ourselves at this stage.

MR. RENDLE observed that the Official Sub-Committee, in framing their recommendations for the initiation of negotiations, had kept this point in view. They had allowed for an opportunity for re-consideration when the attitude of the Sheikh should have been ascertained, by suggesting that any agreement reached should be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, so that His Majesty's Government might not find themselves prematurely committed should some other alternative, after all, prove practicable, or should some unexpected difficulty arise.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY, in reply to a question by the Chairman, stated that the Air Ministry anticipated that an immediate expenditure of £10,000 would be incurred in the establishment of this air route. As the reasons of the transfer of the route from the Persian to the Arabian shore were of a political nature, compensation would have to be paid to Imperial Airways, who had incurred expenditure in the erection of buildings, etc., along the Persian coast and would have to incur fresh expenditure for facilities along the Arabian coast. A further £10,000 would be required to operate a sea-plane service along the/





179
181
Arabian coast. Until the details had been settled (with Imperial Airways) he could not be more precise as to the recurring or non-recurring cost.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should authorise the Air Ministry to make the necessary provisional arrangements with Imperial Airways for the institution of the proposed sea-plane service, after consulting with the Treasury as regards the cost thereof.

The question as to whether financial or strategic considerations would render the establishment of this service impracticable could then be considered separately. It was necessary to authorise the initiation of negotiations with the local Sheikh concerned, in order to obtain the facts on which a decision on this question could be arrived at.


MAJOR ELLIOT asked for the assistance of the Admiralty in the preparation of such estimates.

It was agreed that the Board of Trade would be in a better position to estimate the cost of any sea-borne link.

CONCLUSION.

THE MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE agreed:-

- (a) That the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf authorised immediately to open negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned and to endeavour to secure an agreement, to be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, with one of them, whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £2,000 a year, he and his tribesmen would provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees, and
- (b) That the Air Ministry be invited -
 - (1) to consider, in conjunction with the Treasury and the Board of Trade, the financial liability likely to be incurred by His Majesty's Government in the institution of a service of flying boats from Basra to Gwadar or Karachi via the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf; or alternatively of a shipping service between Bahrein and Gwadar.





- (11) Subject to Treasury sanction being obtained to make the necessary provisional arrangements with Imperial Airways for the institution of such a service to be ready to begin operations at the end of March, 1932.

2. SYRIA.

THE COMMITTEE then proceeded to consider Paper No. M.E.(M) 9.

THE CHAIRMAN asked for remarks and stated that the conclusions in this memorandum met with the concurrence of the Colonial Office.

There were no comments.


CONCLUSION.

THE COMMITTEE accordingly agreed that the Colonial Office should be invited to inform Sir Francis Humphrys, for his personal information and guidance, that the considered views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the possible establishment of a Monarchy in Syria were as follows:-

- (i) That the outcome most likely to be to the advantage of His Majesty's Government would be the constitution of Syria as a republic with a Syrian as President.
- (ii) That for a single individual to hold the Crowns both of Syria and Iraq would be most undesirable, and would, in any case, be likely to prove unworkable;
- (iii) That any attempt by King Faisal to transfer his Crown from Iraq to Syria would be contrary to British interests;
- (iv) That should the Crown of Syria be offered to ex-King Ali, no grounds exist for opposing his candidature.

8, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

17th November, 1931.





(181)
(183)


Copy of letter dated 20th November from
Mr. Walton to Colonel Biscoe.

Many thanks for your confidential demi-official letter of 3rd November, No. 728-S. I will let the Air Ministry know of the point about the danger of marauding Bedouin.

I am glad to say that we have at last got approval of the £3,000 a year limit of expenditure under such agreement as you may be able to secure. The whole question of the air route had to be considered by the Official Middle East Committee, and then by the Ministerial Committee. The latter have passed a recommendation -

'That the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf be authorised immediately to open negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned and to endeavour to secure an agreement, to be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, with one of them, whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £3,000 a year he and his tribesmen will provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees.'

We






(182) (184)

We have more than once pressed home the points which you made in London and mention in the last paragraph of your letter as to the factors which make it difficult to obtain the desired agreement, and suggested the desirability of reasonably generous expenditure. At the same time, we stated that you would, of course, manage as economically as possible.

Subject to what you think, there seems to be a good deal in the Government of India's suggestions that the money to be paid out should be paid for (real or assumed) value to be received under specified heads - e.g., so much for the rent of the lagoon; so much for the payment of guards, and perhaps officers. The Air Ministry and Treasury have made the further suggestion explained in a letter from Bertram of 6th November of which I enclose a copy, the part of the subsidy should take the form of landing fees paid separately on each separate visit of an aircraft. This suggestion, which prima facie we agreed here seemed a good one, might conceivably involve the fixation of some maximum annual limit of the number of visits, unless the landing fee was quite a small


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




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one; but I daresay there will be no difficulty in this connection; we shall see how things pan out when it comes to drafting the agreement. The only point to bear in mind is that the limit of annual expenditure in all cannot be exceeded: but I daresay there is a prospect that it will not even be approached.

The effect of the Ministerial Committee's decision is that you are given a free hand to negotiate and reach the basis of an agreement (if possible) and actually draw up the heads of an agreement; at this stage, however, at the latest - and probably earlier - you would naturally report what measure of success was attending your negotiations and whether there was a prospect of reaching a satisfactory agreement - satisfactory in the sense that it promised a fair measure of security for the protection of the establishment, so far as this depends on the Sheikh and his tribesmen. The agreement of course would be with His Majesty's Government (in the United Kingdom) not with Imperial Airways.





BY AIR MAIL
Confidential.
D.O. No. 728-S.

Copy from E. Spenderhouse Kerby
26. 11. 31

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
The British Residency and Consulate-
General,
Bushire, 3rd November 1931.

My dear Walton.

Thanks for your letter no. P.Z.6570/31 of the
23rd October 1931, regarding the air route.

I enclose for your information an extract from
a letter of proceedings received from the Senior Naval
Officer, which has a direct bearing on the question of the
subsidy. You will see from it that the Bedouin in the
interior have been harassing the crucial Shaikhs. This
of course is nothing new, and these gentry usually levy
blackmail to a lesser or greater extent on the inhabitants
of the coast. During the past summer, however, the
attacks seemed to have been more numerous than formerly,
possibly because the crucial Shaikhs in their present im-
po~~verished~~ condition are not in a position to buy them off
so effectively as before. However this may be, it is clear
that whether the Imperial Airways' halting ground is at Ras-
al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qawain the Shaikh who accepts
responsibility for it will not only have to overcome the
antagonism of his own tribesmen, but will also have to
maintain

J. C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
LONDON.






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maintain a considerable number of guards to protect the Imperial Airways' barge against marauding Bedouin, and, while I am not in a position to give any definite figure at present, 30 or 40 armed men will probably be required and they will have to be provided with arms and ammunition.

You will see that it has been suggested in the Senior Naval Officer's note that representations on the subject of the activities of these Bedouin might be made to Ibn Saud. I think it would be unwise. Ibn Saud would probably jump at the opportunity of establishing his authority over these tribes and would probably send one or two officials, if not to the Trucial Coast, to some place a few miles inland, and there would be every likelihood that these men would carry on constant intrigues with the Trucial Shaikhs and endeavour to extend their master's authority over them. The Shaikh of Ras-al-Khaimah is already reported to have appealed to Ibn Saud for support against British encroachments, and I do not think we want to encourage closer relations between the Trucial Shaikhs and the ruler of Nejd.

As regards the sum which it may be necessary to pay as subsidy, as you know, in London I said that I could not give any definite estimate until I had been down and gone into the matter, and I suggested that a maximum figure should be fixed and that I should endeavour to make the cheapest arrangement possible. I certainly have no intention of offering the ~~maximum~~ amount in the first instance, and I hope that it may be possible to obtain the necessary guarantee from the Shaikh concerned at a relatively moderate figure having regard to the importance of the object to be attained, namely the continuance of the Arab Air Route to India. I did however point out (1) that there






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there was a great deal of antagonism on the Trucial Coast to the establishment of a civil air route which could only be overcome if the inhabitants derived some **definite** advantage from it, (2) that these Shaikhs were not autocratic rulers and that it was a question not only of obtaining the concurrence of the Shaikh but of all his clan, (3) that the alternative, namely, coercion, would be very much more expensive, and (4) that the Shaikh would have to maintain armed guards, and at the conference neither the Secretary of State nor the Air Ministry representatives seemed to think that the figure suggested by me was in any way exorbitant. The subsidy therefore will have to be a generous one, but I should like to emphasise that I will of course try and make the cheapest arrangement I can.

I am sending a copy of this D.O. to Howell.

Y^{rs} sincerely

J. M. Moore







Extract from Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf's
Letter of Proceedings No. 42/587, dated 12th
October 1931.

11. Manasir and 'Awamir Tribes - Bin Saud's
alleged control of.

(a) There is no doubt that the Manasir and 'Awamir bedouins have given much trouble to the Trucial Shaikhs this year, and as shown above under the heading "Hamriyah", they are not above offering their services to dissatisfied individuals who desire to interfere with the established political order in the respective Shaikhdoms. The Residency Agent was loud in his complaints to me of the depredations and interference of these undisciplined marauders. The whole of the Trucial Coast was suffering from them and there was little or no security.

(b) The Residency Agent asked me whether these tribes did not really owe allegiance to the King of the Hejaz and Nejd, and if so could not some action be taken to represent to him that the tribes' activities should be confined to their own territories. He stated too that the tribal chieftains paid tribute to the Amir of Hasa, who collected it on behalf of Bin Saud. All the tribute came originally from the loot captured from the Trucial Coast principalities. No secret was made of this and apparently the Amir encouraged them to obtain more. I could not answer the question put to me nor could I accept the evidence as conclusively proving the case against Bin Saud, but I advised the Residency Agent that he should send a formal protest to the Political Resident, supported by the most reliable evidence he could obtain. Sheikh Muhammed took a keen interest in this part of the discussion. From what he said, and Isa's approving comments, I gather that there is a definite movement on foot amongst the Trucial Shaikhs to meet together to draw up a considered protest to be despatched by Isa to the Political Resident. They are all of the opinion that Bin Saud should be asked to control his tribesmen.







Sheikh or neighbouring tribesmen;

(iii) the danger of an attack on a more serious scale by neighbouring tribesmen, to repel which (so far as the Navy is concerned) it would be necessary to land forces from the ship;

(iv) the greater risk of complications if foreign companies are allowed to use the station and their aircraft become involved in an incident.

The answers to these points seem to be as follows:-

(i) There is no reason why we should not do our best to obtain a satisfactory agreement. It would be far-fetched to suggest that the mere opening of negotiations for an agreement would have an unfavourable effect on the Sheikh or on the Trucial Coast Arabs generally. As regards the conversation between the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah and our Residency Agent, referred to by the Admiralty, the facts are as follows. The R.A.F. petrol barge arrived at Ras-al-Khaimah on 21 May¹⁹³⁰, with H.M.S. "Cyclamen" in attendance. The Sheikh refused to allow the barge to remain. Col. Biscoe^(with a Chief Air Staff Officer) arrived on 1 June and after protracted negotiations, and pressure on the Sheikh by detention of his dhows, on 15 June arrived at agreement with him that the barge should remain for one year, and should be replenished whenever necessary, and that the Sheikh would appoint a guard for its protection and undertake responsibility for the safety of (R.A.F.) aircraft and for that of the Residency Agent.

The incident referred to at the beginning of para. 8 actually occurred some months later, when the Residency Agent, Khan Bahadur Isa bin Abdul Latif, visited Ras-al-Khaimah to ascertain why the Sheikh refused to take the subsidy of Rs.100 a month which was offered.



Minute Paper.

Department.

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offered him for guarding the R.A.F. petrol barge. If during his conversation Isa gave the Sheikh to understand that no further concession would be demanded of him, this cannot affect the question of entering into fresh negotiations; we shall not be demanding further concessions but offering the Sheikh a fresh bargain by which, in return for facilities, etc., for Imperial Airways, he would receive a fresh subsidy (out of all proportion to that offered in respect of the R.A.F. barge).

(ii) We hope to eliminate or at any greatly reduce the danger of casual hostile acts, committed in Ras-al-Khaimah itself, by means of an agreement with the Sheikh; under this agreement he would be responsible for preventing such acts, and as the Air Ministry suggest in para. 9, we should support his authority so long as he acted in good faith and endeavoured to keep order; moreover, the amount of the subsidy is specially calculated with a view to enabling the Sheikh to overcome the opposition of his people and keep the peace.

(iii) This is one of the major defence questions which will no doubt have to be further discussed.

(iv) The Admiralty objection assumes that it will be necessary to admit foreign aircraft when once we have obtained facilities for our own. Though the F.O. tend to take the view that it will be difficult to keep out foreigners, the question has not yet been decided in that sense and is obviously one which will have to be carefully considered/

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considered in due course; it would for various reasons be undesirable to let in foreigners if it can possibly be avoided; if they have to be admitted, our responsibilities will certainly be increased.

Walter
13. 11. 31



(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

S E C R E T.

M.E.(O) 38.

FINAL COPY.

COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.


Note by Secretary.

In accordance with the respective conclusions of the 12th and 13th (Eastern Air Route) meetings of the Official Sub-Committee, the attached paper, M.E.(M) 8 (Eastern Air Route), has been circulated to members of the Ministerial Sub-Committee, with a view to early consideration by that body.

(Signed) G. HIND,

Secretary.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
10th November, 1931.





THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. November 1931

SECRET.

Copy No. 53

M.E. (M.) 8.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST

Eastern Air Route.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF ARABIAN ROUTE IN VIEW OF IMPENDING
CLOSURE OF PERSIAN SECTION.

Memorandum prepared by the Standing Official Sub-Committee.

THE Standing Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence have held two meetings to consider this question, which has become one of great urgency.

2. It has become clear that there is now little or no hope of obtaining from the Persian Government an extension of the permission for the use by Imperial Airways of the existing route across Southern Persia. It was hoped last July that the desire of the Persian Government to secure the reopening of the Duzdab Railway might have furnished the means of striking a bargain with Persia by which an extension of the permit to use the South Persian route might be obtained. It now seems highly improbable that such a bargain can be concluded; and it is essential to face the fact that, in all probability, the South Persian air route will be definitely closed down at the end of March 1932. It is therefore of the utmost importance, if the air service to India is not to be interrupted, that an alternative route should be prepared with the least possible delay.

3. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, moreover, the only hope of continuing negotiations with the Persian Government on this subject with the remotest chance of success lies in our having an alternative route to fall back on. So long as the Persians regard us as being entirely in their power in this matter, negotiations will be impossible. The preparation of an alternative route, therefore, is necessary, not only in order that we may fall back on that route if and when the Persian route is finally closed, but as furnishing the only hope of perhaps, after all, obtaining an extension of the agreement for the use of the Persian route by negotiation.

4. The Air Ministry, who have carefully studied the various alternative routes, consider that the only practicable alternative is a route from Basra to Gwadar (and Karachi), following the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. This would necessitate the use of flying boats instead of land planes, and would involve, in addition to a halt at Bahrein (which presents no difficulty), the development of a regular landing place and refuelling station at some point on the Trucial Coast, where passengers would have to spend the night. The Air Ministry consider that the only practicable points for this landing place would be either the lagoon or creek at Ras-al-Khaimah, or that at Umm-al-Qaiwain, in either of which a rest vessel and petrol supply barge could be moored. From this point it would be possible to fly to Gwadar (which, though belonging to the Sultan of Muscat, is an enclave on the coast of India, and presents no difficulty), in a single flight outside Persian territorial waters.

5. The only really serious difficulty in connection with the development of this route lies in the uncertain attitude of the Trucial Sheikhs, on whose goodwill we shall depend in the first instance for the development of the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar, and subsequently for the safety of the personnel and passengers using the station.

[6166]



6. The India Office hope that it may be possible to secure the necessary facilities and guarantees from the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah, or from the Sheikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, in return for a subsidy not exceeding £3,000 a year. In view of the urgency of the matter, they are most anxious that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf should be authorised to open negotiations on this basis, when he visits this area in the very near future. They hope that the payment of the proposed subsidy could be arranged in such a way as not only to secure the acquiescence of the Sheikh concerned in the establishment of the landing and refuelling station in his lagoon or creek, but also so as to secure his co-operation and that of his unruly subjects and potential rivals, in guaranteeing the safety of the installation. The India Office and Air Ministry can suggest no other alternative, and are hopeful that this proposal will secure the necessary minimum of safety to render possible the continued operation of the air route to India. The arrangements involved will take some months to complete, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that a settlement should be reached before the end of the present year. Before, however, any negotiations even of a preliminary character can be opened with the rulers concerned, it is necessary to obtain Treasury sanction for the proposed subsidy.

7. The Admiralty, while not disputing the desirability of ensuring the continuance of the air route to India, regard the proposal of the India Office and Air Ministry as involving considerable risks and as liable to lead to commitments on a larger scale than the other Departments anticipate. They would have much preferred that the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar should either be eliminated or be situated on one of the islands in the Persian Gulf or at a point under more direct British control than either Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain. They would therefore urge that a further investigation should be made of the possible alternatives; but if, as the Air Ministry contend, those alternatives should still prove entirely impracticable, they are anxious that the decision to open negotiations with the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain should not be taken without a full realisation of the possible commitments and dangers involved.

8. In this connection the Admiralty point out that, when concluding the present agreement for the mooring of the R.A.F. barge, the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah was given to understand by our Residency Agent (an Arab), in response to his specific enquiry, that no further concession would be demanded of him. It is possible, therefore, that a request now for further facilities might be misrepresented as a breach of faith which might prejudice our position with the Trucial Arabs generally, though this danger may be considered to have been reduced by the recent tacit acceptance by the Sheikh of the use by the R.A.F. of a shore landing ground. The Admiralty further consider that, even if the proposed negotiations should lead to a successful result, the position in which the rest vessel and barges will be moored in the lagoon at Ras-al-Khaimah, which is land-locked, and out of sight from warships anchored off the town, will expose the rest vessel and barges to risk of sniping at night by disaffected followers of the local Sheikh or by members of neighbouring tribes seeking an opportunity to embroil the Sheikh. In addition, the Sheikh will be exposed to the risk of attack by neighbouring tribesmen on a serious scale, which might lead to our having to support him, and possibly to carry out punitive operations. In the event of trouble occurring, the fact that at Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain warships cannot enter the Lagoon, but are forced to lie some one and a half miles to seaward, makes it impossible for the Navy to afford any defence without landing forces from the ship. The Admiralty also point out that a further complication would be introduced in the event of an aircraft operated by a foreign company becoming involved in any incident on the Trucial coast, since the necessary measures to obtain reparations and to ensure future protection might develop into a question of international concern.

9. The Air Ministry do not entirely share the Admiralty views. In their opinion, based on considerable experience of tribal control in widely differing countries, the maintenance of the rest vessel and the necessary Imperial Airways installation on the Trucial Coast can best be obtained by imposing responsibility upon the Sheikh concerned; by supporting his authority if his attitude is satisfactory, and by rapid action against him if it is not. In the event of a serious incident occurring on the Trucial Coast, the Air Ministry view is that aircraft



operating in conjunction with warships would be an effective, powerful and rapid means of restoring the situation.

10. The War Office are generally interested, but are not directly concerned in the question of the maintenance of the civil air route to India, except in so far as the Admiralty fears may prove to be justified, and a call may be made for troops for the protection of the proposed landing station on the Trucial Coast in an emergency. They regard it as important to maintain and develop a strategic air route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, but are doubtful how far this will be furthered by the establishment of a civil route for seaplanes.

11. The Treasury appreciate the importance of the air route to India. They would have preferred to see a complete statement of the finance of the projected new route before being committed in any way. In view, however, of the urgency of the case they will raise no objection to the proposed negotiation with the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah when the issue of policy involved in the transfer to the Arabian coast route has been decided by the Cabinet or by the Ministerial Sub-Committee for questions concerning the Middle East.

12. The main issue for decision may be briefly summarised as follows:—

It is almost certain that, failing some quite unexpected development, the present air route to India via South Persia will definitely cease to be available as from the end of March 1932. Unless an alternative route can be established in the immediate future, the air service to India will therefore have to be interrupted as from that date. One suggested alternative is the establishment of a sea link (i.e., one stage by ship). This possible alternative has already been explored by the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways, and is regarded as commercially impracticable.

The only alternative to the interruption of the air service to India which at present appears to be practicable is the establishment of the Arabian air route, which, in the view of the Air Ministry and in the light of their investigations, can only successfully be operated if a night stopping station is provided for at Ras-al-Khaimah, or at Umm-al-Qaiwain, on the Trucial Coast. If this station is to be established negotiations must immediately be opened with the Sheikh of one of these places with a view to obtaining the necessary facilities and guarantees. The establishment of the proposed night stopping station at Ras-al-Khaimah, or at Umm-al-Qaiwain, is open to the serious risks foreseen by the Admiralty and indicated in paragraph 8 above.

13. The Official Sub-Committee, having considered the question in all its bearings, have come to the conclusion that, on the information at present available, and in view of the urgency of the matter, the balance of argument lies in favour of initiating without further delay the necessary preliminary steps for the establishment of a civil air route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, with a station at Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain, notwithstanding the risks involved.


They therefore recommend:—

- (a) That the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf be authorised immediately to open negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned and to endeavour to secure an agreement, to be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, with one of them, whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £3,000 a year he and his tribesmen will provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees, and
- (b) That the Air Ministry should be authorised to make the necessary provisional arrangements forthwith with Imperial Airways for the institution of a service of flying boats from Basra to Gwadar or Karachi via the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf, to be ready to begin operations at the end of March 1932.

On behalf of the official Sub-Committee:

(Signed) A. C. C. PARKINSON, *Chairman.*

November 9, 1931.





(P.Z. 1160/31)

Confidential.

ADMIRALTY, S.W. 1.
21st February, 1931.

M.C36/31.

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, extracts from a report on air activities in the Persian Gulf for the period 15th October 1930, to 17th November, 1930, forwarded by the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, concerning the questions of the oil barge at Ras-al-Khaimah and the installation of petrol tanks at Sir Beni Yas Islands.


A similar letter has been addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) Charles Walker.

The Under Secretary of State,
INDIA OFFICE.





CONFIDENTIAL.

EXTRACT.

FROM: The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division,
H.M.S. "TRIAD" at Mascat.

DATE: 18th November, 1930.

No. 96/177.

TO: The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

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4. OIL BARGE AT RAS-AL-KHAIMAH.

On 31st October I discussed at length the whole question of the R.A.F. Barge at Ras-al-Khaimah with the Residency Agent who reported that he had sent 300 rupees to the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah as the first quarter's instalment of subsidy for guarding the oil barge. The Sheikh returned the money with a request that Isa himself should go to hand it over.

Isa went to Ras-al-Khaimah accordingly and offered the money to the Sheikh who refused it on the grounds that if he accepted the money now he would be precluded from having any further discussion on the question of the oil barge with the Political Resident. It was agreed, therefore, that the money should rest with Isa until the Sheikh had met the Political Resident and had come to a final agreement with him.


In view of the fact that the Sheikh had agreed last May to the barge remaining at Ras-al-Khaimah, Isa asked him why he wanted to see the Political Resident and pointed out that he had not asked for a time to be fixed for such a meeting. To this question the Sheikh replied that he wanted to beg the Government, through the Political Resident, that the barge should be moved out of the Creek.

He was told by Isa that the Political Resident would never agree to this and he suggested that the Sheikh might provide a godown as he had previously considered doing and that then the barge would most certainly be moved. To this suggestion the Sheikh replied that he would give no godown, in fact he preferred to have the barge.

Isa then pointed out that the Sheikh had already promised to accept the rent and asked why he now failed to fulfil his promises. The Sheikh countered by suggesting that his people feared the British, who when once they had some footing, would then want a landing ground and gradually would ask for more and more rights which it would be impossible for him to grant.

The Sheikh was informed that the British Government did not wish for any further concessions, but he then told Isa that the latter might today give him his word of honour on that point, tomorrow Isa might be relieved of his post and then where would he (the Sheikh) stand in relation to the promises made. He then proceeded to tell Isa that he and his people were Wahabis, that the Head of the Wahabis is Ibn Saud and that if British Government persisted in forcing their policy upon him, he would place himself under the protection of Ibn Saud who would deal with the matter direct with the British Government. So far as he was concerned there the matter ended, he would appeal to Ibn Saud and end the friendly Treaty with Great Britain.

Isa advised him that this attitude would not do him any good and in fact would get him into trouble, for in accordance with the terms of his Treaty he was debarred from appealing to another country. Ras-al-Khaimah maintained that other Sheikhs would appeal to Ibn Saud. Isa told him that he did not think that the other Sheikhs were of the same frame of mind.





mind. There the conversation ended.

5. So far as I can gather the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah had already had an interview with Ibn Saud some two years ago. The latter appears to have reminded him of his Treaty engagements with Great Britain, but at the same time the Sheikh affected to be left with the impression that he is unreservedly placed himself under Ibn Saud's protection by a written instrument, the latter would consider the matter.

6. It will be recalled that the agreement arrived at between the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah and the Political Resident after the Naval Operations last June was subject to the following conditions:-

- (a) That the barge should remain in the Creek for one year during which period the future arrangements for the storage of petrol will be discussed with the Political Resident and a representative of the Royal Air Force.
- (b) The British authorities will have the right to replenish the oil barge whenever necessary.
- (c) The Sheikh will appoint guards for the protection of the barge.
- (d) The Sheikh undertakes responsibility for the safety of aircraft landing at Ras-al-Khaimah.
- (e) The Sheikh will be paid a suitable monthly subsidy for providing the guards.

x

x

x

8. INSTALLATION OF PETROL TANKS AT SIR BENI YAS ISLAND.

With reference to East Indies Minute dated 7th September, 1930, No. E.I. 2350, forwarding a copy of Admiralty Letter dated 5th August, 1930, M.02413/30, with certain enclosures relative to the installation of petrol tanks at Sir Beni Yas Island, I beg to report that in my presence the Political Resident approached the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi with a suggestion that a friendly agreement should be arrived at and that permission should be granted to instal the tanks at Yas. Every possible argument was put forward to induce the Sheikh to come to some arrangement, but he remained uncompromising. He gave various reasons, fear of his relatives, fear of his people, inability to supply guards and so on, but it is evident that neither he himself or his people have any desire to see these tanks installed and even the more enlightened of them view the proposal with hostility. The Political Resident was compelled to inform the Sheikh that since he would come to no agreement, then the tanks would be installed in a few weeks' time without his permission. The Sheikh said that he must submit to the use of force and made it quite clear that he gave no permission and that the tanks could only be forced upon him.

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
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9. SUMMARY.

- (a) There is quite a reasonable prospect of more trouble arising at Ras-al-Khaimah when the present agreement expires next June.

(b)/







(b) It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that
H.M. Naval Forces will be called upon to protect the
party responsible for installing the tanks at Sir
Bani Yas Islands.


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DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

Cypher X X X


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FO
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Treasury
11.12.31

SEEN BY	DATE	TIME
REC'D IN TEL. CH.	14/11/31	6.10
CODE, X or XX	XXX	
DISPATCHED	15/11/31	11.10A
NO. OF WORDS	62	
REMARKS (IN W.C.)	296	

PZ 7017/31

My telegram of 14th Nov, No 3328

While appreciating that you could not undertake responsibility for protection of establishment on Trucial Coast I should be glad to know whether when referring to "Indian forces" in para. 4 of your telegram of 25 July 1851-S you had in mind Indian personnel only or whether you foresee similar objection to employment even of European troops which it might conceivably at some future time be desired to borrow from Army in India in a sudden emergency if it occurred.





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Cypher X X X

RECEIVED	DATE	TIME
14/11/31	6 h	11
CODE	14/11	7 p
DESPATCHED	49	79
NO. OF WORDS		
SENDER'S IN-NO'S		

PZ. 7017/31


Important

3328
938 Dressed to S. of L. Refused to Political
Resident Bonaire 3329
Your telegram 21 October 2583-S

Air Route. I agree as to desirability
of definite and tangible quid pro quo.

2. Before concurring in proposed
negotiation for an agreement involving
payment of allowances Treasury desired
that policy of Arab coast route should
be affirmed by Cabinet or Ministerial
Sub-Committee for questions concerning
the Middle East. Matter will be con-
sidered by this Sub-Committee on ^{17th}
November after which I will telegraph
further as to instructions to Biscoe.

3. Please let me know date from
which "Chakla" has been or will be
chartered for his tour and when he
expects to reach Trucial Coast.





Minute Paper.

Department.

U.S.S.

It is understood that a meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee is contemplated for 19 November.

The Official Sub-Committee was unanimous as to the actual recommendations made in para. 13 of its memorandum, and in such circumstances under the normal procedure an actual meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee is not required (unless of course one of the Minister's concerned desires it), and Ministerial approval is signified without a meeting. Presumably, however, in view of the importance of this subject and the desire of the Admiralty that their point of view should be brought to the notice of Ministers, the Secretariat of the C.I.D. assumed that a meeting would be desirable.

There would seem to be little difficulty in regard to the approval of the Official Sub-Committee's actual recommendations (from which the Admiralty have not dissented). The difficulty felt by the Admiralty really has regard to further questions which could be explored after the initial step of opening negotiations had been taken viz. (a) the major question of defence of the Trucial Coast establishment if the negotiations end in a satisfactory agreement, and (b) the question of alternatives (e.g. Abu Musa or the long hop from Bahrain to Gwadar).

A "brief" on the points mentioned by the Admiralty in para. 8 of the memorandum will be submitted.

We should be able to send final instructions to Colonel Biscoe at the end of next week. But meanwhile a draft telegram explaining the present position is submitted.

With

Sankey of Persia
? and Hyderabad
13.01

Samuel
14.1

X The Air Ministry have not
valued that both of these
two alternatives, which the
Admiralty have in mind,
are impracticable.



With reference to Sir F. Stewart's note of 11 November,
it seems desirable, in view of further discussions
on the defence problem, to ascertain from the G. of I.
more precisely what they meant by their reference to
"Indian Forces" in their telegram of 25th July.
A further draft telegram on this point is submitted.

Reddell
2. 11. 55



Minute Paper.

Department.

10.5.5. 10.5.5.
9 P.S.

Meetings of the Middle East Official Sub-Committee regarding the Arab Air Route.

Please see note of the meeting of 2 November (Flag P). The basis of a draft memorandum was prepared by Mr. Rendel, the chairman of the Sub-Committee, and was discussed with him and subsequently with the Air Ministry and the Admiralty on 3 November. The Admiralty asked that the full statement of their views contained in paragraph 8 should be incorporated; subject to this they were prepared to concur in the proposals for immediate action made in the last paragraph of the memorandum. At the resumed meeting of the Sub-Committee on 5 November, paragraph 9 (statement of the views of the Air Ministry on the defence problem) was added. Paragraphs 10 and 11 (views of the War Office and Treasury) were also added.

At this meeting (on 5 November) the chairman (rather unnecessarily) challenged the Admiralty attitude; he suggested if their view as to the risks of a night stopping place on the Trucial coast was so serious as indicated in paragraph 8, it was hardly logical for them to concur in the conclusions of the memorandum, and it might be preferable for them to submit a minority report. Fortunately, however, the Admiralty would not accept this suggestion; their attitude is that they do not wish to ask that the initial step of the negotiations with the Sheikh should be deferred pending a consideration of the defence problem and of possible alternatives to the Trucial coast, but that they are anxious that these further questions should be considered and that, in approving/

The recommendation of the official sub-committee with, I think, fully met the S.C.'s views.

para 10 of the note. When the question of troops for protection of the landing places comes up we must bring out the Q's objection to the use of "Indian forces" (see 25th Feb)

This probably means "Indian troops", but it may mean the Army in India

SOS


11/11

I am much obliged for your letter of 11/11. I am anxious to see the action in connection with the S.C. Committee.

I am, Sir, very

Yours faithfully,
J.A. 11/11

416/800 5/30






Minute Paper.

Department.

approving the initial step, ministers should be fully apprised of the Admiralty views as to the difficulties. I supported the Admiralty (as against the chairman's ^{suggestion} ~~advice~~) that a minority report should be submitted) since, in order to save time, it seemed desirable that an ^{unanimous} ~~initial~~ report in favour of the definite proposals in the last paragraph of the memorandum should be made by the Official Sub-Committee. The meeting decided on this course, prefacing the recommendations in the last paragraph with the preamble, which appears *here*, weighing up the pros and cons.

In paragraph 13 (a) the words "subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government" meant that the agreement would contain a clause providing for ratification or confirmation by His Majesty's Government, not that Colonel Biscoe will have to report for approval at each stage of the negotiations. It may be convenient, however, that if and when he reaches the basis of an agreement, the actual agreement itself should be drafted *here* and telegraphed out to him in order that we may be sure that it is in proper form and that the details are approved by the Departments concerned. The agreement might be one of considerable detail if Colonel Biscoe finds it possible to adopt all the suggestions that ~~have~~ ^{can} be made, e.g. the Government of India's suggestions that part of the payment should take the form of rent for the lagoon and wages for native guards etc., and a further suggestion made by the Treasury and Air Ministry that part of the payment should take the shape of landing fees which would be paid by Imperial Airways for each separate/

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
Minute Paper.


Department.

203 205
separate visit and thus give the Sheikh a continuing interest in the smooth working of the agreement.

I understand that (unless there is any further hitch in the approval of the draft memorandum by members of the ^{Official} Sub-Committee) the document will be signed by the chairman and submitted to the Ministerial Sub-Committee. If the latter approves it, a draft telegram to the Government of India for communication to Colonel Biscoe will be submitted.

Red
10. 11. 31





SPARE COPY

LONDON, S. W. 1.

9th November, 1931.

P.Z. 7017/31.

Dear Bertram


Many thanks for your letter of 6th November regarding the suggestion that part of the subsidy to be paid on the Trucial coast should be paid in the form of dues for each separate landing. This seems prima facie a very good suggestion and we will certainly put it to Biscoe.

It will doubtless be desirable, in order to make our position as strong as possible, that the agreement with the Sheikh should be a formal agreement between him and His Majesty's Government, providing for certain payments by the latter. Though part of the payments might be on the suggested pro rata basis, and might actually be paid in fees on each separate visit by Imperial Airways, it will probably be as well that the agreement should make it clear that the real paymaster is His Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) J. S. WALTON

F.G.L. Bertram Esq., C.B.E.



1. No.:
RIA 1216.

6th November, 1931.

At the meeting yesterday of the Middle East Official Sub-Commission of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Grieve suggested that the allowance to the Sheikh at Ras-al-Khaimah might be in the form of landing dues.

On consideration I think that there is a good deal to be said for some portion, at any rate, of the payments to the Sheikh taking the form of a landing charge for each time an Imperial Airways seaplane lands in his Lagoon. I do not suggest that the whole of the payments should take this form, but that the payments should be partly a fee for guaranteeing the safety of the Rest Vessel and Re-fueling Barge and partly for each landing.


The advantages as I see it in favour of landing charges for each seaplane using the Lagoon is that this is practically a universal method here and in all other countries and also because the frequent payments to the Sheikh by Imperial Airways on each visit would ensure his taking a continuing interest in the weekly arrivals of the seaplanes. Also, in the event of the route being followed by the Dutch and French airlines, the responsibilities of the Sheikh would increase, but as he could levy the same charges from the Dutch and French seaplanes, no additional charge would have to be made from British funds.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Grieve and suggest that you should bear this proposal in mind when negotiations have been opened by Biscoe.

Yours sincerely,

Walton Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
S.W.1.

T. C. 2. 6. South am





Whitehall,

S.W. 1.

6th November, 1931.

I agree with the memorandum M.E. (M) 8.

There are two little points of verbal accuracy which could probably be corrected.


(1) Towards the end of para. 4 for "British Baluchistan" read "India". This part of Baluchistan is not technically British.

(2) Para. 8 line 4 for "resident" read "residency". Residency agent is the correct designation of the person referred to.

Major N.G. Hind, M.C.,

2, Whitehall Gardens,

S.W. 1.





THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

E.(O) 30.

REVISE.

COPY NO. 7.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Note by Secretary.

The attached memorandum which has been prepared as a result of the 13th Meeting of the Official Sub-Committee held yesterday (5th November) is forwarded.


It is requested that members will notify the Secretary as soon as possible of their final approval, subject to any remarks they may wish to make.

After signature by the Chairman on behalf of the Sub-Committee, it is proposed to present this to the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

(Signed) G. HIND.

Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
6th November, 1931.





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SECRET.

(M) S.

COPY NO. _____

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING MINISTERIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.


PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF ARABIAN ROUTE IN VIEW OF IMPENDING
CLOSURE OF PERSIAN SECTION.

Memorandum prepared by the Standing Official Sub-Committee.

The Standing Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence have held two meetings to consider this question, which has become one of great urgency.

2. It has become clear that there is now little or no hope of obtaining from the Persian Government an extension of the permission for the use by Imperial Airways of the existing route across southern Persia. It was hoped last July that the desire of the Persian Government to secure the re-opening of the Duzdab Railway might have furnished the means of striking a bargain with Persia by which an extension of the permit to use the South Persian route might be obtained. It now seems highly improbable that such a bargain can be concluded; and it is essential to face the fact that, in all probability, the South Persian air route will be definitely closed down at the end of March 1932. It is therefore of the utmost importance, if the air service to India is not to be interrupted, that an alternative route should be prepared with the least possible delay.

3. In the opinion of the Foreign Office moreover, the only hope of continuing negotiations with the Persian Government on this subject with the remotest chance of success lies in our having an alternative route to fall back on. So long as the Persians






209 211
regard us as being entirely in their power in this matter, negotiations will be impossible. The preparation of an alternative route therefore is necessary, not only in order that we may fall back on that route if and when the Persian route is finally closed, but as furnishing the only hope of perhaps after all obtaining an extension of the Persian route by negotiation.

4. The Air Ministry, who have carefully studied the various alternative routes, consider that the only practicable alternative is a route from Basra to Gwadar (and Karachi) following the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. This would necessitate the use of flying boats instead of land planes, and would involve, in addition to a halt at Bahrein (which presents no difficulty), the development of a regular landing place and refuelling station at some point on the Trucial Coast, where passengers would have to spend the night. The Air Ministry consider that the only practicable points for this landing place would be either the lagoon or creek at Ras al Khaimah or that at Umm al Qaiwain where a rest vessel and petrol supply barge could be moored. From this point it would be possible to fly to Gwadar (which, though belonging to the Sultan of Muscat, is an enclave on the coast of British Baluchistan, and presents no difficulty) in a single flight outside Persian territorial waters.

5. The only really serious difficulty in connection with the development of this route lies in the uncertain attitude of the Trucial Sheikhs, on whose goodwill we shall depend in the first instance for the development of the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar, and subsequently for the safety of the personnel and passengers using the station.

6. The India Office hope that it may be possible to secure the necessary facilities and guarantees from the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah, or from the Sheikh of Umm al Qaiwain, in return for a subsidy not exceeding £3,000 a year.






(212) (212)

In view of the urgency of the matter, they are most anxious that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf should be authorised to open negotiations on the basis suggested, when he visits this area in the very near future. They hope that the payment of the proposed subsidy could be arranged in such a way as not only to secure the acquiescence of the Sheikh concerned in the establishment of the landing and refuelling station in his lagoon or creek, but also so as to secure his co-operation and that of his unruly subjects and potential rivals, in guaranteeing the safety of the installation. The India Office and Air Ministry can suggest no other alternative, and are hopeful that this proposal will secure the necessary minimum of safety to render possible the continued operation of the air route to India. The arrangements involved will take some months to complete and it is therefore of the utmost importance that a settlement should be reached well before the end of the present year. Before any negotiations can be opened with the rulers concerned, however, it is necessary to obtain Treasury sanction for the proposed subsidy.

7. The Admiralty, while not disputing the desirability of ensuring the continuance of the air route to India, regard the proposal of the India Office and Air Ministry as involving considerable risks and as liable to lead to commitments on a larger scale than the other Departments anticipate. They would have much preferred that the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Qadad should either be eliminated or situated on one of the islands in the Persian Gulf or at a point under more direct British control than either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qaiwain. They would therefore urge that a further investigation should be made of the possible alternatives but if, as the Air Ministry contend, those alternatives should still prove






entirely impracticable, they are anxious that the decision to open negotiations with the Sheikhs of Ras al Khaimah and Umm al Qaiwain should not be taken without a full realisation of the possible commitments and dangers involved.

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213

8. In this connection the Admiralty point out that when concluding the present agreement for the mooring of the R.A.F. Barge, the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah was given to understand by our ^{Residency} Resident Agent (an Arab) in response to his specific enquiry, that no further concession would be demanded of him. It is possible therefore that a request now for further facilities might be misrepresented as a breach of faith which might prejudice our position with the Trucial Arabs generally, though this danger may be considered to have been reduced by the recent tacit acceptance by the Sheikh of the use by the R.A.F. of a shore landing ground. The Admiralty further consider that, even if the proposed negotiations should lead to a successful result, the position in which the rest vessel and barges will be moored in the Lagoon at Ras al Khaimah, which is landlocked, and out of sight from warships anchored off the town, will be exposed to risk of sniping at night by disaffected followers of the local Sheikh or of neighbouring tribes seeking an opportunity to embroil the Sheikh. In addition, the Sheikh will be exposed to the risk of attack by neighbouring tribesmen on a serious scale which might lead to our having to support him and possibly to carry out punitive operations. In the event of trouble occurring, the fact that at Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qaiwain warships cannot enter the Lagoon but are forced to lie some one and a half miles to seaward makes it impossible for the Navy to afford any defence without landing forces from the ship. The/






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Admiralty also point out that a further complication would be introduced in the event of an aircraft operated by a foreign company becoming involved in any incident on the Trucial coast, since the necessary measures to obtain reparations and to ensure future protection might develop into a question of international concern.

9. The Air Ministry do not entirely share the Admiralty views. In their opinion, based on considerable experience of tribal control in widely differing countries, the maintenance of the rest vessel and Imperial Airways installation on the Trucial Coast can best be obtained by imposing responsibility upon the Sheikh concerned; by supporting his authority if his attitude is satisfactory, and by rapid action against him if it is not. In the event of a serious incident occurring on the Trucial coast, the Air Ministry view is that aircraft operating in conjunction with warships would be an effective, powerful and rapid means of restoring the situation.

10. The War Office are most interested but are not directly concerned in the question of the maintenance of the civil air route to India, except in so far as the Admiralty fears may prove to be justified and a call may be made for troops for the protection of the proposed landing station on the Trucial coast in an emergency. They regard it as important to maintain and develop a strategic air route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, but are doubtful how far this will be furthered by the establishment of a civil route for seaplanes.

11. The Treasury appreciate the importance of the air route to India. They would have preferred to see a complete statement of the finance of the






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projected new route before being committed in any way. In view however of the urgency of the case they will raise no objection to the proposed negotiation with the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah when the issue of policy involved in the transfer to the Arabian coast route has been decided by the Cabinet or by the Ministerial Sub-Committee for questions concerning the Middle East.

12. The main issue for decision may be briefly summarised as follows:-

It is almost certain that, failing some quite unexpected development, the present air route to India via South Persia will definitely cease to be available as from March 1932. Unless an alternative route can be established in the immediate future, the air service to India will therefore have to be interrupted as from that date, and could only be maintained by the establishment of a sea link. This possible alternative has already been explored by the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways, and is regarded as commercially impracticable.

The only alternative to the interruption of the air service to India which at present appears to be practicable is the establishment of the Arabian air route, which, in the view of the Air Ministry and in the light of their investigations, can only successfully be established if a night stopping station is provided for at Ras al Khaimah, or at Umm al Qaiwain. If this station is to be established negotiations must immediately be opened with the Sheikh with a view to obtaining the necessary facilities and guarantees. The establishment of a rest station at Ras al Khaimah, or at Umm al Qaiwain, however, is





open to the serious dangers foreseen by the Admiralty and indicated in paragraph 8 above.

13. The Official Sub-Committee, having considered the question in all its bearings, has come to the conclusion that, on the information at present available, and in view of the urgency of the matter, the balance of argument lies in favour of initiating without further delay the necessary preliminary steps for the establishment of a civil air route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, with a station at Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qaiwain, notwithstanding the risks involved.

They therefore recommend:-


- (a) that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf should be authorised immediately to open negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned and to endeavour to secure an agreement, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, with one of them whereby in return for a payment not exceeding £3,000 a year, he and his tribesmen will provide Imperial Airways with the necessary facilities and guarantees, and
- (b) that the Air Ministry should be authorised to make the necessary provisional arrangements forthwith with Imperial Airways for the institution of a service of flying boats, via the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf, to be ready to begin operations at the end of March 1932.


(Signed)


November 1931.

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Chairman.









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THE SUB-COMMITTEE met to consider the following:-


Paper No. M.E.(O) 38 -

Draft of a memorandum on the question of the Eastern Air Route prepared by representatives of the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry, for presentation to the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

MR. RANDEL stated that, before discussing the draft memorandum in detail, the Air Ministry wished to raise a specific point, which he accordingly asked Group-Captain Peirse to explain.

GROUP-CAPTAIN PEIRSE stated that, after perusal of the draft memorandum, the Air Ministry felt that the dangers and difficulties so forcibly pointed out by the Admiralty would leave Ministers in a state of considerable apprehension and that as the Royal Air Force was one of the very interested fighting departments concerned in the Persian Gulf, they felt bound, therefore, to record their views because these were not wholly in accord with those of the Admiralty. He prefaced these views by pointing out that the R.A.F. had had considerable experience of tribal control during the past 12 or 15 years. In their experience control could best be obtained by placing responsibility for law and order on the local Sheikh or headman. Should he fail for lack of support, action was then taken to support him. Should he rebel or disorder arise through any misdemeanour on his part, action was then immediately taken against him and his followers. Success lay in the speed with which the action was taken whilst the misdemeanour was yet in the minds of the individuals concerned. These methods, Group Captain Peirse stated, had proved successful and it seemed reasonable to suppose that the tribes on the Trucial coast would prove no exception. In any case, the Air Ministry considered that, should an unfortunate incident arise, aircraft were likely to

1.






(217)
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be early arrivals on the scene and that action by them in conjunction with warships was likely to prove adequate to restore the situation. He states further that the Air Ministry did not visualise the employment of Imperial Troops.

CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM stated that the Royal Navy had been operating on the Trucial coast for many years and had had considerable experience in dealing with local Sheikhs. They had thought it their duty to point out the implications likely to be involved were a night halting place for aircraft established in this region. They felt strongly that Ministers should be informed on this subject and had accordingly presented this aspect of the case. It certainly was never the intention of the Admiralty to exclude the possibility of co-operation with the Royal Air Force in the event of an emergency arising.

MR. WALTON observed that defence measures must certainly be discussed, though no detailed plan could obviously be settled at present.

MR. RENDWEL agreed that the views of the Air Ministry on the question of defence ought to be stated in the Memorandum. The Admiralty views on this point were fully explained in paragraph 8. The War Office views were stated in paragraph 9. The Air Ministry view that an emergency could to a large extent be dealt with by air action could not be ignored, and he suggested that a new paragraph expressing the Air Ministry view on the defence question should be inserted between paragraphs 8 and 9 of the draft. A new paragraph (paragraph 9 of the revised draft) was accordingly prepared and agreed to.






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MR. REMDEL then raised the following question. The difficulties and dangers which the Admiralty foresaw in the establishment of the Arabian route were very fully stated in the draft memorandum, but the final recommendation of the Sub-Committee was that the establishment of the Arabian route should be proceeded with. It was not clear whether the Admiralty really subscribed to this recommendation. Indeed, their views, as expressed in the memorandum, developed a strong case against its adoption. He considered that the memorandum in its present form was fundamentally unsatisfactory, and would place Ministers in a difficult position, since it argued strongly against the establishment of an Arabian air route with stopping places on the Trucial Coast, and then proceeded to recommend that authority should be given to proceed with the matter. He felt that the Admiralty should either subscribe to some general statement, such as, that, in view of the arguments in favour of the Arabian route and the apparent absence of any alternative, they would waive their objections and definitely subscribe to the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that the establishment of the route should be proceeded with, or alternatively, that the Admiralty should dissent from the ^{majority} recommendation of the Sub-Committee and produce a minority report suggesting some alternative course of action. He did not regard the general statement at the beginning of para. 7, that the Admiralty "did not dispute the desirability of ensuring the continuance of the air route to India", as going far enough.

CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM demurred and stated that the sole object of the Admiralty was to ensure that the risks involved were brought to the notice of the Ministers concerned. It was not within their province, nor was it their desire, to





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
say whether a civil air route was essential or not. They were not, however, convinced that every alternative had been fully explored, such as the establishment of a sea-borne link between Bahrain and Qandahar, which would only entail a delay of some six hours.

MR. BERTRAM stated that this solution had been considered, but rejected on the ground that owing to the very limited load carried by aircraft it was not commercially practicable.

MR. RENDEL maintained his objections to the memorandum in its present form. He felt strongly that the Admiralty should either admit that, in view of the arguments on the other side, they were prepared not to press their objections, or should definitely dissent from the conclusion of the Sub-Committee. To make recommendations to Ministers, and at the same time to argue so conclusively against those recommendations in the explanatory memorandum, was illogical, and would make it most difficult for Ministers to give a satisfactory decision.

MR. GRIEVE suggested that two alternative propositions should be put before Ministers, supported by two sets of arguments, and that the Ministerial Sub-Committee should be asked to choose between them. He also wished to submit a redraft of paragraph 10 of the draft memorandum, somewhat re-stating the Treasury point of view.

MR. RENDEL accepted Mr. Grieve's re-draft of paragraph 10, which now appears as paragraph 11 of the revised draft; but he saw strong objection to putting two alternatives before Ministers without giving them a lead in favour of one or the other. He felt that the Sub-Committee ought to come into the open and definitely recommend one course of action.






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On the other hand, he felt that the difficulty might be got over if, after the views of the various Departments and the Admiralty objections had been stated, the various alternatives were summarised, together with a summary of the arguments in favour of, and against, each. After this summary a paragraph could be inserted explaining that, on the balance, the Sub-Committee definitely recommended one particular course of action. He thought, that it would be very difficult to embark on negotiations with the Sheikhs if we were not prepared to carry them through. The Political Resident might find the Sheikh willing to accept a settlement provided it were concluded at once. In his view the mere opening of negotiations would go a long way towards committing us to the adoption of the Arabian route and to the acceptance of the dangers foreseen by the Admiralty. Were the Admiralty really prepared to subscribe to the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on such a basis?

CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM saw no need for the negotiations to be definitely concluded at this stage. The urgent question appeared to be to obtain authority for the Political Resident to initiate the negotiations. The course of these negotiations might give a useful indication of how far the Admiralty fears were justified. In any case we did not wish to commit ourselves finally on the Arabian coast, since it had been explained that one of the objects in proceeding with the /






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preparations for the establishment of the Arabian route was the chance that it might strengthen our hands in dealing with the Persians. There was therefore still a slight hope that the Persian route might prove available after all, or why otherwise should the effect of the present proposal on our position vis-à-vis the Persians be of any importance; and if this was so, we obviously could not commit ourselves definitely and finally to the Arab Sheikhs at this stage. Moreover in the opinion of the Admiralty some better alternative route might still be found.

MR. REMDEL admitted the force of this argument, and added that in any case it would be important not to enter into a permanent arrangement with the Sheikh, which might be binding for all time and tie our hands in the distant future. Any agreement reached should either be of a temporary nature or should have a provision enabling us to denounce it. These points and those raised by the Admiralty could all be met, however, if it were specified in the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that any agreement which Colonel Biscoe might reach with the Sheikh, or Sheikhs, concerned should be subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government. This would mean that even if Colonel Biscoe found it necessary to conclude an agreement immediately he could still explain that the agreement needed the ratification or approval of His Majesty's Government - which would be reasonable - and we should then still be free to reconsider the matter and make any necessary amendments in it. The question of the temporary or terminable character of the agreement was a subsidiary point which could be dealt with departmentally in the instructions issued to Colonel Biscoe.

MR. GRIEVE suggested that the question of the duration of the agreement might be got over by arranging that any





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payment made to the local Sheikh would be in the form of landing or harbour dues, on the basis of the number of landings made. This might encourage him to be helpful, as he would naturally be anxious to see increased air traffic and with it increased revenue.

THE AIR MINISTRY saw certain objections to this proposal, which was not proceeded with.

CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM asked that it should be recorded that the Admiralty, while unaware of the details of the proposed rest house, were of opinion that the transport to, mooring of, and subsequent maintenance of such a station in the lagoon at Ras al Khaimah may involve considerable difficulty.

MR. RENDEL then redrafted the final paragraphs of the memorandum on the lines suggested at the meeting, so as to state the two alternative courses which appeared to be open to His Majesty's Government and to show that the Sub-Committee on the balance of argument definitely recommended the adoption of a particular line. The memorandum as redrafted was then finally revised and agreed to by the Sub-Committee. A copy of the memorandum, as finally agreed on, is attached.


CONCLUSION.

THE MEETING AGREED:-

- (a) to instruct the Secretary to circulate the memorandum as redrafted for the final approval of members;
- (b) to bring the memorandum, when finally approved, before the Ministers who constitute the Ministerial Sub-Committee at the earliest possible moment, as soon as the Ministers concerned should have assumed office.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

6th November, 1931.





(225) (223)
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SECRET.

COPY NO. 4

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

Reference Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,
November 2nd, 1931. (M.E.(C) 12th Mtg).


C O R R I G E N D U M.

Page 3. In Mr. Grieve's remarks, line 6.

For "en air route" read "a civil air
route".

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

6th November, 1931.





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SECRET.

M.F. (O) 12th Meeting.

COPY NO. 7

FINAL COPY.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THE MIDDLE EAST.

MINUTES of a Meeting of the Sub-Committee held
at No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., on Monday,
November 2nd, 1931, at 3.0 p.m.

(SUBJECT - EASTERN AIR ROUTE)

P R E S E N T:

Mr. G.W. Rendel,
Counsellor, Foreign Office. (In the Chair.)

Captain J.H.D. Cunningham, M.V.O.,
R.N., Director of Plans Division,
Admiralty.

Group-Captain R.E.C. Peirse, D.S.O.
A.F.C., Directorate of Operations
and Intelligence, Air Ministry.

Colonel K.D.B. Murray, D.S.O.,
General Staff, War Office.

Mr. R.A. Grieve, O.B.E.,
Assistant Secretary, Treasury.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. J.C. Walton, C.B., M.C.,
Assistant Secretary,
India Office.

Mr. F.G.L. Bertram, C.B.E.,
Deputy Director of Civil
Aviation, Air Ministry.


Mr. W.H. Hancock, M.B.E.,
Principal, Admiralty.

Mr. C.W. Baxter, M.C.,
First Secretary, Foreign Office.

Squadron-Leader H.S. Kerby,
D.S.O., A.F.C., Directorate
of Operations and Intelligence,
Air Ministry.

Mr. K.W. Blaxter,
Principal,
Colonial Office.

Major N.G. Hind, M.C., Secretary to the Sub-Committee.






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THE COMMITTEE had before them the following papers:-

- (1) Paper No. M.L.(O) 35 -
Copy of a letter dated 29th October, 1931,
from the Director of Operations and
Intelligence, Air Ministry.
- (2) Paper No. M.L.(O) 36 -
Papers circulated at the request of the
Foreign Office.
- (3) Paper No. M.L.(O) 37 -
Copy of telegrams to and from the Govern-
ment of India, circulated at the request of
the India Office.

MR. RENDEL explained that the meeting had been called to consider certain urgent questions connected with the proposed establishment of a civil air route to India along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf. This question had been before the Cabinet in July last, but no decision had been reached on the main issue of the establishment of the Arabian route as at the last moment the possibility had presented itself of striking a bargain with Persia, by which the Persian Government should agree to extend the permission for Imperial Airways to use the South Persian air route after its present date of expiration in March 1932, in return for the re-opening of the Duzdab Railway to which they appeared to attach some importance. No progress had been made in this direction, however, and it now seemed most improbable that a settlement would be reached on these lines. The Foreign Office view indeed was that the possibility of obtaining from the Persians any extension of the permit to use the South Persian route was now exceedingly remote. His Majesty's Government had no levers to use with the Persians in this matter, and so long as they had no alternative route to fall back on were in a hopelessly weak position vis-à-vis the Persian Government. With the Persians in their present state of mind, there was no likelihood of

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
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obtaining any concession from them so long as they thought that we were entirely in their power and dependent on them for our main air communications to India.

In view therefore (1) of the fact that the South Persian route would almost certainly not be available after March 1932, and (2) of the fact that we were in any case helpless in dealing with the Persians unless we had an alternative to the South Persian route ready to fall back on, the Foreign Office considered it a matter of great importance that the preparation of an alternative route should be proceeded with with the least possible delay, unless His Majesty's Government were prepared to see the air service to India definitely interrupted.

The establishment of an alternative route along the Arabian coast involved negotiations with certain of the Arabian rulers concerned, including the offer of a subsidy in return for certain necessary facilities and guarantees. These negotiations would be difficult and should be initiated at the earliest possible moment. Colonel Biscoe, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was expected to visit the Trucial Coast about the middle of November, and it was very desirable that the necessary instructions should be sent to him in time to enable him to initiate the proposed negotiations during his impending visit.

MR. REMDEL believed that there was a general agreement among the Departments concerned on these points, but he understood that two difficulties had arisen, and it was particularly to deal with these that the present meeting had been called. The first was that the Treasury were reluctant to give the necessary sanction for the proposed subsidy to the Arabian ruler, or rulers, concerned - without the specific authority either of the Cabinet or of a Cabinet Committee. The second was that the Admiralty would be






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closely concerned with the question of the protection of any landing places or rest houses established on the Arabian coast and that he understood that they wished to raise certain points in connection with this aspect of the matter.

MR. REMDEL asked Mr. Grieve to explain the Treasury point of view.

MR. GRIEVE said that in the Treasury view an authoritative ruling should be sought either from the Cabinet or from the Ministerial Committee as to the policy of opening the new route. The decision of the Cabinet in July last certainly gave no authority for establishing an air route along the Arabian shore or for expenditure thereon. Obviously the Treasury would have preferred to see a comprehensive financial statement of the capital and running costs of the new route. He understood however that this could not be made available at the present time and that the matter was of sufficient urgency that the preliminary arrangements in respect of Ras al Khaimah should be made at once. He therefore confined his point to the necessity of obtaining an authoritative decision in the matter of policy.

CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM stated that the Admiralty feared that there would be considerable difficulties in maintaining such a route, especially if it were attempted to establish a rest stage at Ras al Khaimah or any other place on the strip of coast controlled by the Trucial Sheikhs. This coast was in a constant state of unrest, owing to the rivalries of the various local Chieftains. An unfortunate incident might easily arise which it would be the business of the Admiralty, and possibly the War Office, to clear up.






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At Ras al Khaimah the proposed "floating rest house" would be moored in an enclosed lagoon within easy rifle range of the palm groves on the shore, and very liable to attack, particularly by any discontented local elements who wished to involve the local Sheikh in trouble. He considered that more than a few armed guards would be required for defence purposes. In his view, a subsidy to the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah would by no means represent the ultimate cost. Other local Sheikhs would demand subsidies, and there also existed the possibility of involving Ibn Saud.

While the Admiralty recognised the desirability of an air route along the Arab coast, they had no information to show that all possible alternatives had been fully explored. He suggested that the island of Abu Musa, which lies some sixty miles to the west of Ras al Khaimah would be an alternative rest stage on the route. Here the problem of defence was simple, and, being an island some two miles long by one mile broad, whatever the direction of the wind it seemed possible that by providing alternative moorings on either side of the island the necessary facilities could be ensured. He was aware that Abu Musa could not be used for land planes, whereas a landing ground at Ras al Khaimah was practicable, but it was apparently admitted that this route must now be operated by flying boats.

Should Abu Musa prove impracticable, he suggested that Imperial Airways should be asked to consider further the possibility of a non-stop flight from Bahrain to Gwadar, which would obviate any landing on the Trucial coast.

He considered that the full implications and risks





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
involved, if an air station were established at Ras al Khaimah, should be brought to the notice of the Ministers concerned before they arrived at any decision. He was averse to any immediate reference being made to the Cabinet or the Ministerial Committee unless this had been done.

COLONEL MURRAY said that the War Office agreed with the Admiralty point of view.

MR. WALTON stated that the sum of £3,000 represented an outside limit at the disposal of the Political Resident in the Gulf as allowances to the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah and other local notables. The main object of these allowances would be to secure the goodwill of the Sheikh and his people and thus facilitate the establishment of the route and reduce the difficulties of defence to a minimum. In this region the inhabitants are very poor, particularly so at the present moment, owing to depression in the pearling industry, consequently a small amount of money goes a long way.

In his view this expenditure was not merely a subsidy, but a definite quid pro quo, i.e., expenditure on account of rent of the lagoon at Ras al Khaimah, and a further sum to the local inhabitants for its protection. The Secretary of State for India was anxious to start preparations for the establishment of this route at the earliest possible moment.

MR. BERTRAM said that it was the intention of Imperial Airways to operate a seaplane service between Basra and Karachi via the Arabian coastal route. In this event it would be necessary to establish some intermediate stage where passengers would pass the night and aircraft refuel. It was proposed to anchor a vessel to serve as a






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rest house for passengers, as a stores depot, a wireless station, and as permanent quarters for a few operators and mechanics. A barge for the storage of oil fuel and two moorings for seaplanes would also be necessary.

Ras al Khaimah had been chosen as the most suitable place, as the result of surveys by Air Ministry representatives. Abu Musa had been reconnoitred by the present Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, who had twice visited the island and who had reported that it was impracticable. Ras al Khaimah was accordingly the most suitable place for an intermediate resting stage, Bahrain and Gwadar being convenient halts for fuelling purposes, while Koweit, Yas island and Ormara formed emergency refuelling stations en route.

As regards the Admiralty suggestion to fly from Bahrain to Gwadar in one flight, the distance involved, i.e., over seven hundred miles, was not outside the power of aircraft, but owing to the amount of petrol etc., that would have to be carried, any economic load was impossible. Not only was such a long distance flight undesirable, from the point of view of maintenance and wear and tear involved, but a complete re-adjustment of Imperial Airways route and times would be required.

GROUP CAPTAIN PEIRSE was convinced that the possibilities of Abu Musa had been fully explored by the Air Ministry. He recognised that the question of defence at Ras al Khaimah and the risks involved should be pointed out to the Ministers concerned. The Air Ministry were, however, very anxious to obtain an early decision to open negotiations with the Trucial chiefs with a view to establishing this route.






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MR. REMDEL emphasised the importance of proceeding without further delay to the preparation of some alternative to the South Persian route, which would almost certainly not be available after March 1932. If the air service to India was not to be closed down, the development of the Arabian route appeared to be the sole solution. If, however, this was to be ready in time to be of any use, negotiations must be opened with the Arabian rulers concerned at once. Authority was required to enable the Political Resident to do this during his impending visit to the Trucial Coast and to enable him to offer the subsidy which had been proposed.

The general views of the Sub-Committee might be summed up as follows:

The AIR MINISTRY & INDIA OFFICE considered that in view of the urgency of the question immediate steps should be taken to secure the necessary Ministerial authority. The FOREIGN OFFICE who had long been pressing the urgency of the matter shared this view. The ADMIRALTY on the other hand considered that Ministers should not be asked to authorise the opening of negotiations with the Arab rulers or the offer to those rulers of the proposed subsidy without having the dangers and difficulties involved placed clearly before them. The WAR OFFICE were inclined to support this view, and regarded with misgiving the possibility of being called upon to supply ground troops in an emergency for the protection of the proposed Trucial Coast landing and refuelling station.

The TREASURY wished before sanctioning the payment of the proposed subsidy to have authority from the Cabinet, or a Cabinet Committee, which would cover not only the subsidy but any further expenditure involved should the dangers anticipated by the Admiralty materialise. They did not wish to oppose any steps which might be necessary for the maintenance of the air service





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to India, but they were anxious that all the aspects of the question should be fully considered before we committed ourselves to a policy which might involve ultimate further expenditure.

The COLONIAL OFFICE asked for a few days delay before the matter was referred to Ministers in order to study the question further and submit the necessary information regarding it to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, as Chairman of the Ministerial Sub-Committee for Middle Eastern Questions, was very closely concerned.

MR. REINDEL therefore suggested that an effort should be made to prepare a comprehensive memorandum putting the whole matter before the Ministerial Sub-Committee and setting out the views of the various Departments. He suggested that the Admiralty, Air Ministry and India Office representatives should prepare a joint statement of their views which could then be incorporated by the Foreign Office into a comprehensive draft, and that the Official Sub-Committee should meet again as soon as possible in order to consider this draft with a view to its submission to Ministers.


CONCLUSION. The Sub-Committee agreed (a) that Captain Cunningham, Group-Captain Peirse and Mr. Walton should prepare a draft statement explaining the Admiralty, Air Ministry and India Office points of view, and showing the advantages and disadvantages involved.


(b) that the Foreign Office should then embody this statement in a draft memorandum on the whole question for consideration at the next meeting of the Official Sub-Committee;

(c) that the Official Sub-Committee should meet at 3 p.m. on Thursday November 5, at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., to consider the draft statement in its final form.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
4th November, 1931.

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I think this is substantially all right;
but it covers the impression that the
Admiralty alone have over the situation & risks,
& that the Air Force has been entirely left out of the
U.S.S.

This is the draft memorandum which the
official Middle East Sub-Committee asked to have
prepared for discussion at its adjourned meeting
to-morrow with a view to submission to the
Ministerial Sub-Committee.


It will be remembered that submission to
the Ministerial Sub-Committee is necessitated by
the attitude of the Treasury.

The basis of the draft memorandum, except
paragraph 8 which was incorporated by the Admiralty,
was prepared by Mr. Rendel the chairman of the sub-
committee; it was discussed with him yesterday and
subsequently with representatives of the Air Ministry
and Admiralty. It will be seen that paragraph 11
recommends that the instructions which we desire
should be sent to Colonel Biscoe. I understand that
the Admiralty ^{are prepared to} agree to this, in view of the fact that
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the memorandum contain a full
statement of their views as to the various difficulties
and dangers involved at Ras-al-Khaimah.

The Air Ministry
in action being
kind to know
no big ready
light. I have had to
set them aside.
Para. 6 also seems
to credit the
Air Force to
definite operations.
Some small
alterations in
wording would
remove these
impressions.

G.H.
4.11.31

I discussed this with Mr. Waddy. Some of the alterations of wording were proposed & accepted
in the Sub-Committee. I sounded the Admiralty as to altering the first part of paragraph 11 but we could
not agree on any form of words & I therefore refrained from proposing any alterations to the
Sub-Committee. 4.11.31





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SECRET.

M.E.(O) 38.

COPY NO. 7

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Note by Secretary.


The attached is a draft memorandum which has been prepared for discussion by the Official Sub-Committee at the meeting to be held at 3 p.m., on Thursday, November 5th, 1931, at 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

When finally approved it will be presented to the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

(signed) G.HIND.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

4th November, 1931.





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EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF ARABIAN ROUTE IN VIEW OF
IMENDING CLOSURE OF PERSIAN SECTION.


Draft Memorandum prepared by representatives of
the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty and
Air Ministry.

The Standing Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence have held two meetings to consider this question, which has become one of great urgency.

2. It has become clear that there is now little or no hope of obtaining from the Persian Government an extension of the permission for the use by Imperial Airways of the existing route across southern Persia. It was hoped last July that the desire of the Persian Government to secure the re-opening of the Dubdab Railway might have furnished the means of striking a bargain with Persia by which an extension of the permit to use the South Persian route might be obtained. It now seems highly improbable that such a bargain can be concluded; and it is essential to face the fact that, in all probability, the South Persian air route will be definitely closed down at the end of March 1932. It is therefore of the utmost importance, if the air service to India is not to be interrupted, that an alternative route should be prepared with the least possible delay.

3. In the opinion of the Foreign Office moreover, the only hope of continuing negotiations with the Persian Government on this subject with the remotest chance of success lies in our having an alternative route to fall back on. So long as the Persians regard us as being entirely in their power in this matter, negotiations will be impossible. The preparation of an alternative route

1.





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
therefore is necessary, not only in order that we may fall back on that route if and when the Persian route is finally closed, but as furnishing the only hope of perhaps after all obtaining an extension of the Persian route by negotiation.

4. The Air Ministry, who have carefully studied the various alternative routes, consider that the only practicable alternative is a route from Basra to Gwadar (and Karachi) following the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. This would necessitate the use of flying boats instead of land planes, and would involve, in addition to a halt at Bahrein (which presents no difficulty), the development of a regular landing place and refuelling station at some point on the Trucial Coast, where passengers would have to spend the night. The Air Ministry consider that the only practicable points for this landing place would be either the lagoon or creek at Ras al Khaimah or that at Um al Qaiwain. From this point it would be possible to fly to Gwadar (which, though belonging to the Sultan of Muscat, is an enclave on the coast of British Baluchistan, and presents no difficulty) in a single flight outside Persian territorial waters.

5. The only really serious difficulty in connection with the development of this route lies in the uncertain attitude of the Trucial Sheikhs, on whose goodwill we shall depend in the first instance for the development of the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar, and subsequently for the safety of the personnel and passengers using the station.


6. The India Office [consider that it should] be possible to secure the necessary facilities and guarantees from the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah, or from the Sheikh of Umm al Qaiwain, in return for a subsidy not exceeding 23,000 a year.

2.



7. The Admiralty, while not disputing the desirability of ensuring the continuance of the air route to India, regard ^{the} ~~the~~ proposal ^{to be made} ~~of~~ the India Office and Air Ministry as involving considerable risks and as liable to lead to commitments ^{on a larger scale} ~~on a larger scale~~ than the other Departments anticipate. They would have much preferred that the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar should either be eliminated or situated on one of the islands in the Persian Gulf or at a point under more direct British control than either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qaiwain. They would therefore urge that a further investigation should be made of the possible alternative/ but if, as the Air Ministry contend, these alternatives should still prove

3.






238 240
entirely impracticable, they are anxious that the decision to open negotiations with the Sheikhs of Ras al Khaimah and Umm al Qaiwain should not be taken without a full realisation of the possible commitments and dangers involved.

8. In this connection the Admiralty point out that when concluding the present agreement for the mooring of the R.A.F. Barge, the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah was given to understand by our Resident Agent (an Arab) in response to his specific enquiry, that no further concession would be demanded of him. It is possible therefore that a request now for further facilities might be misrepresented as a breach of faith which might prejudice our position with the Trucial Arabs generally, though this danger may be considered to have been reduced by the recent tacit acceptance by the Sheikh of the use by the R.A.F. of a shore landing ground.

The Admiralty further consider that, even if the proposed negotiations should lead to a successful result, the position in which the rest vessel and barges will be moored in the Lagoon at Ras al Khaimah, which is landlocked, surrounded by palms and out of sight from warships anchored off the town, will be exposed to risk of sniping at night by disaffected followers of the local Sheikh or of neighbouring tribes seeking an opportunity to embroil the Sheikh. In addition, the Sheikh will be exposed to the risk of attack by neighbouring tribesmen on a serious scale which might lead to our having to support him and possibly to carry out punitive operations.

In the event of trouble occurring, the fact that at Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qaiwain warships cannot enter the Lagoon but are forced to lie some one and a half miles to seaward makes it impossible for the Navy to afford any defence without landing forces from the ship. The





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
Admiralty also point out that a further complication would be introduced in the event of an aircraft operated by a foreign company becoming involved in any incident on the Trucial coast, since the necessary measures to obtain reparations and to ensure future protection might develop into a question of international concern.

9. The War Office are not directly concerned in the question of the maintenance of the civil air route to India, except in so far as the Admiralty fears may prove to be justified and a call may be made for troops for the protection of the proposed landing station on the Trucial coast in an emergency. They regard it as important to maintain and develop a strategic air route along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, but are doubtful how far this will be furthered by the establishment of a civil route for sea planes.

10. The Treasury fully appreciate the importance of maintaining the air route to India. They are not prepared however to sanction any expenditure in connection with the proposed negotiations with the Arab rulers concerned, except on the direct authority of a decision of the Cabinet or of the Ministerial Sub-Committee for Questions Concerning the Middle East, and unless they are assured that the possible implications of such a decision, as indicated by the Admiralty, are fully realised.


11. In view however (1) of the great importance of maintaining the air route to India, (2) of the extreme improbability of the South Persian route remaining available after March 1932, and (3) of the urgency of preparing an alternative without further delay, the Middle East Official Sub-Committee recommend

- (a) that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf should be authorised immediately to open



for - limited period
only with the
scientific staff 7/19/11
(b)

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Minute Paper.

Department.

Note on meeting of Middle East Official Sub-Committee
2nd November.

The Treasury stated that they would make no difficulty about the subsidy to a limit of £3000 a year, provided that the policy of the civil air route along the Arab shore were first formally endorsed by a Cabinet decision or by the Ministerial Middle East Sub-Committee before definite instructions were sent to Colonel Biscoe.



The Admiralty raised the difficulty of protection. I suggested that this would be very much reduced if Colonel Biscoe obtains an agreement with the Sheikh, and The Admiralty agreed. But they suggested that further consideration should be given to the possibility of finding some alternative plan which would avoid the necessity of a night-stop at Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain, and were doubtful whether the First Lord would agree to instructions being sent to Colonel Biscoe meanwhile.


It was pointed out how urgent it was that definite authority should be given to Colonel Biscoe to open negotiations with the Sheikhs at once. It was suggested that it might be submitted that the matter should be brought before the Cabinet as a matter of urgency tomorrow. A conclusion in this sense was drafted with a view to empowering Colonel Biscoe to commence negotiations, while other aspects of the problem including that of defence were further considered. The Admiralty were at first prepared to agree to this formula, but subsequently both they and/

Letter of Mr.
L. S. L.
3.11

Letter. This
sums up the
course. No
further. I am
very glad to
hear of the
early conclusion.

SA 4/11







Minute Paper.

Department.

and the Colonial Office objected that there was not sufficient time to brief their Ministers before tomorrow.

As it was understood that there would not be another Cabinet till next week, the alternative of a recommendation to the Ministerial Sub-Committee was considered. Mr. Rendel was inclined to think that the divergent views of the Admiralty and of the rest of the official Sub-Committee should be submitted to the Ministerial Sub-Committee. As this would involve a meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee in order to decide the difference, I suggested that an effort should still be made to reach an agreed conclusion which would satisfy the Admiralty for the time being, while still allowing Colonel Biscoe to go ahead; such an agreed conclusion might be endorsed by the Ministerial Sub-Committee in circulation, thus satisfying the Treasury without its being necessary to wait for a meeting of that Committee. It was settled that an effort should be made on 3rd November by the Air Ministry, Admiralty and India Office representatives to draft such a conclusion and that the official Sub-Committee should meet again on 5th November.

2. 11. 31





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SECRET.

M.E.(O) 12th Meeting.

COPY NO. 7

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

A meeting of the Sub-Committee will be held in Conference Room "A", No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., on Monday, November 2nd, 1931, at 3.0 p.m.

A G E N D A.

SUBJECT - EASTERN AIR ROUTE.



1. Copy of a letter dated 29th October, 1931, from the Director of Operations and Intelligence, Air Ministry.
(Paper No. M.E.(O) 35 - circulated herewith).
2. Papers circulated at the request of the Foreign Office.
(Paper No. M.E.(O) 36 - circulated herewith).
3. Copy of telegrams to and from the Government of India, circulated at the request of the India Office.
(Paper No. M.E.(O) 37 - circulated herewith).

(Signed) G. HIND.

Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

30th October, 1931.





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SECRET.

M.E. 35.

COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THE MIDDLE EAST.

Subject:-

Eastern Air Route.

Letter by Director of Operations and Intelligence,
Air Ministry, dated 29th October, 1931, to the Secretary,
Standing Official Sub-Committee for Questions Concerning the
Near East.

AIR MINISTRY,

LONDON, W.C.2.

29th October, 1931.

S.30656.

Persian Gulf - Civil Air Route on Arabian Coast.



The Cabinet on 5th November, 1928 (Cabinet 49 (28)
Conclusion 1), approved generally the Interim Report (C.I.D.
Paper No. 169-D) of Lord Hailsham's Sub-Committee of the
Committee of Imperial Defence.

The Report contained among the Summary of Con-
clusions the following:-

"We should press on with the measures required to
establish and secure our strategic and civil air
routes along the shores of the Gulf. On the
Arabian littoral we should retain the status quo
in its entirety. On the Persian littoral we
should maintain the status quo to the utmost limit
that political considerations will admit."

"On the Arabian side of the Gulf every possible
effort should be made by political means to prepare
the way for the development of the air route.
Wherever the conditions are favourable, early steps
should be taken to secure the necessary aerodromes
and facilities, and, if necessary, financial con-
sideration should be given to the Chiefs concerned
for this purpose."

- 1 -





2. From the above, it is clear that the development visualised was:-

- (a) A strategic air route on the Arabian shore.
- (b) A civil route on the Persian shore.

Formal approval has not, therefore, so far been given to the policy of developing a civil route as such on the Arabian shore.

3. As the Committee are aware, negotiations with Persia for facilities on the Persian shore have been in progress for some time, and appear likely to fall through, especially if we have no alternative route available on the termination of the present agreement with Persia at the end of March, 1932.

It is most necessary to make arrangements as early as possible for the operation of the civil route on the Arab shore and the immediate requirement is authority to make financial arrangements with the local sheikhs. At a later date the question of protection of the ground installations and passenger accommodation may have to be considered also.

The first requirement, however, is formal approval for the policy of making preparations with a view to inaugurating civil air services on the Arabian littoral next April, and it is suggested that the M.E. (O) Committee should recommend, as early as possible, that this approval should be given.

The matter is one of considerable urgency since it is understood that the Resident, Persian Gulf, will be visiting Ras al Khaimah in the course of the next few days and it is clearly important that the question of air facilities should be arranged simultaneously with other matters outstanding with the Sheikh.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that quite apart from the need for maintaining the India service of Imperial Airways regardless of Persian intransigence, the opening of the civil route on the Arabian shore will fully accord with the approved policy of maintaining strategic routes wherever possible by the operation of civil services on a commercial basis in order to avoid duplication of effort and expense.



(Signed) C.S. BURNETT.

Director of Operations and
Intelligence.

The Secretary,
Standing Official Sub-Committee for
Questions Concerning the Middle East,
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

30th October, 1931.





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SECRET.

M.E.(O) 37.

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COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THE MIDDLE EAST.

SUBJECT:-

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Note by Secretary.



Copies of telegrams to and from the Government of India on the question of the Air route to the East are circulated to members of the sub-committee at the request of the India Office.

- (1) From Secretary of State for India to the Government of India No. 3032 of 16th October, 1931.
- (2) From the Government of India No. 23835 of 21st October, 1931 in reply to the above.

(Signed) G. HIND.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

30th October, 1931.





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COPY OF TELEGRAM No. 3032 FROM SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DATED 16.10.31.


Foreign and Political Department 3032.

Your telegram 25th July, 1851-S. and connected correspondence. Air Route.

2. Every effort will be made to obtain Persian agreement to continuation of permit to fly south Persian route, as drawbacks of Arab route from both commercial and political points of view are fully recognised. But it is in any case essential, as is realised by Government of India no less than His Majesty's Government, that air communications with India should be maintained, and as it is still uncertain whether Persia will agree to extension of permit it is essential to make preparations in advance for Arab route as second string in case negotiations with Persia fail. Knowledge that Arab route is in course of preparation may quite possibly also make Persians more reasonable if once they realise that we are not dependent on South Persian Route.

3. Air Ministry point out that it is the approved policy of His Majesty's Government, after routes have been organised strategically, to arrange wherever possible for them to be kept open by regular civil air lines, e.g. Cairo-Baghdad and Cairo-Cape routes. Development of civil air route along Arabian coast, if forced on us prematurely by Persian intransigence, has at least this compensating advantage.

4. It is contemplated that Imperial Airways would operate Arab coast route by seaplanes with terminal






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stations at Basra and Karachi and night-stop at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain. Abu Musa which you suggested as alternative for intermediate station has been considered but is unsuitable.

Facilities (regarding which no special difficulties arise) would be required for refuelling stations at Bahrein and Gwadar and emergency refuelling stations at Koweit, Yas Island and Ormara. Full list of requirements was sent by air mail of 9 October. At either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain two moorings and refuelling barge would be required and Imperial Airways propose to maintain a sloop or hospital barge or some other suitable vessel which would accommodate passengers and staff and also act as a wireless station and stores depot. Two or three Europeans might be left in charge of this barge.

5. Matter has been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government after a full discussion between the India Office, the Foreign Office and the Air Ministry. It is thought that best plan will be that Biscoe should have free hand to negotiate with Sheikhs as soon as possible after his return with a view to securing requisite facilities at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain by such methods as he finds best, but that he should first try to secure an agreement from Sheikh concerned to provide facilities in return for allowances on fairly generous scale so as to overcome opposition of Sheikh's retainers. Air Ministry are taking up with Treasury question of provision of funds for this purpose.


6. Means of protecting Imperial Airways establishments and preventing unfortunate incidents





will have to be fully examined by His Majesty's Government but it is understood that Government of India do not undertake any responsibility in this connection.

7. Please telegraph whether you concur in proposed instructions to Biscoe.





TELEGRAM NO. 23835.

from Government of India, Foreign
and Political Department, to Secretary
of State for India.

Dated New Delhi, 21st October, 1931.


Received 21st October, 1931, 3.50 p.m.

2583-S. Addressed to Secretary of State for India
and repeated to Resident, Bushire, to whom copy of Secretary
of State's telegram under reference is being sent by post.
Copy to Minister at Tehran by air mail.

Your 3032. Air route.

2. We concur in the proposed instructions to Biscoe.

3. We suggest that, if trouble is to be avoided later
on, Biscoe should, so far as possible while making
reasonably generous offers, endeavour in each instance to
secure something definite and tangible, and not merely
good will, as quid pro quo. For example, at Ras-al-Khaimah,
it seems to us legitimate to pay rent for use of lagoon and
wages for such guards as may be required, or even to appoint
some particularly obstreperous relative of the Sheikh to
command guards, but undisguised blackmail always spells
trouble later.





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SECRET.

M.E.(O) 36.

COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THE MIDDLE EAST.

SUBJECT:-

EASTERN AIR ROUTE.

Note by Secretary.

The following papers are circulated at the request of the Foreign Office to members of the Sub-Committee for their information.

Annexure I. Record of an interdepartmental meeting held on July 8th, 1931.

Annexure II. Memorandum prepared by the Secretary of State for Air, dated 23rd July, 1931.

Annexure III. Extract from a Conclusion by the Cabinet on this matter, dated 30th July, 1931.


Annexure IV. Letter from Lord Amulree, Secretary of State for Air to Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, dated 28th September 1931.

(Sgd.) G. HIND.

Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

30th October, 1931.





ANNEXURE NO. 1.

S. 26214.

Record of an interdepartmental Meeting held at the Air Ministry (Gwydyr House) on 8th July, 1931, to consider the Persian attitude to the operation of the England-India air service in the Persian Gulf.

Present:-

Air Ministry: Mr. F. Montague (U.S. of S.) (Chairman).
Mr. C. Ll. Bullock.
Sir S. Dannreuther.
Air Vice Marshal C.S. Burnett.
Mr. F.G.L. Bertram.
Major R.H.S. Mealing.
Mr. G. Calder.
Mr. W.W. Burkett.

Colonial Office: Mr. K.W. Blaxter.

Foreign Office: Mr. G.W. Rendel.
Mr. C.W. Baxter.

India Office: Mr. J.G. Laithwaite.
Mr. G.H. Silver.

Imperial Airways Ltd: Mr. G.E. Woods Humphery.


Mr. Montague referred to the brief expose of the position which had been prepared in the Air Ministry and circulated to the Meeting. He asked Mr. Woods Humphery as a preliminary to give an explanation on the point raised by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, as to why the central route should be impossible for Imperial Airways Ltd., when the German-Persian Company operated it with success.

Mr. Woods Humphery replied that the routes operated by the Junkers Company were different from that laid down by the Persians as the air route to India and did not present such difficulties of terrain. Moreover, the Junkers Company operated with small aircraft with which they were content to face possible forced landings and damage. Delays and interruptions of the service for climatological reasons would be inevitable during a great part of the year. It would not, in fact, be possible for Imperial Airways to operate a service of the same standard as they had built up on other sections of the route.

Mr. Rendel gave an appreciation of the political aspect of the question. The attitude of Persia was at present hostile to foreign, and particularly British, interests. They resented our predominance in the Gulf and were politically determined to bring that position to an end. In the Foreign Office view the indications were definite that Persia would refuse to renew the permit for the coastal route. Even the Junkers Company was suffering from Persia's anti-foreign mentality and contemplated reducing their air services.

It was therefore extremely important to concentrate on an alternative route. From the bargaining standpoint the Foreign Office were powerless in the absence of such an alternative.

(1)





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Only one sector of the Arabian coast route (the Nejd sector) was the immediate concern of his Department, and there the difficulties were not unaccountable. He appreciated the difficulties of the stretch with which the India Office were concerned, but on the assumption that flying boats would be used he thought that it should be possible to establish the route on reasonable conditions. He felt that Colonel Biscoe had stated the case in extreme terms and that in the light of the Persian difficulties the possibilities of the Arabian side should be fully examined.


In reply to a question on the point, Mr. Rendel stated that there was nothing to prevent the Persians from allowing the French and Dutch to continue to use the coastal route and yet refusing to renew the British permit. Such a course would not constitute a breach of any agreement and without a cast iron legal case the matter could not be taken to the League of Nations. On the one hand there was at present no lever to use with the Persians to force a permit, and on the other hand there were many other British interests in Persia to consider. Even supposing that it was found possible to force Persia's hands, Imperial Airways Ltd. would probably be subjected to various vexations and their operations would probably be made almost impossible.

It was probable that the Persians would close down the coastal route altogether and inform the French and Dutch that, if they wished to carry on the service through Persia, they must use the Central Persian route. While it was clear from what Mr. Woods Humphery had said that this route would be impracticable for Imperial Airways, with their large machines and high standards of safety, it was possible that the French, in particular, who use small machines and are prepared to take greater risks, might agree to use the Central route. In that case the invidiousness of the Persians granting permission to the French and definitely refusing it to the British would not arise, but the situation would, nevertheless, be equally unsatisfactory.

Mr. Bullock observed that if the French and Dutch permits were renewed we should, presumably, at least apply for renewal also. It was essential to know as soon as possible how we stood in the matter, and that being so he asked whether we should not put them up to making the application for renewal. What he had in mind was not official action, but that Imperial Airways should get in touch with the French and Dutch air transport companies.

Mr. Rendel doubted the wisdom of approaching the French in that sense in case the fact should come to the knowledge of the Persians. He would rather favour the course of letting the French and Dutch know that we were proposing to abandon the route. That would at once tend to better our position with the Persians. The fact that there was a probability, not of the British leaving the Gulf altogether, but of establishing a strong position on the opposite side with a consequent loss to the Persians of all advantages to be derived from the air service might possibly induce them to reconsider their attitude. But it would be useless to rely only on bluff; we must be ready with a genuine alternative route to which it would be possible to have recourse.

There would be no Foreign Office objection to





Imperial Airways Ltd. Making the Dutch and French Companies aware that this alternative was being investigated.

Mr. Bullock asked how the Foreign Office would view an unofficial approach by the Company to the Persian Government for renewal of the permit.


Mr. Rendel replied that the Persians would probably not agree to deal directly with the Company. They would in any case think that the Company had been prompted to act in that way. It would in any case be best to let the French and Dutch make their applications for renewal in the first instance. He could not hold out hope that the Persians would even agree to a temporary extension of Imperial Airways permit.

Mr. Leithwaite stated that his Department recognised the importance of finding a solution of the Persian difficulty and agreed with the Foreign Office as to the necessity for a counter in the negotiations. But there were political complications involved in the use of the Arabian coast, and particularly of the Trucial Area, which they were reluctant to face.

A skeleton military air route had now been established along the coast, but the considerations affecting a civil air service were different. The Political Resident in his Note had indicated the difficulties and the India Office shared his views with regard to them. The policy of the last 100 years had been to preserve a maritime peace there and to abstain from internal commitments. There would be a definite danger of serious incidents arising unless adequate protection were afforded to rest houses and stations established in that area for the air service, and the despatch of troops for purposes of protection would involve a very important change of policy. There is the further difficulty that we could not presumably exclude foreigners were we to establish an air route. Our position on the Trucial coast is difficult and delicate, and the admission of foreigners would tend to undermine it.

In the view of his Department the Persians should be pressed as strongly as possible to modify their attitude and a definite application should be made for Imperial Airways' permit to be renewed. British prestige would suffer a serious blow if the French and Dutch were allowed to operate the obviously better route and the British were refused. He felt that both the Cabinet and the Government of India would wish to be satisfied that every possibility with regard to the Persian route had been exhausted before the Arabian route was adopted.

Mr. Rendel deprecated any attempt to press the Persian Government further. Any approach to the Persians at present was bound to meet with a rebuff, and every such rebuff was likely to retard the eventual re-establishment of British prestige in Persia. Mr. Rendel thought that that prestige could eventually be re-established - but only provided that we did not meanwhile go to the Persians hat in hand and appear dependent on their goodwill.





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In answer to Mr. Bullock's enquiry as to whether he considered that money would oil the wheels with the Trucial sheikhs, Mr. Laithwaite replied that the India Office were advised that small amounts of money in fact went sufficiently far on the Trucial coast. The real difficulty was that these little States were ruled not by the nominal Sheikhs but by a junta, and that the junta was increasingly suspicious of any British or foreign encroachment, or anything which might lead to an increasingly close control.

Air Vice Marshal Burnett pointed out that the military route was vital to the Empire, and that it might be necessary in future to take a stronger line, than hitherto, with the sheikhs.

Mr. Laithwaite said that he understood that in the event of emergency, we could probably immediately reinforce India or the East along the existing military air route.


Mr. Laithwaite pointed out that in return for the degree of protection we at present granted to the Trucial Sheikhs we had secured from them, under treaties, the oldest of which was a century old, undertakings regarding piracy, slavery, gun-running and the control of their foreign relations. This was a not unsubstantial *quid pro quo*. We could not well add to the obligations imposed by our treaties save in agreement with the Sheikhs and in return for some further concession.

Mr. Rendel asked whether a landing place could not be utilised for the Arabian air service in the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, who held the tip of the Mazandam peninsula and the eastern extremity of Arabia, and was more dependent on and better disposed to His Majesty's government than were the Trucial Sheikhs.

Mr. Laithwaite pointed out that the authority of the Sultan of Muscat was very weak in Mazandam, where climatic conditions were also most unfavourable.

Mr. Bullock remarked that for a flying boat service the only Sheikh concerned in the Trucial Area appeared to be the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah.

Mr. Rendel, on the question of the best way of dealing with that ruler, said that we had supported the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah against Persia, whose claim to one of his islands we were firmly resisting on his behalf, and suggested that we were entitled to obtain some concession from him in return. As regards Mr. Bullock's question whether something might be done by way of a subsidy, Mr. Rendel thought that if the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah was indeed the only obstacle to the establishment of the Arabian air route, it should be possible to offer him a price for the use of his lagoon such as he could hardly refuse. A financial inducement might be all the more acceptable at present owing to the serious slump in the pearl trade which had, Mr. Rendel believed, produced a very serious economic crisis on the Trucial coast.





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Mr. Laithwaite was not too easy about the suggestion. Even assuming that we could overcome difficulties with Ras-al-Khaimah by bribing him lavishly, there was the danger of making him a target for his jealous neighbours. He felt, too, that there was some risk that a combination of Sheikhs might be formed against us.

Mr. Woods Humphery suggested that, if it was difficult to maintain a station on land in connection with the air service, it might be possible for his Company to make use of a steam yacht, like their present "Imperia" which is stationed off Crete, both as a W/T station and as a rest house for passengers en route.

Air Vice Marshal Burnett enquired what the attitude would be to an application by the French and Dutch to operate over the Arabian route once it was established.

Mr. Rendel remarked that our position in Arabia was peculiar in that, unlike the position in Iraq and Palestine, we were not tied by international obligation to give facilities to other nations. Our usual policy was, however, in such a case to accord privileges in order that we might ourselves demand others in return.

Mr. Laithwaite referred to our obligations in the event of a foreign aeroplane crashing in the hinterland or along the Trucial coast. We could hardly well refuse to accord assistance, and very awkward political complications might ensue. In any case, it had been our consistent policy to exclude foreigners and we remained anxious to keep this area a British preserve so far as possible, even in present day conditions.

Mr. Bullock observed that the Air Ministry view was that only flying boats should be operated along the Arabian coast at present.


Mr. Woods Humphery remarked on the question of cost that operation of the service in the Persian Gulf by flying boat would involve his Company in additional expenditure, resulting from the change necessitated in their fleet and the greater distance to be flown.

Mr. Bertram enquired whether, in the event of withdrawal of the Persian permit, it would be possible for us to take retaliatory action in Iraq with regard to the Persian-Junkers service to Baghdad.

Mr. Rendel replied that it would be impossible to take retaliatory action against the Persian-Junkers service in Iraq, owing to the no-discrimination provisions of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which the League of Nations would certainly insist on seeing continued after Iraq's admission to the League.

Mr. Bullock said that the next step seemed to be to bring the matter before the Cabinet. He would propose this course to the Secretary of State and have an Air Ministry memorandum prepared on the question. This would be circulated to the other Departments concerned, who would thus have full opportunity of bringing their views before the Cabinet.

(v)





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SECRET.

ANNEXURE II.

THREATENED INTERRUPTION OF THE OPERATION OF THE
ENGLAND-INDIA AIR SERVICE BETWEEN BASRAH AND
KARACHI.

(A)—THE PRESENT SITUATION.

1. I FEEL it necessary to bring before the Cabinet as a matter of urgency the very difficult situation which has arisen *vis-à-vis* Persia in connection with the Indian Air Service. I would remind my colleagues that the air route to India is the key trunk route of the Empire, since, important as it is of itself, it constitutes also the first stage of the route to the Straits Settlements and Australia. Its whole future is now endangered by Persian intransigence.

We have had one international difficulty after another in the organisation of this route, and it is most unfortunate that, when at length we have succeeded in negotiating satisfactory long-term agreements with Italy and Greece safeguarding its operation across Europe, this even more serious complication should be threatening our hard-won security.

2. The service is at present operated along the northern (or eastern) shore of the Persian Gulf, with halts *en route* at three points in Persian territory, viz., Bushire, Lingah and Jask. It was only after difficult and protracted negotiations that the Persian Government consented to give facilities for the use of this coastal route, and, when doing so in 1928, they insisted that their permit to Imperial Airways must be for 3 years only. They were prepared to consider the grant of facilities thereafter to operate via a route across Central Persia (though they gave no positive undertaking as to this), but declared they would in no circumstances renew or extend the permit to fly along the shore of the Gulf. The three-year period runs out in eight months' time, i.e., at the end of March 1932.

3. All that we seek is the right of peaceful transit for *civil* machines only, with but three landings in Persian territory at grounds which were originally prepared and equipped with wireless stations, &c., to a large extent at our charges. The Persian attitude is, therefore, unreasonable in the extreme, though doubtless it has its roots to a large extent in their longstanding dislike of the position which Great Britain has built up for herself in the Gulf, which is now pointed by their new national self-consciousness. At all events, the Air Ministry is advised by the Foreign Office that the present mood of the existing Persian régime is such that, if they persist, we have no option but to accept the situation, seeing that Persia has never ratified her accession to the International Air Traffic Convention. Further, the Foreign Office are reluctant to approach the Persian Government at all in present circumstances, as they hold that to do so, in the absence of any lever on our side, would be to court a refusal with all its consequential embarrassments.

4. I should add that the French and Dutch are also at present operating services over the same route along the Persian coast and that their permits are due to expire 3 months before our own. The Foreign Office advise that the French and Dutch Governments should be left to take the initiative in opening negotiations with the Persian Government for an extension of their permits, and that we should not at this juncture attempt a joint *démarche*, as our association with them would be likely to hinder rather than help matters. It has, however, been agreed that Imperial Airways can approach the French and Dutch Air Transport Companies concerned informally and unofficially and enquire of them

[5769] [6130]



what they propose doing, which may lead to some move on their part. This may or may not in due course clarify the situation, but time presses, and it is the view of the Foreign Office that, even if the French and Dutch permits are extended, it is possible, if not probable, that the Persians will refuse a similar extension to ourselves, and that, if they do so, we shall have no remedy even in the teeth of such glaring discrimination against Great Britain, in view of Persia's failure to ratify the Air Traffic Convention. We appear, in short, to be in a state of complete impotence *vis-à-vis* Persia.

5. If a satisfactory alternative route were available the matter would, perhaps, not be of very great moment. *The trouble is that there is no satisfactory alternative.* The route through Central Persia has just been surveyed by a representative of Imperial Airways, and unfortunately his report is definitely adverse. He advises that it is impracticable, owing primarily to (a) the height of the mountains to be traversed and (b) the unsuitability of the route for operation in winter, whilst (c) it appears that it would be very costly to transport supplies of petrol to the necessary aerodromes. He states that Sir R. Clive expressed the view that the route was "preposterous," crossing as it does high mountain ranges, entailing flight at an altitude of 13,000 feet winter and summer, and generally operation over a terrain so rough that for stretches hundreds of miles in extent there is no possibility of a safe forced landing. Nor are there any telegraphic communications available. He further reports that the head of the Persian Air Force frankly admitted to him that the route was impossible for commercial operation, and undertook to say as much to the Persian authorities. He adds that he is satisfied (and Sir R. Clive confirms) that there is no practicable alternative route across Central Persia. Lest the point be queried, I had, perhaps, better explain that the Junkers services at present in operation in Persia do not fly over this route, and that they are, in any event, able to use for their limited operations a much smaller and lighter type of aircraft which can land in a restricted space. Even so, these services suffer from great irregularity, particularly in the winter, when engines are liable to freeze up, and a machine, once on the ground, has great difficulty in getting into the air again.

6. The only other route lies along the Arabian coast of the Gulf, which is for the most part barren, inhospitable and uncivilised. The terrain is more difficult and the climate is reported to be hotter in summer than on the Persian side, and generally there is, (except perhaps at Bahrein), a lack of facilities and amenities for civilian passengers, which could, however, be remedied without much difficulty. This route is at present in process of being opened up by the Royal Air Force for strategic purposes, but it is not yet fully organised, and even here potential obstacles have been encountered in the shape of opposition by at least one petty Arab potentate—the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah.

If Imperial Airways are compelled to use this route along the Arabian coast, it will mean, I fear, a slowing down of their existing time-table to India, with consequent loss of traffic, and it will almost certainly be necessary to operate this section by flying boats, instead of by landplanes as at present, which will entail increased expense.

7. Nevertheless, in the *impasse* in which we find ourselves, I see no alternative, if the Foreign Office view be accepted, but to press on with the organisation of this latter route, which will take several months to prepare. But here we are faced with a new complication. The India Office, whilst fully recognising that it is essential to find some solution which will permit of the continued operation of the Indian service, are of the opinion that there are serious political objections to the use of this Arabian route for regular *civil* purposes. The difficulty lies primarily in that section which runs through the territory of the Trucial Chiefs. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf is also opposed to the use of this route and stresses the fact that these Chiefs have always looked askance at the development of an air route through their territory, objecting in particular to the idea of a *civil* air service. The India Office point out that our policy has consistently been to abstain from any commitments by land in the territory of these Chiefs. They are advised that if a civil air route is put into operation it would probably be necessary to station troops in the areas affected for the protection of the route. This would represent a very important change of policy and might have far-



reaching consequences. Failing such protection, it would be impossible to guarantee the safety of the rest-house or refuelling point, and there would be the risk of an incident sooner or later which would necessitate active and armed intervention on our part. They further represent that our own position on the Trucial Coast is a delicate one, and that with the establishment of a civil air route it would be impossible to maintain our present policy of excluding foreigners or even, presumably, foreign aircraft. This is in their view an important consideration, especially as their advent would involve great additional risk of incidents and of the consequent necessity of armed British intervention for the protection of such foreigners.

The India Office would therefore favour a further effort being made to secure an extension from the Persians.

Quite clearly great weight must attach to the India Office view in this matter, but I would stress that, if the service is operated (as is proposed) by flying boats, it would only be necessary to have one intermediate landing place on the Trucial Coast, viz., at Ras-al-Khaimah or alternatively at Umm-al-Kaiwain, 25 miles to the South, which offers superior facilities for flying boats, but so far has not been generally used by the Royal Air Force, owing to the British agent being established at Ras-al-Khaimah. Unfortunately, the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah has been one of the most strenuous objectors to the opening up even of a military air route, though his attitude has been one of "passive resistance" and aircraft of the Royal Air Force have in fact made frequent use of his territory. I should hope, therefore, though I hesitate to express too definite an opinion on the point, that it might be possible to hold out to him some relatively small financial inducement which would cause him to modify his present attitude. I am further advised by senior officers of the Royal Air Force with first-hand knowledge of the local situation that in their view, (which, however, is not shared by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is responsible for our relations with the Sheikhs in question), there is little danger of serious trouble, if we are prepared to take a firm line. Further, it might be possible to have as rest-house a small shallow-draught vessel, such as those already successfully employed for this purpose by Imperial Airways in the Mediterranean, which could be moored at the place selected; and in this event the Air Staff, as at present advised, consider that troops would *not* be required for its protection, but that a small armed guard (which could be provided at negligible cost) would suffice. In this connexion I may perhaps remind my colleagues that, after full investigation and consideration by an authoritative Committee, it has been fully recognised that a *military* air route along the Arabian coast of the Gulf is a vital Imperial necessity. The organisation of a *civil* air route would therefore have a definite strategic value. As regards the question of foreign aircraft using this route, the French and Dutch services are at present operated with *landplanes*. If it is accepted that Imperial Airways must use flying boats for operating down the Arabian coast, the Air Ministry view, (which I believe to be shared by the Foreign Office), is that we should be justified in withholding facilities from the French and the Dutch, unless and until they also utilise flying boats. If they do this, we could hardly deny them the use of our facilities, but in view of the importance of securing at all costs the maintenance of our own Indian service, the Air Staff consider that this situation must be accepted. Indeed, if the French and Dutch desired to operate a flying boat service down the Arabian coast at their own risk, irrespective of anything we might be doing, themselves providing the very modest ground facilities required, it is difficult to see how this could be prevented.

(B)—SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION.

8. In sum then, the situation as regards the only three alternative routes is as follows:—

(a) *Persian Coastal Route.*

This route, which is that at present in operation, is undoubtedly far preferable to any other on grounds alike of safety, operational convenience and expense. The present permit to Imperial Airways to operate along the Persian coast expires, however, on the 31st March, 1932, and the Foreign Office have repeatedly advised that in their opinion there is virtually no hope of an extension. They are further, in view of Persia's original warning,



when granting the concession, of her subsequent attitude, and of the fact that she has never ratified the International Air Traffic Convention, averse from approaching the Persians with a request of this nature, which, particularly in the absence of any lever on our side, would be certain to be refused.

(b) *Central Persian Route.*

The route through Central Persia prescribed by the Persian Government has been surveyed and reported on as commercially and operationally impracticable, and there appears to be no other inland route possible.

(c) *The Arabian Coast Route.*

This appears feasible, if satisfactory arrangements can be come to with the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Kaiwain, but to open it up may entail, in the opinion of the India Office, serious political drawbacks, whilst it is longer, on the whole, more difficult of operation, less comfortable for passengers and definitely more costly.

9. With these conflicting considerations and the divergent views held by the Foreign Office and the India Office, it is very difficult for me to present to my colleagues any clear-cut recommendation. I presume it can be premised that somehow or other the continued operation of this route must be secured; to abandon the Indian service—a service which is bound to grow steadily in importance with the passage of time—is, in my view, unthinkable, and would react on our prestige throughout the whole of the East. If this situation is to be avoided, some action must be taken and taken immediately. The question is what that action should be, and it is on this that I am anxious to take counsel with my colleagues as a matter of urgency. My own tentative recommendations are as under:—

(1) If it is not possible to take further diplomatic action with Persia at the present juncture through official channels for an extension of the present permit on a firm basis, then arrangements should be made for Imperial Airways to approach the Persian Government forthwith as a matter of ordinary commercial negotiation. It seems incumbent upon us to notify the Persian Government that a careful survey has now shown the Central Persian route to be impracticable, and, in doing so, it would appear natural and inevitable to ask for a continuance of facilities to use the coastal route. I may say that I have taken steps to secure informally the advice of Sir John Cadman on the advisability of such negotiations, in view of his intimate knowledge of present conditions in Persia. He definitely recommends such action, and has intimated that the Anglo-Persian Company will give all possible assistance to Imperial Airways, though it cannot actually negotiate on their behalf. I would emphasise, however, that, in the light of the advice tendered by the Foreign Office, I am none too hopeful of the result of these unofficial negotiations, which are likely in any event to drag on for several months.

(2) Whatever action may be taken under (1) I consider that we ought forthwith to take all preliminary action for the organisation of the Arabian coast route—a course advocated by our Minister at Tehran and the Foreign Office since July 1930—despite its admitted drawbacks from the political and other aspects. It will take several months to organise, and we simply cannot afford to wait on the results of further negotiations with the Persians, whether official or unofficial. I should add that the Foreign Office incline to the view that signs of activity on our part on the Arabian side may just possibly produce a more accommodating frame of mind in the Persian authorities.

Air Ministry, July 23, 1931.

(Initialled) A.




ANNEXURE LII.

At the 40th meeting of the Cabinet held on 30th July, 1931, the following conclusion was arrived at on the question of the threatened interruption of the England-India Air Service between Basrah and Karachi.

The Cabinet agreed:-

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should reopen negotiations with the Persian Government, with a view to an extension of the route along the northern (or eastern) side of the Gulf, using as a lever the possible reopening of the Duzdab railway. (Cabinet 40 (31), Conclusion 5).





ANNEXURE 4.

Private Letter from Lord Amulree, Secretary of State for Air to Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, dated September 28th, 1931, re Eastern Air Route.

(Circulated with Lord Amulree's permission).

28th September, 1931.


My dear Secretary of State,

In July last I circulated a paper - C.P. 183(31) - on the threatened interruption of the England - India Air Service between Basra and Karachi. As you may remember the present permit to Imperial Airways to operate along the Persian coast expires on the 31st March next; and the Foreign Office have repeatedly advised that in their opinion there is virtually no hope of the existing concession being extended beyond that date. The Persians have suggested an alternative route through Central Persia; but this has been surveyed by a representative of Imperial Airways and found to be quite impracticable.

Accordingly, in the paper above quoted, I proposed to the Cabinet that we should proceed forthwith with the preliminary steps necessary to organise a flying boat route along the Arabian coast, that is to say the southern shore of the Gulf. Such a route would have certain disadvantages, as being more difficult of operation, less comfortable for passengers, and more costly than the present route along the northern shore of the Gulf, as seaplanes would have to be used and the route is longer; but at the time there seemed to be no practicable alternative, and I therefore put my proposal to the Cabinet, pointing out that the India Office unfortunately considered that the use of this route was open to serious political objection.

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* Annexure II






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At the last moment a way out of the difficulty suggested itself simultaneously to the Foreign Office and to my advisers here - viz. to meet the Persian request for the reopening of the Duzdap Railway in return for the extension of the concession to Imperial Airways. This was agreed to by all the Departments concerned and approved by the Cabinet at their meeting on July 30th. Since then negotiations have been proceeding on these lines through the Legation at Tehran.

According to the last reports from Tehran the Persians are maintaining their refusal to extend the concession beyond March next, and it is therefore a question of getting to work on an alternative route with the smallest possible delay. So far as the Air Ministry is concerned, the Arabian coast route is the only practicable alternative, but to this, as I say, the India Office see objection on political grounds. I do not want in any way to minimise the importance of the political considerations advanced by your advisers, but confess to some doubt as to whether the Political Resident may perhaps not have overstressed the element of risk. Imperial Airways are prepared to use a boat as a Rest House if necessary, and the Air Force will undertake to prevent, so far as they can, the occurrence of any unfortunate incidents. The country is backward and under the control of a few small Sheikhs living largely on slave labour. The operation of a civil air route (in addition to the military air route which it has been agreed is indispensable) would, I should have thought, tend to civilise and bring prosperity to the inhabitants, whilst a trifling sum of money might smooth away the objections of any of these Sheikhs to the use of some of their harbours by the flying boats of Imperial Airways.






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Even, however, if the organisation of a route along this coast is not altogether free from political objection, is it not better than the complete cessation of the England - Karachi Service beyond Basra? For let it be clearly understood -- if the Persians will not extend their concession to Imperial Airways and Imperial Airways are not allowed to use the Arabian coast, this great link in our Imperial air communications, in the inauguration of which you yourself played so important a part, will be severed definitely at the Persian border. As I said in my paper, this seems to me unthinkable.

I should perhaps add that your predecessor suggested in two Cabinet papers which he also circulated in July (C.P. (31) 192 and 196) that Imperial Airways might use another route through Persian territory, or, if they flew along the Persian Gulf, might use the Island of Abu Musa as a base. Neither of these alternatives is, unfortunately, practicable. Imperial Airways are satisfied that, even if the route were commercially practicable in other ways, which it is not, they could not maintain the regularity necessary on a trunk line service if they had to fly over the Persian mountains in winter, and this view is confirmed by Royal Air Force officers who have had to fly during winter in those regions. It is quite a different matter for the Junkers Company, operating a local service over a portion of the route with small machines, though even they find considerable difficulty and can, I understand, only maintain an approximate regularity in winter time, by taking risks and having forced landings which would not be justifiable for Imperial Airways with larger aircraft.

As to Abu Musa, I have ascertained from two of my officers who have flown over it on various occasions that

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it is not practicable as a permanent refuelling depot, although a flying boat might find temporary shelter there if forced to come down.

I would repeat, therefore, that if Imperial Airways cannot be allowed to make use of the Arabian coast route, as proposed in the paper I circulated to the Cabinet in July, there will be no alternative but to close down the service beyond Iraq; and I think you will agree with me that this is a position we cannot accept, even if the operations of the route involves the modification of a long established local policy.


I know how busy you are, and only trouble you with this because of your close personal interest in the matter. Further discussion on the Departmental level will, I fear, be fruitless: but if you would like to talk things over with me I am at your disposal.

You know how long it takes to organise an air route: we now have a bare six months left before Imperial Airways' concession in Persia runs out. It is most urgent therefore, that we should obtain your concurrence to start work on the Arabian coast at a very early date.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) AMULREE.

The Rt.Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt., G.B.E.,
C.M.G., M.P.,
INDIA OFFICE,
King Charles Street,
S.W.1.





INDEXED
In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 65519/439/2
and address—not to any person by name, but to
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

INDIA DIRECT
P.Z.
6788
Confidential (264)
(266)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
26th October, 1931. *pp 6555*

6555 Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. 6 4953/439/2
of 14th October


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>From Am. Representative, Tehran Telegram no. 240 24th Oct</i>	<i>Imperial Airways' service to India via Persia</i>

RECEIVED IN
27 OCT 1931
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Similar letter sent to *60.*
Amir
Admiral

14-5901 (2)





P.Z.
6788
1931

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Mr. Hoare, (Tehran),
24th October, 1931.

D. 9.00 p.m. 24th October, 1931.

R. 10.00 a.m. 25th October, 1931.


No. 240.

Perusal of recent correspondence regarding Henjam, Imperial Airways and Duzdap leads me to submit that air question should be taken up as isolated issue both here (if possible with the Shah) and with Minister of Court in London (I understand he is actually in Paris).

Time is essential factor but it would be useless to press matter here unless you were prepared simultaneously to tackle Minister of Court and convince him that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to pay any price for even short maintenance of present route.

On his return Minister of Court's hands will probably be full with Russian negotiations which seem to have reached deadlock and general stocktaking of his personal position necessitated by 3 months absence so that it would be virtually impossible for me to get him to concentrate on a question with regard to which he would think that he gained rather than lost by procrastination.

I should like you to tell him that for obvious technical and administrative reasons Imperial Airways must know definitely by say November 30th whether prolongation is agreed in principle and that details must





2.


must be settled by December 31st. Failing definite agreement by that date other arrangements would be put in hand either to use route along West Coast if tribal chiefs proved on enquiry to be less averse to modern progress than Persian Government or for partial substitution of steamships for aeroplanes through the Gulf. This decision if taken would not be lightly reversed.

With regard to the Shah I would hold similar language. I understand there are some grounds for believing that he is determined not to renew the agreement, regarding it as a potential menace to Persian sovereign rights. Minister of Court's demeanour in the face of categorical representations would probably give better information on this point than I can obtain here and he is the only person who may be able to alter the Shah's mind. On the other hand if the Shah's mind is definitely made up desirability of early decision regarding our future course of action is enhanced.

I understand we have no effective bargaining counters though Duzdap Railway might be useful for improving terms of settlement if principle of settlement had been accepted.

I hope to present credentials about November 2nd.

Addressed to the Foreign Office No.240, repeated to India No.149.





INDEXED
In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. *63440/439/31*
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

INDIA DIRECT
Important
Confidential (269)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
3rd November, 1931.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. 65079/439/31
of 28th October, 1931.


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Im. Representative, Yehran Telegram no. 246 1st Nov.</i>	<i>Imperial Airways' services to India via Persia.</i>

Similar letter sent to *Amman*

14-5901 (2)

RAILS BRANCH
4 NOV 1931
INDIA OFFICE





COPY.

6941
1931

268
270

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Mr. Hoare. (Tehran)

November 1st, 1931.

D. 1.40 p.m. November 1st, 1931.


R. 5.00 p.m. November 1st, 1931.

No.246.

Your telegram No.165.

Yes. Covering summary points out that no route through Central Persia is practicable (of Mr. Dodd's telegram No.214) and does not invite further suggestions.

Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to government of India No.153.





INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 65319/439/31
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

INDIA DIRECT
269
271

P.Z.
6841
1931

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
28th October, 1931. Pp 678

Reference to previous correspondence:
6786 Foreign Office letter no. 65319/439/31
of 26th October, 1931


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<u>To</u> <u>Im. Representative,</u> <u>Shiran</u> <u>telegram no. 165</u> <u>24th Oct.</u>	<u>Imperial Airways' service to</u> <u>India via Persia</u>

Similar letter sent to his Ministry

14-5901 (2)

RECD E. & O. REGD
29 OCT 1931
INDIA OFFICE
MAILS BRANCH
29 OCT 1931
INDIA OFFICE





REFY
5519/459/459/34)


Code telegram to Mr. Hoare (Tehran).

Foreign Office, 27th October 1931, 7.00 p.m.

No. 165. (R).

Your telegram No. 240 (of October 24th. South Persian Air Route). Has memorandum in my despatch No. 583 (of October 8th), yet been communicated to Persian government? and if so was it accompanied by enquiry proposed in Mr. Dodd's telegram No. 208 (of September 1st)?

Repeated to India No. 37.





Whitehall,

S.W. 1.

30th October, 1931.


Dear Hind,


With reference to the meeting next Monday ^{2nd} ~~3rd~~ November about the air route, could you circulate the two enclosed telegrams


- (1) From Secretary of State for India No. 3032 dated 16th October, 1931,
- (2) From Government of India to Secretary of State for India No. 2583-S dated 21st October, 1931

with a covering note saying they are circulated by the India Office for the information of the Committee.


Major N.G. Hind, M.C.,
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W. 1.










*MJ 24/10 L. M. S. M.
SAS L. P. M. M. (273)
29/10 (275)*
J. A. M. 30/10


Secretary of State,

Simultaneously with the authorisation for despatch of this telegram below, I received from the Air Ministry the attached letter, from which it will be seen that the Treasury (whose consent to the proposed expenditure is necessary before final instructions can be sent to Colonel Biscoe) have some ^{enquiries} questions because the matter has not been before the Middle East Committee.

The draft telegram has been held up, and I have discussed the position with Mr. Bullock. It would, as he says, seem inappropriate that the main question should be referred to the official Committee after the course proposed has been approved by the Ministers principally concerned, and it had not occurred to me (it having been decided that reference to the Cabinet was unnecessary) that reference to the other Ministers on the Ministerial Committee (the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretaries of State for War and the Dominions, and First Lord of the Admiralty, I think) was/






was desirable before orders were finally issued.

Mr. Bullock is however proposing that the subsidiary question of the measures to be taken to protect the air route should be brought before the official Middle East Committee at a meeting to be convened very shortly, and he thinks that if the position in regard to the main question is then explained, the Treasury - and presumably the other Departments represented on the Committee - will be satisfied, and that the way will then be clear for the sending of final instructions, including authority for expenditure.

In the circumstances the best course seems to be to hold up the draft telegram pending the proposed meeting. It is to be hoped that the delay will be very short, and in any case Colonel Biscoe could not proceed very far until he knows where he stands as regards expenditure.

L. S. L.
P. M.





THE AIR MINISTRY,
ADMIRALTY BUILDINGS,
LONDON.

AIR MINISTRY,
ADMIRALTY HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.

27th October, 1931.

Dear Wakely,

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 19th October, which has been put before me on my return from a few days' leave.

I note the alteration you wish made, at the instance of the Foreign Office, to the last sentence of the summary of the proceedings of the recent interdepartmental meeting which accompanied your letter of the 9th instant.

As regards the question of the amount of money to be spent by way of subsidy, I have asked the Treasury to authorise expenditure within a maximum of £3,000, but I still very much hope that this full sum will not be required.

I quite agree that the parallel at Aden is not exact - it was this I had in mind in saying in my letter of the 14th October that "the circumstances in Aden and on the Trucial coast are not altogether comparable" - but the parallel is perhaps rather closer than you have appreciated, and I ought to have mentioned in my earlier letter that the Aden sheikhs in question also undertake responsibilities in the matter of aerodromes and landing grounds in return for the subsidies they receive.

Moreover, there are parallels elsewhere. For example, in Iraq there is a sheikh who was subsidised to the extent of £450 per annum in order to ensure his carrying out certain duties - amongst others the upkeep of a landing ground and, though I realise that the position of the Trucial coast sheikhs is somewhat peculiar, there is no doubt that in other areas too a sheikh receiving a subsidy has to disburse a substantial proportion of it to relatives or important retainers.

Moreover, there is also the grave danger of "spoiling our market". It is in contemplation to pay Ibn Saud rental for three landing grounds at which we require facilities on the Arabian coast and the British Charge d'affaires at Jedda has himself recently suggested that a suitable sum would be £1,000 per annum. To pay a minor sheikh lower down the coast three times as much for one landing ground (or equivalent facilities) as we contemplate paying an important ruler like Ibn Saud for three landing grounds might be a definite source of future embarrassment.

I am sure we can rely on Biscoe to do his best for us, but I should be grateful if you would, if possible, acquaint him with the gist of this letter also. Thereafter, I have no doubt we can confidently leave it to him to strike the best bargain he can for us within whatever maximum the Treasury are prepared to authorise.

I have now, however, heard that the Treasury, whilst they will not make any financial difficulty, would feel happier if,

before/

D. Wakely, Esq., C.B.,
India Office,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.




AIR MINISTRY
ADMIRALTY HOUSE
KINGSWAY, W.C.2

before any further action is taken in the matter, the whole question of the Arabian coast route is referred to the Middle East Committee.

Personally I do not think this necessary as regards the main issue, now that complete agreement has been reached at a meeting at which the Secretary of State for India took the Chair and the Secretary of State for Air was also present, whilst the Foreign Office was represented by Oliphant. Indeed, it seems to me a little inappropriate that an ordinary interdepartmental committee of officials should purport to review conclusions arrived at at a ministerial meeting presided over by a member of the Cabinet. However, I do not want to make any difficulties as regards procedure - my only anxiety being that we should be able to give Biscoe more definite instructions without further delay. Moreover, at a later stage, I think it will be highly desirable that the question of "protection" (which I agree with you requires very careful consideration) should be examined by the Middle East Committee, which seems to me the most suitable body for the purpose, particularly in view of the close interest of the Admiralty in developments in the Persian Gulf. I am therefore arranging for the matter to be brought before the Middle East Committee at the first possible opportunity.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. Bullard



INDIA OFFICE,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

29th October, 1931.

PRIVATE.


With reference to my letter of 23rd October (P.Z.6570/31) I enclose extract from a further letter dated 27th October from Bullock regarding the Arab air route.

Bullock also states that he has heard that the Treasury while they will not make any financial difficulty would feel happier if before any further action is taken in the matter the whole question could be referred to the Middle East Committee. We expect that it will accordingly be discussed by that Committee at an early date, but we hope that this will not involve any appreciable delay and that the discussion will be confined to outstanding questions, namely the maximum limit to be authorized for allowances to the Sheikh and the question of the protection of the establishments.

A similar letter is being sent to Howell.

The Hon. Lt.-Col. E. V. Biscoe,

The Residency,
Bushire.





INDIA OFFICE,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

29th October, 1931.

PRIVATE.


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not involve any appreciable delay and that the discussion will
be confined to outstanding questions, namely the maximum limit
to be authorised for allowances to the Sheikh and the question
of the protection of the establishments

A similar letter is being sent to Biscoe.

H. Howell, Esq., CSI., CIE.,

Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India.





AIR MINISTRY,
ADASTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY, W.C.2.

27th October, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM Mr. BULLOCK to Mr. WAKELY.

X X X X X X
I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 19th October, which has been put before me on my return from a few days' leave.


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I quite agree that the parallel at Aden is not exact - it was this I had in mind in saying in my letter of the 14th October that "the circumstances in Aden and on the Trucial coast are not altogether comparable" - but the parallel is perhaps rather closer than you have appreciated, and I ought to have mentioned in my earlier letter that the Aden sheikhs in question also undertake responsibilities in the matter of aerodromes and landing grounds in return for the subsidies they receive.

Moreover, there are parallels elsewhere. For example, in Iraq there is a sheikh who was subsidised to the extent of £450 per annum in order to ensure his carrying out certain duties - amongst others to upkeep of a landing ground and, though I realise that the position of the Trucial coast sheikhs is somewhat peculiar there is no doubt that in other areas too a sheikh receiving a subsidy has to disburse a substantial proportion of it to relatives or important retainers.

Moreover,






Moreover, there is also the grave danger of "spoiling our market". It is in contemplation to pay Ibn Saud rental for three landing grounds at which we require facilities on the Arabian coast and the British Charge d'affaires at Jedda has himself recently suggested that a suitable sum would be £1,000 per annum. To pay a minor sheikh lower down the coast three times as much for one landing ground (or equivalent facilities) as we contemplate paying an important ruler like Ibn Saud for three landing grounds might be a definite source of future embarrassment.

I am sure we can rely on Biscoe to do his best for us, but I should be grateful if you would, if possible, acquaint him with the gist of this letter also. Thereafter, I have no doubt we can confidently leave it to him to strike the best bargain he can for us within whatever maximum the Treasury are prepared to authorise.

x x x x x x





(280)
(282)

Register No.
PZ. 6696
31

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from _____ Dated _____ 19
Telegram _____ Rec. _____

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Chairman.....			
Under Secretary	26. 10.	<i>Whe</i>	The Arab air route
Secretary of State...	27		
Committee.....			G. of L. Amine in instructions to Col. Biscoe
Under Secretary....			& make suggestions as to nature of the agreement
Secretary of State...			to be made with the Sheikh

Copy of *Memorandum* to C.O.
Memorandum to P.O. & Q.O.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Draft letter authorizing Col. Biscoe to commence tentative negotiations (pending settlement of maximum limit of the subsidy) & agreeing that there should be a definite
Guidance given for the subsidy.

Send SH 28/10
in h. Schen 11/27/10

Previous Papers :—

4407a 750 3.30





Minute Paper.

Department.

The G. of I.'s reply is entirely satisfactory, and we can evidently reckon on them to help.

They make the important suggestion that we should aim in the agreement at the form, even if not the substance, of a quid pro quo for the subsidy, in order to avoid the appearance of being open to blackmail by giving something for nothing. The G. of I. of course have a large experience of agreements on the N.W. Frontier of the kind now contemplated on the Trucial Coast, and a past experience of the unfortunate results of the purely blackmailing type of agreement. We have already taken up with the Air Ministry the point that the agreement should include a definite undertaking of responsibilities by the Sheikh possibly extending to the payment by him of native guards. The exact details of the agreement may be left to Colonel Biscoe. The Sheikh's undertaking of responsibility will be of substantial value; other items to be covered by the subsidy may be of more or less substantial value; the reckoning in the subsidy of some figure as "rent" for the Lagoon would go to avoid the appearance of blackmail. The essential objects are that the total payment should be sufficient to make an enforceable reality of the Sheikh's responsibility to us and of that of his numerous unruly subordinates to him, and that each separate item of the bill should be on account of some (real or assumed) value received.

We are not yet in a position to give Col. Biscoe his maximum limit of expenditure, but he may be able to commence putting out feelers without waiting for this

4792A 5000 10/39



this, and as it may take time to obtain Treasury sanction to an exact figure, we might authorise him to go ahead.

The fact that the choice is open between Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qawain should of course be an advantage ^{to him} in bargaining. A draft telegram to the G. of I. is submitted.

A draft memo. for the information of the Cabinet (please see the S. of S.'s minute of 9 Oct. flagged M.) is also tentatively submitted.

W. A. G.
26.10.31

VICEROY



DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Cypher XXX

Copy to F.O.
AM.

P 2 6696/51 (284) (282)

Not to come yet

From tel. 21 Oct 1903-5 His route.

agree as to desirability of
1. ~~be sure that undertakings to be given~~

by Sheikh in return for allowances should

be for as possible represent definite and

transferable good for you or I understand that

this is Bisco's view also & he will further

bear in mind during negotiations the particular

suggestions which you make.

2. A further tel. will follow as soon as possible
regarding maximum limit of expenditure. Meanwhile

Bisco may if he has no objection commence


tentative negotiations as soon as he is ready.


3. Please instruct Bisco accordingly.

I presume you will arrange with him for

date from which the "Chakha" should be

chartered.





Draft Paper.

Department.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM.

The Air Route to India.

I circulate for the information of my colleagues a note on the present position in regard to the Basra-Karachi section of the civil air route to India together with copy of telegrams exchanged with the Government of India on the subject.

The permit which Imperial Airways Limited obtained for three years from the Persian Government to fly along the south coast of Persia expires on 31st March 1932. The Persian Government have ^{hitherto} refused to grant a renewal and have failed to offer any practical alternative route through Persia. As it is obviously essential that imperial air communications should be maintained this attitude of the Persian Government has confronted us with a problem of some urgency and difficulty.

It was decided on the 30th July last that negotiations should be reopened with the Persian Government for a renewal of the permit to fly the south Persia route, and that the possible reopening of the/



the Duzdap railway should be used as a lever; the train service on this railway had been closed down by the Government of India last June as a result of the obstructive attitude of the local Persian authorities, and the Persian Government in July had asked that it should be reopened.

The British Charge d'Affaires at Tehran accordingly, at the beginning of August, informed the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India were prepared to consider the reopening of the railway for a period of, say, five years, if the Persian Government would meet them in a similar manner by granting an extension of Imperial Airways' permit for the same period. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to bring the question before the Persian Government and urge the case for an extension.

No reply, however, has yet been received, and it has consequently become a matter of great urgency to provide an alternative for the Persian section of the Air route to India, in case (as seems too likely) all efforts to secure an extension of the present permit from the Persian Government prove unsuccessful. I therefore/




Draft Paper.

284
286
Department.

therefore invited Lord Amulree and Captain Eden, representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with their advisers, to a meeting at the India Office on 7th October. The whole matter was then fully discussed and certain conclusions were agreed upon.


The only possible alternative outside Persia is a route along the south shore of the Persian Gulf. This alternative is, from every point of view, a pis aller; the climatic conditions are unfavourable, the coast is barren and inhospitable, and the inhabitants of the mainland are Arabs of a most primitive type unused to Europeans and very suspicious of interference. It has accordingly been decided that the route from Basra to Karachi should be operated by seaplanes, but it is necessary to provide for a night stop at some point intermediate between these places, ^{which might be somewhere} and ~~it is also necessary that this point should be~~ located on the independent Trucial Coast of Oman at the eastern end of the Persian Gulf, the choice lying between Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qawain. The Imperial Airways' route will follow that which has already/

214A 4000 5/31



already been developed as a strategic route for military aircraft. Ras-al-Khaimah marks one of the stages on the military route, and a fuel barge has already been established there after considerable difficulty resulting from the opposition of the Sheikh of that place. Imperial Airways would require to maintain at Ras-al-Khaimah, or alternatively Umm-al-Qawain, in addition to moorings and refuelling facilities, some suitable vessel as a house-boat to accommodate passengers and staff and to act as a wireless station and stores depot. It is anticipated that the opposition of the Sheikh and inhabitants of the place selected will be greater in the case of the civil air route (with the more elaborate organisation and frequent visits which it involves) than that which has already been experienced in the case of the military route. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to overcome these difficulties and to secure adequate guarantees for the safety of the establishment by negotiating an agreement with the Sheikh by which he would receive an annual subsidy and in return grant the required facilities and undertake responsibility for safety and possibly the provision of native/

Dr



Draft Paper.

Department.

native guards. It is obviously essential that all precautions should be taken in advance against the risks that would otherwise be involved in the establishment of the rest-house among these independent and potentially hostile Arabs. The best method of providing for its safety would be an agreement with the Sheikh, and though this involves a certain amount of expenditure it is surer and cheaper than any other method.

It is intended to give Colonel Biscoe, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, a free hand to negotiate with the Sheikhs with a view to securing the facilities required at one or the other of the alternative places; and he is being instructed in the first instance to try and secure an agreement, of the character mentioned above, with one or the other of the Sheikhs. It will be necessary that the annual subsidy should be large enough, not only to secure the agreement of the Sheikh but to enable the latter to overcome the opposition of the rest of his clan, as the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast are not absolute rulers but merely representatives/


214A 1000 8/31





representatives of their clans and are easily deposed or (more often) assassinated. It may be necessary to provide monetary inducement for as many as 200 persons; but, even so, the total disbursement necessary will probably not be large. The question of expenditure is being taken up by the Air Ministry with the Treasury. About £3,000 a year has been suggested by the India Office as an estimate, not of the actual cost, but of the maximum limit to which we should be prepared to go, if necessary; it is possible that we may secure the desired agreement more cheaply than this, but it is desirable that Colonel Biscoe should have a sufficient margin in hand to avoid any risk of his negotiations being held up, perhaps at a critical moment, by the necessity of applying for further sanction. As soon as the maximum figure has been settled, supplementary instructions will be sent to Colonel Biscoe.


Copies of a telegram addressed to the Government of India on the subject on 16th October and of their ~~reply~~ *replies* dated 21st October ~~are~~ *sent to him on* appended.


The question of the best method of providing for the protection
of/











Confidential.

21st October, 1931.

Dear Mr. Wakely,

I write to acknowledge your letter of the 19th October addressed to Mr. Bullock on the subject of the air route to India.


Mr. Bullock is at present on leave for a few days, but I will show him the letter as soon as he returns. The remarks which you have sent us on the financial aspect of the scheme will be of great interest.


Yours sincerely,

M.P. Murray

Private Secretary.

L.D. Wakely, Esq., C.B.,
India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.





BY AIR MAIL.

LONDON, E. W. I.

P.S. 6570/31.

23rd October, 1931.

With reference to the Secretary of State's telegram No.3032 of 16th October and the Government of India's reply of 21st October, No.2583-3 regarding the Arab air route, I enclose copy of the papers noted in the margin. You will see that we promised to pass on to

Summary of conclusions of a meeting at the India Office on 7th October 1931 (as amended at request of the Foreign Office).
Letter from Mr. Bullock, dated 14th October and enclosure.
Letter to Mr. Bullock, dated 19th October.


Discuss the suggestions made in Bullock's letter of 14th


October, while pointing out that the cases of Aden and of the Trucial Sheikhs are not really parallel and explaining the special difficulties which have to be faced in the latter case owing to the strong opposition that has to be overcome and the position of the Sheikhs as mere representatives of the ruling classes.


The amendment of the summary of conclusions referred to in Wakely's letter to Bullock related to a point/


H. H. Russell Esq., C.B.I., C.I.E.

Foreign Secretary to the Govt. of India.









BY AIR MAIL.
P.Z. 6570/31.

LONDON, S. W. 1.
23rd October, 1931.

I enclose copy of the papers noted in the margin.
You will see that we promised to pass on to you the
suggestions made in Bullock's letter of 14th October.


Summary of conclusions of a meeting at the India) while
Office on 7th October 1931 (as amended at) pointing out
request of the Foreign Office).) that the cases
Letter from Mr. Bullock, dated 14th October and) of Aden and of
enclosure.	
Letter to Mr. Bullock, dated 19th October.	

the Trucial Sheikhs are not really parallel and
explaining the special difficulties which have to be
faced in the latter case owing to the strong opposition
that has to be overcome and the position of the Sheikhs
as mere representatives of the ruling class.

The amendment of the summary of conclusions
referred to in Wakely's letter to Bullock related to a
point in connexion with the question of the Dard
Railway.

I am sending a similar letter to Howell.

The Hon. Lt. Col. H. V. Biscoe.
British Residency, Bushire.





INDEXED On this subject, please quote
No. *64933/439/34*
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

6555 *Confidential* *292*
NW
294

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India* and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
14th October, 1931. *6194*
6448
6570 *11/10.15/10*

Reference to previous correspondence:
6197 Foreign Office letter no. *64820/439/34*
of *28th September, 1931*.

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Am. Representatives, Tehran no 2114 of 28th Sept. (telegram)</i>	<i>Unavoidability of proposed central Persian air route</i>


ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. *45* 42 *15* OCT. 1931
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECEIVED IN
15 OCT 1931
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Similar letter sent to *C.O.*

14-5901 (2)





6555

1931

(293)

(295)

NO DISTRIBUTION

Decypher. Mr. Dodd (Tehran).
28th September 1931.

D. 4.35 p.m. 28th September 1931.

R. 9.00 a.m. 29th September 1931.

No. 214.


6197

My telegram No. 208.

It is of course desirable to leave Persian Government as little opportunity as possible to suggest further impracticability of routes and if it is a fact that there are no practicable inland routes, to make this clear by implication. Consequently the larger the area memorandum can condemn convincingly the better.

I therefore suggest it should be one dealing with route section by section to show that eastwards from Ispahan any alternative route would be even more inhospitable and dangerous.

As Junkers directed to fly Baghdad-Tehran-Ispahan route, Persian Government might suggest this or a variation involving direct flight from Hamadan to Ispahan. If this would be impracticable memorandum might cover this route which was flown in part at least by Traver.





*Put into H.
W.
H.*

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

21st October 1931.


Am. 1/10/31

My dear Wakely,

Just two lines to acknowledge the receipt of your letter PZ 6570/1931 of 19th October about the Imperial Airways in Persia, and to thank you for having accepted our amendments.

*Yours and
Sanctus Oliphant*

L.D. Wakely Esq., C.B.





285
297

Register No.
P.Z.
6570
1931

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from _____ Dated _____ 19____
Telegram Rec. _____

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Chairman.....			
Under Secretary	16	<i>W.H.</i>	The air route to India
Secretary of State...			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State...			

5/10/10 And telegram a line
letter
I have made a
small notation to
Para 5 with the object
of showing the
work all the
one agreed 16/10
W.H.
MCS/15/10

Copy of _____ to _____
Lt. Bulluck to be informed as required in
Lt. Bulluck letter of 16.10.31.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Draft letter to S.P. with suggestions by Mr. Bulluck &
P.O. incorporated
Draft letter to Mr. Bulluck explaining reasons for one figure
of £2000 for allowances to be made to & referring to the
function of protection
Draft letter to Mr. L. Clapham.


16.X.31
Relg. to Govt. of India No 3032


19 OCT 1931 Ltr to Mr L. Clapham.

19 OCT 1931 Ltr to Mr. Bulluck.

Previous Papers :—

4407A 750 3.30





Minute Paper.

Department.

Please see the letters from Sir L. Oliphant and Mr. Bullock below.


Mr. Bullock's suggestions have been incorporated in the fair copy of the draft telegram submitted; those of Sir L. Oliphant have also been adopted except that it is preferable to retain the statement that the alternative of Abu Musa has been considered. *The sending of the draft telegram referred to by Sir L. Oliphant is dealt with on a separate file.*

Though the Air Ministry cannot commit themselves to the figure of £3,000 without Treasury sanction, it is greatly to be hoped that they will be able to obtain the latter. It is an outside estimate, but it is desirable that Col. Biscoe should have sufficient margin; there may be as many as 200 members of the Sheikhly clan to be satisfied; moreover, he hopes to obtain a written agreement which would secure our position and place certain responsibilities on the Sheikh; the money is therefore not merely a douceur but payment for value received. *Col. Biscoe discussed the question of the amount again with me yesterday.*

As regards protection, it is sufficient for the present to let the G. of I. know that they are not asked to accept responsibility. The problem of protection will have to be carefully considered by H.M.G., and it is desirable that we should be kept in touch because (1) the local knowledge of the Pol. Resident might be useful in helping to solve it, and (2) India (despite the G. of I.'s disclaimer of responsibility) is not of course necessarily ruled out as a source of supply for assistance that might be urgently required on

loan/

354 3660 531







loan in an emergency.

Draft letter to R. B. Bullock & Co. L. Oghlan, for R. W. W. W.
signature if approved, in submitted
1/10. 10. 31

Dra

Sir







Draft Paper.

(9)

P.Z.
6570
1931

Department.

300

298

C. Ll. Bullock, Esq., C.B., C.B.E.,
AIR MINISTRY,
Admiral Gwydder House,
E.W. 1.
Kempsey.
L.C. 2

19 OCT 1931

Dear Bullock.

Thank you for your letter of the 13th October about the air route to India. We incorporated your suggestions in the telegram to India, together with some verbal ^{additions} suggested by Oliphant.

I enclose a copy of the telegram as sent. We have heard from the F.O. that the last sentence of the summary enclosed with my letter of 9 Oct. does not correctly represent their position, as they are not at present prepared to agree to the transfer of the Persian section of the Duzdap Railway in exchange for the air route. We shall have to discuss this further with the F.O. Meanwhile Oliphant has asked that the last sentence of the summary should be omitted. Could you delete it in your copy?

As regards the amount of money which Biscoe is to be authorised to spend, we ^{greatly} hope that you will be able to obtain Treasury sanction to a maximum of £3,000 a year. We suggested this figure after a good deal of consideration. You may rely on it that ^{him} Biscoe will not promise a penny more than is

necessary/

I am afraid that the parallel with
what is now done enough to make us to
it and help from the standards set up
there. We will however of course be glad to
for us to discuss the suggestions made in this
connection in form letter of the 14th. I am
sure that


350 3000 5.31



necessary, ~~and~~ we may get off much more cheaply than ~~this~~, but it is very desirable that he should have a fairly generous margin so that he may not be hampered in his negotiations by having to refer home for further sanction, perhaps at a critical moment. It is impossible in advance to form a close estimate of the amount that will actually be required, but we have discussed the matter again with Biscoe, and in favour of a limit of not less than £3,000 he points to the following considerations.

There is a general and strong objection among the Trucial Coast Arabs to the advent of the civil air route, and it would take a good deal to overcome it. The objection is very much stronger than it was to the military air route, because a regular civil air route, involving as it does regular visits and more organisation, is regarded by the Arabs as a far more serious threat to their independence. In the second place, the money ~~does~~ ^{will} not all go to the Sheikh, who is not an absolute ruler but merely the representative of the ruling clan. It would have to be divided in varying proportions among a large number of relatives, possibly amounting to 200 persons/

Draft



Draft Paper.

Department.

persons. A third point is that the money is not simply in the nature of a bribe but also of payment for value received. Biscoe hopes to enter into an agreement which would secure the good will of the Sheikh and by which in return for the allowance he would undertake certain responsibilities; these might even extend to the payment by him of native guards. Lastly, Biscoe suggests that the sum involved is trifling compared with the cost of any permanent measures of protection, such as stationing troops, which might otherwise be necessary.


Perhaps you will find some of the above arguments useful in explaining the matter to the Treasury.

As regards the question of protection, we agree that it is sufficient for the moment to let the G. of I. know that they are not asked to accept responsibility. At the same time we agree as to the necessity of an exhaustive examination of the ways and means of affording protection. We shall be very glad to be kept in touch with/



with the progress of this examination,
and to do anything possible to assist
in solving the problem; it is possible
that points may arise on which Biscoe's
advice would be useful. As we see
the matter at present, there are
various contingencies, more or less
remote, under the head of protection,
which have to be provided against,
e.g., - an extreme hypothesis - there
is a possibility mentioned by the
G. of I. of the Trucial Sheikhs
uniting against us and seeking
assistance from Ibn Saud. This
extreme case might, ^{raise some, but not} I suppose, involve
^{a matter of some importance.} an operation on a small scale. Then
there is the contingency (which we
hope will also be remote if Biscoe's
negotiations are successful) of some
sort of interference or sabotage, or of
an actual attack, by the local Arabs at
the place selected for the houseboat.
Lastly (more serious than the latter
and not altogether improbable) there
is the risk that the local Sheikh,
with all the good will in the world,
may not be able to protect the
establishment or the passengers on the
houseboat from a raid by neighbouring
Arabs living outside his own
jurisdiction - e.g., the Shihu tribe,
living in the mountains of the

Draft



Draft Paper.



Department.

Musandim Peninsula. A successful raid on the houseboat by these people might ~~also~~ presumably involve ~~a small~~ operation to recover the captives.

Though the G. of I. have stated that they could not ^(by which they perhaps mean Day to Day protection) undertake protection of the establishment with Indian forces, it seems obvious that if a sudden emergency had to be dealt with, the possibility of borrowing personnel or material from India, if required, need not be ruled out in advance.

Yours sincerely.

(SD) L. D. WAKELY





P.Z.
6570
1931

Draft Paper. Department.

Secretary of State to Government
of India, Foreign & Political
Department.

Important

Cypher XXX

3032

Your telegram 25th July 1851-S
and connected correspondence. Air
route.

2. Every effort will be made to
obtain Persian agreement to
continuation of permit to fly
south Persian route, as drawbacks
of Arab route from both commercial
and political points of view are
fully recognised. But it is in any
case essential, as is realised by
Government of India no less than
His Majesty's Government, that air
communications with India should
be maintained, and as it is still
uncertain whether Persia will agree
to extension of permit it is
essential to make preparations in
advance for Arab route as second
string in case negotiations with
Persia fail. Knowledge that Arab
route is in course of preparation
may quite possibly ^{also} make Persians
more reasonable if once they
realise that we are not dependent
on South Persian route.



3. Air Ministry point out that
it is the approved policy of His
Majesty's/


Part I



RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
16/10/31 7.40 PM	XXX	
DISPATCHED	16/10	8.45 PM
NO. OF WORDS	104	
SENDER'S INITIALS	Em/P.	


Copy to C.O. 30 OCT 1931


Important Second Part






















L.D. Wakely, Esq., C.B.,
India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

think/





Payments of Subsidies to Tribal Chiefs in Arabia.

ADEN.

The following stipends are paid annually to the various Arab Chiefs. The amounts were settled by various treaties, and are mainly in return for various services, e.g. maintenance of trade routes, etc.

The AEDALI SULTAN	£974
(in addition he receives £1,980 annually in)	
(respect of certain water and salt rights)	
(which have been acquired from him.)	
The AQRABI SHEIKH	£ 72
The ALAWI SHEIKH	£ 90
The AMIRI AMIR	£360
The AUDALI SULTAN	£ 72
The AULAQI SHEIKHS (2)	£288
The BSIHAN SHARIF	£ 39
The FADHLI SULTAN	£324
The HAUSHABI SULTAN	£360
The QUTAIBI SHEIKH	£ 90
The SUBEIH SHEIKHS (6)	£276
The UPPER Yafa SHEIKHS (6)	£342
The LOWER Yafa SULTAN	£ 90

THE TRUCIAL SHEIKHS.

No subsidies are or have been paid to any of their number.

SULTAN OF MUSCAT.

Annual subsidy of £6,480 in respect of Zanzibar, Annual subsidy of £7,500 in respect of losses arising out of the suppression of the arms traffic. The latter ceases with the present ruler.

SHEIKH OF BAHREIN.


There is no subsidy paid to the Sheikh of Bahrein.



SHEIKH OF KOWEIT.

No subsidy is paid to the Sheikh of Koweit.

Note:- The last four items are extracted from C.I.D. Paper P.G.13 of 1928, but so far as is known there has been no change since that date.

A.I.5.
13.10.31.







AIR MINISTRY
AIRSTATION HOUSE
KINGSWAY, W.C.

- (3) Lastly, we should much like to see some insertion on the lines I suggested at the end of our meeting the other day. Since the point was (as I understood from our subsequent conversation) not clear to you, I feel pretty certain it will not have been appreciated by the Government of India - and to us it appears a point of considerable substance.

It is approved policy that the Royal Air Force, in opening up Imperial strategic air routes, "blazes the trail" (so to say), and that thereafter, wherever possible, they are turned over to civil air transport and thereby kept open at a minimum cost. This is what we have done in the case of the Cairo-Baghdad and Cairo-Cape services. The Royal Air Force no longer operates regularly between Cairo and Baghdad and we contemplate before long substituting for the annual service flights made of recent years between Cairo and the Cape, flights to Nigeria and West Africa generally, which again we hope will in due course prove to have been the precursors of a regular civil service.

This policy is indeed one of the main justifications for the subsidising of civil air transport, and for that reason the Cabinet Committee which went into this question in 1927 included the following passage in their report :-



"We find that the natural commercial routes to India and beyond and to South Africa are virtually coincident with the great strategic lines of air communication which are essential if our Imperial air forces are to possess the full mobility which is required for their economical disposition at selected centres, whence they will ultimately be able to reinforce any threatened point with a minimum of delay. If it is necessary on strategic grounds that we should possess and maintain available for instant use a long chain of aerodromes between the different points of the Empire, it is clearly better that they should not lie fallow against emergency, but be put to profitable use in time of peace".



The opening up of the Arabian coast route to civil air transport is therefore from this angle a natural development to be looked for in the future; it has merely been forced upon us before its due time by circumstances over which we have no control.


I think the point could be dealt with by some such insertion as the following wherever you think most suitable :-

A
The Air Ministry point out that it is the approved policy of His Majesty's Government, after routes have been organised strategically,

/to







Foreign Office,
S.W.I.

10th October 1931.

My dear Wakely,



To save time over the week-end I hasten to return the enclosures in your letter of 9th October about Airways in Persia.


I have made in the margin a few alterations which I should prefer to see used - but if you feel strongly against so doing, I do not feel justified in pressing you. But the last paragraph of the summary should end at "Persian route".


It was only after the meeting that you and Walton discussed with us the question of "transfer": and as I meant, but fear I failed to explain clearly, there are many difficulties ahead, and in present circumstances I could not think of promising that we will definitely offer the transfer.


Lancelot Hogarth.

L.D. Wakely, Esq., C.B.













3 Air Ministry point out that it is the approved policy of His Majesty's Government, after routes have been organized strategically, to arrange wherever possible for them to be kept open by regular civil air lines, e.g. Cairo-Baghdad and Cairo-Cape routes. Development of civil air route along Arabian coast, if forced on us prematurely by Persian intransigence, has at least this compensating advantage.


4. It is contemplated that Imperial Airways would operate Arab coast route by seaplanes with terminal













(P.Z. 6570/31)


Summary of conclusions of meeting at the India Office
on 7th October, 1931, regarding the air route to India.

At the meeting with the Air Ministry and Foreign Office it was agreed that though the Arab coast route is from every point of view a bad prospect, it is essential to put in hand at once preparations for its establishment so that it may be ready by the end of March in case failure of the negotiations with Persia make it necessary to fall back on this route. The Foreign Office even went so far as to consider that active preparation might well help to bring the Persians to a more reasonable frame of mind, were they once to realise that we are not dependent on the South Persian route.

The question was discussed whether when the Arab route is established it would be desirable, if possible, to exclude foreign aircraft. It was pointed out that it is undesirable to depart further than is necessary from the traditional policy of excluding foreign influence from the Arab States, and also that in practice we should have to take the responsibility for dealing with incidents which might result from the presence of foreign aircraft. The Foreign Office, however, were doubtful of the expediency of excluding foreigners. It was agreed that this question could be considered later.

It was agreed that Colonel Biscoe should visit the Trucial Coast as soon as possible, and that it would be desirable to give him a free hand in negotiation with the Sheikhs. Imperial Airways will require an intermediate station for a night stop at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, with a vessel for accommodation of passengers and staff. It was thought that this vessel should be placed in charge of two or three Europeans.

Colonel Biscoe would first try to secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of the alternative places mentioned by offering/




Summary of conclusions of meeting at the India Office
on 7th October, 1931, regarding the air route to India.


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It was agreed that Colonel Blasco should visit the Turkish Coast as soon as possible, and that it would be desirable to give him a free hand in negotiation with the Sheikhs. Imperial Airways will require an intermediate station for a night stop at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, with a vessel for accommodation of passengers and staff. It was thought that this vessel should be placed in charge of two or three Europeans.

Colonel Blasco would first try to secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of the alternative places mentioned by offering







Summary of conclusions of meeting at the India Office on 7th. October 1931 regarding the air route to India.

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P.Z.
6570
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
At the meeting with the Air Ministry and Foreign Office it was agreed that though the Arab coast route is from every point of view a bad proposition, it is essential to put in hand at once preparations for its establishment so that it may be ready by the end of March in case failure of the negotiations with Persia makes it necessary to fall back on this route. The Foreign Office agreed that active preparation might also be expected to help to bring the Persians to a more reasonable frame of mind, since they would realise that we are not dependent on the South Persian route.

essential
well
they must be considered
well
they must be considered

The question was discussed whether when the Arab route is established it would be desirable, if possible, to exclude foreign aircraft. It was pointed out that it is undesirable to depart further than is necessary from the traditional policy of excluding foreign influence from the Arab States, and also that in practice we should have to take the responsibility for dealing with incidents which might result from the presence of foreign aircraft. The Foreign Office were doubtful of the expediency of excluding foreigners. It was agreed that this question could be considered later.

however

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





(317)
(319)
al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, with a vessel for accommodation of passengers and staff. It was thought that this vessel should be placed in charge of two or three Europeans.

Colonel Biscoe would first try to secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of the alternative places mentioned by offering sufficient monetary inducement to satisfy the Sheikh and his retainers. The Air Ministry would probably be able to supply sufficient funds for this purpose.

The Foreign Office will remind the Persian Government of the question of the South Persian route, using as a peg the transmission to them of a report by Mr. Travers on the impracticability of the central Persian route. The offer to transfer the Persian section of the Duzdop Railway to Persia as well as the offer, already made, to re-commence the running of trains on this section, would be used at an appropriate opportunity.





TELEPHONE 2800.

QUEENS HOTEL,
EASTBOURNE.

10/10/31

My dear Walton.

There is one point that I stupidly
omitted to raise at the conference, that I should
like cleared up before I leave. The A.M. have
at times mentioned that air facilities at
Am-ul-Kawain would suit them as well
as at Ras-el-Khaimah. It is possible that it
may be easier to get what we want out of
the Sheikh of Am-ul-Kawain than out of the
Sheikh of Ras-el-Khaimah. Could you kindly
ascertain definitely from the A.M. whether it




at Khaimah or Um al Qawa, with a vessel for
accommodation of passengers and staff. It was
thought that this vessel should be placed in
charge of two or three Europeans.
Colonel Biscoe would first try to
secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of
the alternative places mentioned by offering
sufficient monetary inducement to satisfy the
Sheikh and his retainers. The Air Ministry
would probably be able to supply sufficient
funds for this purpose. The Foreign Office will remain

They are prepared to give me a free hand to
get them the required facilities at whichever
place seems most hopeful, or easier. I
think Um-ul-Q. might be more amenable, &
if so would go for him instead of the other man,
but I do not want to express a definite
opinion until I have consulted Isa.

I return to Town Monday morning. I have
got a sheet from Ismael re Muscat which I should
like to show you, so will come in & see you shortly
if I may.

Yrs sincerely

W. H. D. B. B.



(319) (321) Drafts for approval

S/S.

When the G. of S. reply
to the matter is settled finally,
a memorandum for information
might perhaps be circulated
to the Cabinet? Ref.


Private Secretary

The attention of Mr. 9/10

S. of. might perhaps be drawn
to Mr. Keen's note of the 30.
Inst. (which slip). But if the
three Departments are in agreement
upon this doubt it will probably
not be thought necessary to bring
the matter before the Cabinet
now.

L. G. L.
f. x

Done
S. A. 9/10





Register No.
PZ
6422/31

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Letter from _____ Dated _____ 19 ____
Telegram _____ Rec. _____

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To Chairman.....			
Under Secretary	8.10.	WJ	
Secretary of State...	8	WJ	The air route to India
Committee.....			
Under Secretary....			
Secretary of State...			

Copy of _____ to _____

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Draft to letter to Mr. Bullock + Mr. L. Elephant
including
Draft telegram to G. G. L. stating the position & asking
comment on proposed instructions to Col. Biscoe

9 OCT 1931

d.o. Letter to Mr Bullock
d.o. Letter to Mr L. Elephant.

Previous Papers:—

4407A 750 3.30





Minute Paper.

Department.

At the meeting with representatives of the Air Ministry and F.O. yesterday, with the S. of S. in the chair, it was agreed that though the Arab coast route is from every point of view a bad prospect, it is necessary to put in hand at once preparations for its establishment so that it may be ready by the end of March in case failure of the negotiations with Persia makes it necessary to fall back on this route. The F.O. agreed that active preparation might also be expected to help to bring the Persians to a more reasonable frame of mind, since they would realise that we are not dependent on the south Persian route.

The question was discussed whether when the Arab route is established it would be desirable, if possible, to exclude foreign aircraft. It was pointed out that it is undesirable to depart further than is necessary from the traditional policy of excluding foreign influence from the Arab States, and also that in practice we should have to take the responsibility for dealing with incidents which might result from the presence of foreign aircraft. The F.O. were doubtful of the expediency of excluding foreigners. It was agreed that this question could be considered later.

It was agreed that Col. Biscoe should visit the Trucial Coast as soon as possible, and that it would be desirable to give him a free hand in negotiation with the Sheikhs. Imperial Airways will require an intermediate station for a night stop at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, with a vessel for

accommodation/

314 3000 5 31




accommodation of passengers and staff. It was thought that this vessel should be placed in charge of two or three Europeans.


Col. Biscoe would first try to secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of the alternative places mentioned by offering sufficient monetary inducement to satisfy the Sheikh and his retainers. The Air Ministry would probably be able to supply sufficient funds for this purpose.


The F.O. will remind the Persian Govt. of the question of the south Persian route, using as a peg the transmission to them of a report by Mr. Travers on the impracticability of the central Persian route. The offer to transfer the Persian section of the Duzdap Railway to Persia as well as the offer, already made, to recommence the running of trains on this section, would be used at an appropriate opportunity.

A draft telegram to the G. of I. explaining the position and asking whether they concur in the proposed instructions to Col. Biscoe is submitted. It is drafted in persuasive language, because while they could of course be overruled if necessary, it is desirable to take them with us if we can, as this will undoubtedly make for smooth working. It is not anticipated that they will dissent. To do them justice, they have, I think, always recognised that the air route to India must be maintained. Their insistence on the difficulties of the Arab route has been due to anxiety that every possibility on the Persian side should be explored and that in facing the difficulties of the Arab side we should not make the mistake of under-rating them.

Since in their last telegram on the subject (of 25 July, flagged F) the G. of I. stated that if recourse
to/







Draft Paper.

Department.

C. Ll. Bullock Esq., C.B., C.B.E.
Air Ministry.

Dear Bullock

A Copy is attached of a very brief summary of the conclusions reached at the meeting here ~~yester-~~^{Monday} day about the air route to India, together with a draft telegram which, subject to the concurrence of the Air Ministry and Foreign Office, our Secretary of State proposes to send to the Government of India.

It will be desirable to carry the Government of India with us if we can, as this will make for smooth working. I do not anticipate that they will dissent, as their chief anxiety has been to make sure that every possibility on the Persian side of the Gulf is fully explored and that the risks on ^{the Arab} ~~the Arab~~ side are not underrated. They will now, I think, be satisfied on these points, and there seems no reason to anticipate that they will object to the proposed instructions.

You will remember, however, that in their last telegram on the subject No. 1851-S of the 25th July, which Mr. Benn ^{circulated} ~~circulated~~ to the Cabinet, the Government of India were somewhat emphatic on the point that/





they could not undertake to protect the airways establishments on the Trucial coast with Indian forces. In order to cover this point it seems desirable in our telegram to inform the Government of India that (as we understand to be the case from Lord Amulree's letter of the 28th September) the Air Ministry consider that the R.A.F. could undertake the responsibility for protection of the route, including, as far as possible, the prevention of unfortunate incidents.

Perhaps you could let me know whether you concur in the draft telegram or have any suggestions.

Yours sincerely,

(SD) L. D. WAKELY







Minute Paper.

~~FOIA/PS/12~~

Department.

Summary of conclusions of meeting at the India Office on 7th October 1931 regarding the air route to India.

At the meeting with the Air Ministry and F.O. it was agreed that though the Arab coast route is from every point of view a bad pis aller, it is necessary to put in hand at once preparations for its establishment so that it may be ready by the end of March in case failure of the negotiations with Persia makes it necessary to fall back on this route. The F.O. agreed that active preparation might also be expected to help to bring the Persians to a more reasonable frame of mind, since they would realise that we are not dependent on the south Persian route.

The question was discussed whether when the Arab route is established it would be desirable, if possible, to exclude foreign aircraft. It was pointed out that it is undesirable to depart further than is necessary from the traditional policy of excluding foreign influence from the Arab States, and also that in practice we should have to take the responsibility for dealing with incidents which might result from the presence of foreign aircraft. The F.O. were doubtful of the expediency of excluding foreigners. It was agreed that this question could be considered later.

It was agreed that Col. Biscoe should visit the Trucial Coast as soon as possible, and that it would be desirable to give him a free hand in negotiation with the Sheikhs. Imperial Airways will require an intermediate station for a night stop/

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


stop at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, with a vessel for accommodation of passengers and staff. It was thought that this vessel should be placed in charge of two or three Europeans.

Col. Biscoe would first try to secure an agreement with the Sheikh at one of the alternative places mentioned by offering sufficient monetary inducement to satisfy the Sheikh and his retainers. The Air Ministry would probably be able to supply sufficient funds for this purpose.

The F.O. will remind the Persian Govt. of the question of the south Persian route, using as a peg the transmission to them of a report by Mr. Travers on the impracticability of the central Persian route. The offer to transfer the Persian section of the Duzdap Railway to Persia as well as the offer, already made, to recommence the running of trains on this section, would be used at an appropriate opportunity.

*In P 6570
done*



Draft Paper.

Department.

S. of S. to G. of I., F. & P. Dept.


Your telegram 25 July 1851-8
and connected correspondence. Air
route.

2. Every effort will be made
to obtain Persian agreement to
continuation of permit to fly south
Persian route, as drawbacks of Arab
route from both commercial and
political points of view are
generally recognised. But it is in
any case essential, as is realised
by G. of I. no less than H.M.G.,
that ^{air} communications with India
should be maintained, and as it is
still uncertain whether Persia will
agree to extension of permit it is
necessary to make preparations in
advance for Arab route as second
string in case negotiations with
Persia fail. Knowledge that Arab
route is in course of preparation
may also help to make Persians more
reasonable by shewing them that we
are not dependent on South Persian
route.

3. It is contemplated that
Imperial Airways would operate
Arab coast route by seaplanes with
terminal stations at Basra and
Karachi and ~~night~~-stop at either

Ras/

5155 5000 231





Draft Paper.


Department.

327
329

Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain, Abu Musa which you suggested as alternative for intermediate station has been considered but is unsuitable. Facilities (regarding which no special difficulties arise) would be required for refuelling stations at Bahrain + Zaidah and emergency refuelling stations at Koweit, Yas Island and Omara. Full list of requirements was sent by ^{air} mail of 8 October. At either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain two moorings and refuelling barge would be required and Imperial Airways propose to maintain a sloop or hospital barge or some other suitable vessel which would accommodate passengers and staff and also act as a wireless station and store depot. Two or three Europeans might be left in charge of this barge.

4. Matter has been carefully considered by H.M.G. It is thought that best plan will be that Biscoe should have free hand to negotiate with Sheikhs as soon as possible after his return with a view to securing requisite facilities at either Ras al Khaimah or Umm al Qawain by such methods as he finds best, but that he should first try to secure an agreement from/

3115 5099 2.31






Draft Paper.


Department.

from Sheikh concerned to provide facilities in return for allowances on fairly generous scale so as to overcome opposition of Sheikh's retainers. Air Ministry would ~~be~~ be prepared to provide funds within reason and subject to maximum of say £3000 per annum.

5. Air Ministry consider that R.A.F. which is already operating military route could undertake responsibility for protection of Imperial Airways establishments and so far as possible prevention of unfortunate incidents.

6. Please telegraph whether you concur in proposed instructions to Biscoe.







S.26214.

P.Z.
6422

(6)

(330)

(332)

Notes of Meeting held in D.D.C.A's Room, Gwydyr House
on 5th October, 1931.

Present. Air Ministry: D.D.C.A. and Major Mealing (C.A.4.).

Imperial Airways: Major Woods-Humphery,
Colonel Burchall and Air Commodore
Fletcher.

ARABIAN COAST ROUTE.

1. On the assumption that Imperial Airways would be obliged to operate the Arabian Coast route between Basra and Karachi with Seaplanes, it was agreed that :-

Basra and Karachi would have to be equipped as terminal stations,
Ras-al-Khaimah or
Umm-al-Qaiwain would be the main stopping places at which passengers would spend the night.
Bahrein and Gwadar would be refuelling stations and
Koweit, Yas Island and Ormara would be emergency refuelling stations.

2. Three Flying Boats would be required for the operation of the service, but it might perhaps be necessary to start operation with two only making use of the two Calcuttas released from the North African service when that route is operated by land planes instead of by seaplanes.

Alternatively Imperial Airways might have to ask the Royal Air Force for the loan of service Calcuttas, in this event Imperial Airways would propose temporarily to carry mails only and not passengers.

3. It was agreed that the following ground organisation would be required along the route:-

Slipways at

Basra
and Karachi; it might be possible to get the Indian Government to provide this slipway.

Shed Accommodation.

Basra) Hangar accommodation would not be required, but
and Karachi) some shelter under which work could be carried out on the aircraft.


Moorings.

Basra 2
Koweit 1
Bahrein 1
Yas Island 1; possibly the existing R.A.F. Moorings would suffice.
Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain 2
Gwadar 2
Ormara 1
Karachi 2

Refuelling.

Fuel Barges where main stock would be kept would be required at:-

Basra
Bahrein
Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain
Gwadar
Karachi





2.

331

333

Refuelling (Ctd.)

Smaller refuelling stocks would be required at:-

Koweit
Yas Island and
Ormara.

Workshops.

General purpose small building for the repair of aircraft, but not of engines would be required at:-

Basra and
Karachi

Imperial Airways would propose to send, generally by air, any engines requiring repair through to their workshops at Cairo.

Staff Accommodation.

Staff accommodation would be required at:-

Basra; ^{probably} available
Bahrein; available if required
Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain; see below
Karachi; available.

Passenger Accommodation.

Passenger accommodation would be required at:-

Basra; probably by arrangement with the R.A.F.
Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain; see below
Karachi; available.

Wireless.

It was thought that D.F. would not be required along the route, but that a W/T station would be required at:-


Basra; R.A.F. existing
Bahrein; Imperial Communications Company existing
Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain; see below
Gwadar; Imperial Airways existing
Karachi; existing.

Meteorology.

It was thought that the R.A.F. station at Basra and the Indian Government station at Karachi would be sufficient.

4. Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain.

Imperial Airways would propose to maintain, in addition to the refuelling barge a sloop or hospital barge or some other suitable vessel at either Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qaiwain.






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
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
334


This vessel would accommodate passengers and staff and also act as a wireless station and a stores depot. It was not thought necessary that this vessel should also perform the functions of a rescue ship; any rescue work would have to be left to ships in the neighbourhood of an accident that could be communicated with from the wireless station in the Gulf.

5. In carrying out the negotiations for these stations and emergency refuelling stations on the Arabian coast, it will be necessary to remember that facilities will be required for importing aircraft and engine spares, stores, fuel and food.









Imperial Airways propose to maintain at the place selected a
sloop or hospital barge or some other suitable vessel,
which would accommodate passengers and staff and also act
as a W/T station and a stores depot.

Gwadar: Refuelling Station.

Moorings 2.

Refuelling Barge.

(W/T.: existing, Imperial Airways)

(Meteorology: existing, Imperial Airways Staff)

Ormara: Emergency Refuelling Station.

Moorings 1.

Refuelling: small emergency stock required.

KARACHI. Terminal Station.

Slipway.

Moorings 2.

Shed Accommodation

Refuelling Barge.

Workshop: general purpose building for repair of aircraft
but not of engines.


(Staff Accommodation: available)

(Passenger Accommodation: available)

(W/T: existing)

(Meteorology: existing)

P.D.C.A.
7.10.31.





Minute Paper.

Register No. P. 2 6260

SECRET. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated 19 .

Rec.

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
2. 10.	W	The South Persia air route
3		Present position of question

To

Under Secretary

Secretary of State...

Committee.....

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State...

Copy of to


FOR INFORMATION.


Please see P.2.5018/31 for the conversation of the British Charge d'Affaires with the Persian M.F.A. at the beginning of August on the subjects of the Dardap Railway and the Imperial Airways ^{permit} extension. The Persian M.F.A. deprecated the coupling of the two questions and said that he would bring the latter question before the Council of Ministers and urge the case for an extension.

In their despatch No.520 of 10th September, as no reply had been received from the Persian Government, the F.O. asked Mr. Dodd to consider what steps could be taken to ascertain from the Persian Government the result of their consideration of the question of extending Imperial Airways' permit. He replied by telegram on

Previous Papers :-

4475a 1000 5.30





Minute Paper.

Department.

26/9/31, Hagg C


on 21st September^x that a direct enquiry would merely elicit a refusal. He suggested however that an approach might be made to the question in the following manner; no formal notification has yet been made to the Persian Government that the central Persia route offered by them has been found impracticable; Mr.Dodd suggests that he should communicate on behalf of Imperial Airways to the Persian Government a report by Mr.Travers (the pilot who examined the route) and should make this a peg for enquiring what alternative they have to offer and press them for an urgent reply; he suggests that Mr.Travers' existing report should be altered and amplified for this purpose.

The French Minister was recently instructed by ^{his government} ~~the Minister~~ to ^{sound} ~~approach~~ the M.F.A. as to the prospect of an extension of the French ^{permit} ~~concession~~. It appears that the M.F.A. stated that the Persian Government did not propose to renew Imperial Airways' ^{permit} ~~concession~~ and that they would be unable to renew the contracts of the French and Dutch lines ^{beyond} ~~on~~ the 31st March 1932 "since H.M.G. would in that case claim m.f.n. treatment". The Dutch Minister has also spoken to the M.F.A. and has been informed that there would be no objection to an extension of the Dutch ^{permit} ~~concession~~ till that of Imperial Airways expires but that no more than this could be promised.

Hagg D

Hagg E

I understand from the F.O. that the reason why they were previously averse to the idea of joint representations by the British, French and Dutch Governments was that, since the French and Dutch ^{permits} ~~concessions~~ expired three months earlier than ours, they thought it better tactics to wait till the French and Dutch Governments made the first move and we knew what attitude/





Minute Paper.

Department.

attitude the Persian Government adopted towards them. As these moves have now been made, it seems desirable to consider again the question of joint representations and I understand that the F.O. will consider this and let us know their views at the meeting next week.

In reporting *to Dutch Minister's demands* Mr. Dodd stated that he found it difficult to suggest the best tactics to pursue in regard to our own ^{permit} ~~concession~~ until he was informed of the conclusions of H.M.G. as to (1) the question whether we could claim m.f.n. rights in the event of the French or Dutch securing an extension; and (2) as to the feasibility of the Arab coast route.


The F.O. have replied by despatch of 21st September regarding the m.f.n. question. This depends partly on whether the word "subjects" in the m.f.n. article of our Treaty with Persia can be interpreted as including "companies". They also consider that it would be difficult to claim m.f.n. rights if the Persians should give a complete monopoly of their air services to the French or the Dutch (*perhaps* an improbable contingency). The F.O. therefore conclude that it is impossible to state how strong a claim H.M.G. might have until the question arises in practice.


As regards Mr. Dodd's question regarding the Arab route, it will now be possible to inform ^{him} ~~them~~ that preparations are being put in train. When the Persians become aware of this, it may have an effect in making their attitude more accommodating.


We still have the inducement, for what it may be worth, of the re-opening of the Dugdap railway to give to the Persians on condition of their extending the Imperial Airways ^{permit} ~~concession~~. If it would increase the value

It is now generally assumed that the Persian Govt. is leaning towards a French interest & supplanting British, though the French Govt. has stated that no negotiations are in progress.

40311 5000 3/30









In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 6260
and address—not to any person by name, but to
The Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

2.2. Very confidential (339)
6260
1931
hde
11/11
(341)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for*
India and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
1st October, 1931. *pp 5914 4982*

5914 Reference to previous correspondence:
Air Ministry letter No. S.26214/D.P.C.A., of 16th September.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>To</i> <i>H.M. Representative</i> <i>Tehran.</i> <i>No. 543, of 21st September.</i>	<i>Imperial Airways service</i> <i>to India via Persia.</i> <i>British most-favoured-nation</i> <i>rights.</i>

RECEIVED
2 OCT 1931

Similar letter sent to *H.M.*
C.O.
5/11
Admty.

14-5901 (2)





THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

PERSIA.

September 21, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

P.Z.
6260

SECTION 1.

[E 4727/439/34]

No. 1.

931

The Marquess of Reading to Mr. Dodd (Tehran).

(No. 543. Very Confidential.)

Foreign Office, September 21, 1931.

Sir,
I HAVE received your despatch No. 423 of the 10th August in which you request to be furnished with a considered opinion on the question whether, in the event of the Persian Government renewing the permission at present enjoyed by the Dutch and French air lines to fly along the Persian shore of the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Government would be able to claim a similar extension of permission on behalf of Imperial Airways on the grounds of their rights to most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia.

2. As you are aware, most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia is accorded to British subjects and their trade by article 9, paragraph 2, of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1857, which runs as follows:—

"The high contracting parties engage that the treatment of their respective subjects, and their trade, shall also, in every respect, be placed on the footing of the treatment of the subjects and commerce of the most favoured nation."

3. In order to establish the right to claim for Imperial Airways, under this treaty article, permission to use a route in Persia for a commercial air service, on the ground that similar permission had been given to French and Dutch air transport companies, it will be necessary in the first place for His Majesty's Government to show that Imperial Airways are covered by the word "subjects." The first question, therefore, is whether, in this treaty, the word "subjects" applies to "companies," that is, whether it includes corporations as well as individuals. His Majesty's Government do not usually interpret the word "subjects" as including corporations, as is shown by the ordinary commercial treaties between Great Britain and other countries, which contain certain articles giving rights to subjects and citizens, and certain other articles setting forth the treatment to be accorded to companies. On the other hand, there are certain old treaties in connexion with which His Majesty's Government have, in the past, contended for, and have in practice secured, an interpretation of "subjects" as including companies.

4. But even if this difficulty can be overcome, it is difficult to express a categorical opinion on the possibility of establishing conclusively a legal case under the most-favoured-nation provisions of the treaty of 1857. The Persian Government might well endeavour to complicate the legal point at issue. They might, for example, assert that they had decided to reorganise completely their air communications, and had reached the conclusion that it would be in Persia's best interests to grant a concession to a particular foreign company, or companies, giving them under suitable conditions the complete monopoly of operating air services across Persian territory. It is questionable whether, in that event, it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to establish a claim that, because Persia had given a concession to companies of French and Dutch nationality, she was also bound under her most-favoured-nation obligations to grant the same or a similar concession to a British company. The Persian Government might claim that most-favoured-nation rights could not be considered as applying to the grant of concessions, since a concession obviously cannot be extended to an unlimited number of concessionaires.

5. For these reasons, it is not possible to state in advance, before the question has arisen in practice, and before it is known in precisely what form the question is likely to arise, how strong a claim His Majesty's Government could advance for most-favoured-nation treatment in this respect. The strength of such a claim must depend largely upon the form in which the question arises, and this in its

[254 x—1]





turn depends upon the Persian Government. In practice, the Persian Government may find it difficult to adduce reasonable grounds for a refusal to grant Imperial Airways the same facilities as they grant to other foreign air lines, and this may be all that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs meant when he mentioned the question of most-favoured-nation treatment to the French Minister. At the same time it must be recognised that if the purely legal issue were taken to arbitration, it is by no means certain that His Majesty's Government would win their case; and, while it may be found advisable to appeal in the last resort to most-favoured-nation rights, it would be unwise to rely on the supposition that such an argument will prove successful.


6. As regards the last sentence of paragraph 3 of your despatch, there can be no question of giving an assurance to the French and Netherlands Governments that His Majesty's Government will not, in any circumstances, claim most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia for Imperial Airways. Such an assurance would only render it more difficult to obtain for Imperial Airways an extension of the South Persian route, and would serve no useful purpose. I appreciate the fact that, if Imperial Airways operate the Arabian route, and the French and Dutch Air companies are also precluded from operating the South Persian route, these companies will also probably have to be accorded facilities on the Arabian route, provided that they are prepared to use flying boats instead of land planes, and to comply with such reasonable conditions as may be considered necessary.


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
READING.













reference particularly to the Persian side of the question. I think all concerned in this country are agreed that preparations for the Arab route, as our second string, should be put in hand at once. So far as preparations on the political side are concerned, the best idea will probably be to give Biscoe a free hand to negotiate as he deems best with any Sheikhs concerned, with a view to securing the requisite facilities. We can send the necessary instructions to the Government of India to this end. But in order that matters may be put in train it is necessary that we should first have information as precise as may be possible on the questions referred to in my letter of 25th September, viz: what facilities Imperial Airways will require and at what places. I expect the Company and the Air Ministry have already worked out an approximate scheme. We understand that the service will be by flying boats from Basra to Bahrein (where there will be no difficulties) and thence to Gwadar via an intermediate place on the Trucial Coast, the choice of which lies between Ras
al/






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
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al Khaimah and Umm al Qaiwain. If the choice between these two places depends partly on political considerations we can treat them as alternatives in telegraphing to the Government of India. But we would like to have pretty definite information as to minimum facilities required at either of these places so that the Government of India and Biscece may know what is involved. To make the information complete, the facilities required at Bahrain and Gwadar might also perhaps be stated. Could your Department provide the necessary information, and (if this is thought desirable) arrange for a representative of Imperial Airways to come to the meeting?

د. س. (ب)

1





F.G.L. Bertram, Esq., C.B.E.,
AIR MINISTRY,
Gwydyr House,
S.W. 1.

IMPORTANT.

2. 10. 31

Will you please refer to my letter of 25 Sept., P.Z. 6078/31, regarding the preparation of the Arab coast air route in case we fail to get an extension of Imperial Airways' present concession from the Persians and have to fall back on the Arab route.

Our Secretary of State has heard from yours that Abu Musa is technically unsuitable for a regular refuelling station; so the G. of I.'s suggestion on that point need not be further pursued.


Sir Samuel Hoare is inviting Lord Amulree to a meeting, accompanied by advisers, for some day after Wednesday next week. We are also asking representatives of the F.O. to come, with reference particularly to the Persian side of the question. I think all concerned in this country are agreed that preparations for the Arab route, as our second string, should be put in hand at once. So far as preparations on the political side are concerned, the best idea will/


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will probably be to give Biscoe a free hand to negotiate as he deems best with any Sheikhs concerned, with a view to securing the requisite facilities. We can send the necessary instructions to the G. of I. to this end. But in order that matters may be put in train it is necessary that we should first have information as precise as may be possible on the questions referred to in my letter of 25 Sept., viz. what facilities Imperial Airways will require and at what places. I expect the Company and the Air Ministry have already worked out an approximate scheme. we understand that the service will be by flying boats from Basra to Bahrein (where there will be no difficulties) thence to Gwaddar via an intermediate place on the Trucial Coast, the choice of which lies between Ras al Khaimah and Um al Qaiwain. If the choice between these two places depends partly on political considerations we can treat them as alternatives in telegraphing to the G. of I. But we would like to have pretty definite information as to minimum facilities required at ^{either of these} each place so that the G. of I. and Biscoe may know what is involved. ^{perhaps} ~~your dept.~~ ^{provide necessary information, & if this is possible} will consider whether to arrange for a representative of Imperial Airways/

To make the information complete, & further required at Bahrein & Gwaddar might also be studied. Could







TEL. NO. 1
VICTORIA 1216.

S.26214/D.D.C.A.

AIR MINISTRY,
GWYDYR HOUSE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.

347

349

2nd October, 1931.

Dear Walton,

With reference to your letter of the 25th September, P.Z.6078/31, I have passed it to our D.C.A.S., Burnett, as he had personal flying knowledge of Abu Musa.


I understand from him that he saw Colonel Biscoe and yourself yesterday and explained that from a flying point of view it would be sheer waste of time to explore the possibilities of Abu Musa and therefore that we should concentrate on obtaining facilities at Ras al Khaimah or at Umm al Quaiwan.

I am sending Rendel a copy of this letter.

Yours sincerely,

F.P. Sertan

J.C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.,
India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. Σ 4820/439/34 and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6197
1931

INDIA DIRECT
(Tehran tele. only)

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India* and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
28th September, 1931.

Reference to previous correspondence :
599 Foreign Office letter No. Σ 4611/439/34,
of 11th September.

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Tehran Telegram No. 208, of 21 st September.	Imperial Airways service across Persia.
Air Ministry. of 26 th September.	


29 SEP 1931


ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 240 1 OCT. 1931
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C-0.

14-5150 (2)









E 4820/439/34

P.Z.
6197
1931

FOREIGN OFFICE.

S.W.I.

26th September, 1931.

IMMEDIATE.

Sir,

With reference to Foreign Office letter No. E 4611/439/34 of the 11th September transmitting a copy of a telegram to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran requesting an expression of his views as to the possibility of clearing up the situation regarding the continued use by Imperial Airways Limited of the south Persian air route, I am directed by the Marquess of Reading to transmit to you, to be laid before the Air Council, the accompanying copy of a telegram which has been received from Mr. Dodd in reply.


2. It will be seen that, in Mr. Dodd's opinion, any direct enquiry of the Persian Government as to their decision regarding the extension of the permission at present enjoyed by Imperial Airways Limited would merely elicit a further refusal to agree to the extension. On the other hand, he considers that to communicate to the Persian Government the result of Mr. Travers' survey of the Central Persian route would give him an opportunity of breaching the question indirectly by enquiring what alternative the Persian Government suggested.


3. Mr. Dodd points out, however, that Mr. Travers' report does not in its present form contain any general conclusions regarding the impracticability of the Central route such as would be essential in formulating a convincing statement to the Persian Government.

4.

The Secretary

of the Air Ministry.






4. Lord Reading is in agreement with Mr. Dodd's views, as explained in the enclosed telegram, and would suggest, for the consideration of the Air Council, that Mr. Travers should be requested urgently to prepare a self-contained memorandum on the lines indicated by Mr. Dodd, for communication to the Persian Government.


I am,


Sir,


Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) G. W. RENDEL.









NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Mr. Dodd. (Tehran).

September 21st, 1931.

D. 9.00 p.m. September 21st, 1931.

R. 9.30 a.m. September 22nd, 1931.


No. 210.


My immediately preceding telegram.


I am definitely against acceptance and suggest
you should await my despatch No. 522 which leaves by
bag September 24th.

Arrangements could not in any case be carried
through by October 1st and I do not consider resultant
delay of any consequence.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 210; repeated to
Government of India No. 131.









In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. *16 4844/1152/34*
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

INDEXED

INDIA DIRECT
5972
1931

PZ. *PA* (355)
(357)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith cop/c of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
18th September, 1931.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. 3353/1152/34
of 4th August, 1931. m. w. 1/9


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
Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Iran Representative, Tehran no. 455 of 25th Aug.</i>	<i>Aviation Questions in Persia</i>

MAILS BRANCH
18 SEP 1931
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to *50*

14-5180 (2)





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5972

September 4, 1931.

SECTION 2.

PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

4544/1152/34]

No. 1.

Mr. Dodd to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(Received September 4.)
(No. 455.)

Gulhek, August 25, 1931.

Sir,
IN his despatch No. 319 of the 17th June last Sir Robert Clive gave an account of the difficulties recently experienced by the Persian branch of the Junkers Company in their dealings with the Persian Government. I have the honour to inform you that since that date the negotiations between Herr Weil and the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs have dragged on in a somewhat desultory fashion, and no settlement is yet in sight. The former has, indeed, won his point in connexion with the original cause of the dispute: the heavy increase of rates recently imposed on all correspondence sent by air has now been withdrawn: and he has not carried out his ultimatum to send three of his aeroplanes home to Germany, though it seems that he has reduced his already exiguous establishment and dispensed with the services of three out of his nine pilots. But his negotiations now embrace the larger question of the extension or rescission of the company's contract, which comes to an end next February, and in spite of the wholly admirable quality of the services rendered by Junkers during the past years in the development of Persian communications, it is evident that a prolongation of the contract is by no means a foregone conclusion.

2. I enclose herein a translation of an article which appeared a short while ago in the "Ittilâ'ât," a Tehran evening paper; there can be no doubt but that this article was officially inspired, and it is, indeed, characteristic of the methods employed by the Persian Government, who habitually make use of a press which they allege to be free of any but an "eliminator" control in their efforts to influence foreign firms engaged on contract work in this country. Herr Weil admits the inspired nature of this article, but professes to be not much perturbed by its purport.

3. It cannot be denied that the company are still very far from having carried out all the obligations incumbent on them by virtue of their contract. No three-engined machines have as yet made their appearance in Persia, and nothing has been done to establish either an aviation school or a Persian aviation company. The question of the aviation school would appear to constitute at present the chief stumbling-block in the way of a satisfactory settlement; Herr Weil estimates the cost of establishing such a school at some 80,000 tomans, and is naturally anxious to postpone the moment for embarking on this costly enterprise until the financial situation of the company has improved. It seems, moreover, that both the company and the Persian air force insist on controlling the school when it is finally brought into being, and neither side is ready to give way over this important point. Relations between the company and the air force are habitually strained, and both the German Minister and Herr Weil have received, from Teymourache and the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs respectively, unmistakable hints to the effect that an extension will be secured only if matters can be "arranged" with the military authorities. The latter have before now contrived to make capital out of their position; two years ago, Herr Weil informs me, they received from him 6,000 tomans' worth of spare parts, and he has information to the effect that this material is entered in the air force books as having been duly paid for, though the company has never received a kran for it. It is now a standing rule with Junkers that no special aeroplane chartered by the military may leave the ground until the fare has actually been received; and Herr Weil declares that he will leave the country rather than resort to bribery to obtain a renewal of the contract.

4. Rumours have of late been current in Tehran to the effect that the Persian Government have received an offer of £10,000 for the supplanting of the Junkers Company by a French contractor. The French Minister informs me, however, that no negotiations are in progress in this connexion, and that the

[254 d-2]



forthcoming visit of a French military air squadron to Tehran will in reality be an exercise planned without any such ulterior motive. It is certain that the Shah has a prejudice against French aviation owing to the failure of the last French air mission, and Herr Weil, who estimates his own chances of securing a renewal of the contract at a little over 50 per cent., is of the opinion that if he should fail, the windfall is more likely to be secured by an Italian firm than by a French one.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch, with its enclosure, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.
CHARLES DODD.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Ittilâ-ât" of August 2, 1931

(Translation.)

THE JUNKERS CONTRACT.

THE prospective renewal of the contract granted by the Government to the Junkers Company gives us occasion to set forth our views on this question. We hope that the authorities will receive them in the same impartial and unbiased spirit in which they are given :—

Desiring to introduce all the latest improvements into the country, the Government took steps to create a system of aerial posts in Persia. This gave rise to a competition between French and German aviation companies, which was won in Bahman 1304 by the Germans, who offered the best terms.

Those who had the progress of Persia at heart welcomed this event, and the papers described the inauguration of an aerial post as a useful step in the advancement of the new Persia. The concession was granted for five years, and it will therefore come to an end in Bahman of this year (sometime in February 1932). It may be as well, at this stage, briefly to review the history of this concession, in order to ascertain whether the contracting company has fulfilled its contractual obligations and to determine whether the renewal of its contract is genuinely in the advantage of Persia. Before proceeding to answer these questions we must give the directors of the company their due and testify to their proficiency and technical and scientific qualifications. They have done much to gain the public confidence, and their aeroplanes have suffered hardly a casualty. We do not therefore wish to call in question the safety, comfort, speed or solidity of their machines. We are also glad to be able to say that notwithstanding the hot climate of our country and its peculiar meteorological conditions, their aeroplanes have fully proved their worth so that the various types of accident so frequent, even in Europe, have seldom occurred in this country.

Having said this, we must, however, state that where its own advantage was not concerned the contracting company has seldom stopped to consider the vital interests of this country in matters to which we attach the utmost importance, and this, though the Persian Government have always taken great care to safeguard the company's interests, and have even gone so far as to exempt the petrol and lubricating oil used by the company from customs dues.

The company undertook by virtue of section (c) of article 8 of the concession—

To establish a technical aviation school and import instructional aeroplanes for the training of Persian pilots and mechanics.

Section (d) of the same article runs :—

The admission by the company into its various institutions of two Persian students at a time, throughout the period of the contract, for instruction at the expense of the company in all branches of aviation.

Section (f) of the same article :—

The formation of a Persian aviation company in accordance with Persian law.





Section (h) of the same article :—

The use by the company throughout the period of the concession of a number of large aeroplanes with three engines and the use, if necessary, of one such machine immediately after the sanction and granting of this concession.

The Government had in mind to ensure that while others reaped the advantages of the contract, Persia should also benefit through an arrangement by which she should eventually be able to count on a number of trained Persian pilots and air mechanics. They wished to bring about the establishment of an aviation school, the training of two Persian students at a time in the various branches of the company and the formation of an aviation company with at least half of the shares held by Persians. None of these obligations, though legally binding on the company, have been put into effect, and it is the company which is responsible for the fact that advantages which should have accrued five years ago to Persia still remain in abeyance. One wonders whether it is really expedient that the concession should be renewed with a company which regards with total indifference the interests of the Government which granted it. From the legal point of view the answer is in the negative, unless indeed the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, who enjoys a merited reputation as a competent official and an energetic supporter of Persian interests, is fully satisfied that the company will turn over a new leaf and will henceforth fulfil scrupulously its obligations and safeguard Persian interests. Confident as we are that the present Government never adopts an obstructive attitude towards any measure conducive to the public welfare, we cannot but attribute the indifference displayed towards these unfulfilled obligations to the company and not to the Government, and we therefore repeat that unless the interests in question are safeguarded, the concession should not be renewed to Junkers.

We consider that it is in the interests of our country that at the present stage when the contract has still five months to run, this hint should be given to the Government, in order that when the time comes to consider the renewal more attention may be paid to the moral and material interests of the Persian people.





Minute Paper.

Department.

U.S.S.

Please see Mr. Rendel's letter of 16th September below.

It was contemplated by the Cabinet on 30th July that if the negotiation with Persia (for continued permission to fly the S. Persian route in exchange for reopening of the Duzdap Railway) fails, the Air Ministry should consider preparations for the Arab route (see flag A).

The present position is that the negotiation with Persia has not yet failed, but that we shall probably not know for some time whether it is a failure or not.


In these circumstances it seems desirable to proceed with preparations for the Arab route as a pis aller, i.e. to prepare plans to which, if necessary, effect can be given at short notice. What seems to be specially required is the preparation of plans on the technical side; this is a matter for the Air Ministry in consultation with Imperial Airways. It is doubtful whether plans on the political side can make much further progress beyond the point already reached - viz. the de facto establishment of a skeleton military route. Colonel Biscoe at any rate thinks that it is a mistake to approach the Sheikhs with tentative and contingent schemes, and preferable to make up our own minds first as to what we require of them so that we can adopt a firm and definite attitude; if we asked for facilities which we may (contingently) require, and if they objected and we subsequently found that we did not require the facilities, they would think that our desistence/

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desistence was due to their objections and prestige would suffer. However, we can consider what can be done to prepare the minds of the Sheikhs for the advent of a civil route, when the technical side of the scheme is more advanced, and we know exactly what facilities would be required and where. The Air Ministry memorandum to the Cabinet stated that if the service is operated, as is proposed, by flying boats, it would only be necessary to have one intermediate landing place on the Trucial Coast, viz: at Raz-al-Khamah or alternatively at Umm-al-Qaiwan. As a step towards the materialisation of a definite scheme, we might ask the Air Ministry, if they have no objection, to get a report on the technical suitability of Abu Musa as an alternative to Ras-al-Khamah.

*I telephoned to Mr. Braham about this last week & he said he would consult the military side. I have heard nothing further.
I submit a brief letter
Lewiston
14.5.31*








complete, so far as possible, the preparation of definite plans for an Arab coast route, so that it will be possible to give effect to them at short notice if we have to fall back on that route. The preparation of plans on the technical side especially seems to be desirable, so that we may know exactly at what places facilities for the civil air route would be required and the extent of the facilities at each place. It will then be possible to consider what should be done to prepare the minds of the Sheikhs, etc., concerned, and to obtain the facilities, though it is a question whether any definite approach should be made to the Sheikhs until the Persian negotiations break down and we thus become certain that we shall require the facilities. When we know this we can make firm demands on them to which they are more likely to be amenable than to contingent demands or requests. This at least, as you probably know, is Biscoe's view of the question of the tactics to be adopted with them.

At any rate the first thing necessary seems to be to reach final conclusions as to what facilities will be required and where, and in view of the difficulties experienced before at

Ras/







FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I.

16th September, 1931.


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
Dear Walton,

Dodd's latest despatch about the South Persian Air Route (No. 464 of August 25th), a copy of which will shortly be sent you in print, mentions the question of the tactics to be pursued if there is no further move from the Persian side in response to our offer to reopen the Duzdap railway in return for an extension of the air route. As you know, we cannot press the Persians on the question of this suggested bargain, or our lever would lose even such doubtful value as it at present possesses. It was just an off chance that the Persians might think the deal worth while. If they do not, I fear there is no more to be done in that particular direction. Meanwhile Dodd points out that it is difficult for him to suggest the best course of action until he is definitely informed inter alia of the conclusions reached by His Majesty's Government as to the feasibility of the route down the Arab Coast.

We


J.C. Walton, Esq., C.B., M.C.






We are a little uneasy at having heard no more about the question of the examination and preparation of the Arabian route, which as you know we have been urging so strongly for so long. We fully realise how greatly preferable it would be to secure a continuance of the permission to use the Persian route, but we still feel very strongly that it may prove impossible to secure this, and that it is essential, from every point of view, that we should be ready with an alternative. It seems to us therefore most important that the matter should not be allowed to drift, and we wonder whether any steps have yet been taken with regard to the Government of India's suggestion that use should be made of Abu Musa island, instead of the Trucial Coast itself (see paragraph 5 of their telegram of July 25th). If not, might it not be well to have the island examined forthwith by a competent expert from the Royal Air Force or even Imperial Airways to see whether it is in any way suitable?


I





I am sending a copy of this letter to
Bertram at the Air Ministry.

Yours sincerely
C. W. Rendell.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. *64550/439/34*
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6078
1931

INDIA DIRECT
(365)
(366)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to the *Under-Secretary of State for India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
27th September, 1931.

Reference to previous correspondence :
5774. Foreign Office letter no. 64320/439/34
of 10th September, 1931.


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

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Iran Representative, Tehran no 464 of 25th Aug.</i>	<i>South Persian air route</i>

24 SEP 1931
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to *Co.*

14-5180 (2)





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PERSIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

P.Z.
6078

September 4, 1931.

1931

SECTION 7.

[F 4550/439/34]

No. 1.

Dr. Dodd to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 464.)

Gulhek, August 25, 1931.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that since writing my despatch No. 423 of the 10th August, I have had further conversations with the French and Dutch representatives on the subject of the Southern Persian air route.

2. As Sir Robert Clive had informed the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in May that he did not propose, for the time being, to press for the prolongation of Imperial Airways' permission (see your despatch No. 443 of the 11th August approving this language) and as the situation had been radically changed by His Majesty's Government's offer to reopen the Duzdap Railway in return for the prolongation of the permission, I felt it only right to tell him, in strict confidence, of the step which His Majesty's Government had taken. In doing so, I impressed upon him the necessity, in the interests of all three countries concerned, of maintaining complete silence as to the *pression* which His Majesty's Government were exercising. He promised to do so and I am confident that this promise will be observed.

3. M. van Buttingha Wichers has since spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the extension of the K.L.M.'s permission. Feroghi stated that there would be no objection to the grant of an extension until the Imperial Airways' permission expired, but that he could promise no more than this. When M. van Buttingha Wichers asked for a reason, Feroghi replied that a similar request had already been refused when made by him a year ago. His Highness did not repeat the reason which he had given on that occasion (which was that the Persian Government objected to an extension for Imperial Airways' permission owing to their fears of British political influence), but said that the Persian Government wished the aeroplanes to follow a route profitable to Persian interests, that is to say, one across the centre of Persia by which cities not now connected by air might be linked up. M. Buttingha Wichers protested that no such route across the centre of Persia was practicable, to which Feroghi merely replied that there might be other reasons with which he was not acquainted.

4. M. van Buttingha Wichers then impressed upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs the deplorable effect which the denial of a Persian link in air communications to the Orient would have on Dutch and other European public opinion, and said that the Netherlands Government could not endure it. Feroghi asked if they proposed to use force, to which M. van Buttingha Wichers replied that, if anyone were using force, it was the Persian Government. He compared their action to the closure of the Suez Canal—it was even worse than closing the Canal, as there was no alternative route—and said that he was quite unable to believe that in the end they would really refuse. Feroghi finally said that there was no "décision nette et précise," that he was not opposed to the extension himself, that unfortunately his own influence in the question was very small, and that in any case he would lay M. van Buttingha Wichers's representations before the Council of Ministers.

5. M. Buttingha Wichers informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on this occasion that the K.L.M. intended to run a bi-weekly service in each direction from the 1st October, instead of a weekly service as at present. This was in accordance with their permission, which allowed 104 flights each way yearly. Feroghi said that there would be no objection.

6. The French Minister has also been informed of His Majesty's Government's offer to reopen the Duzdap Railway in return for the prolongation of Imperial Airways' permission and has promised to observe complete silence. He, too, has discussed the question with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who explained the attitude of the Persian Government as being quite definitely due to fear of British political influence.

[254 d—7]



7. In the meanwhile, I have received no reply from the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the offer, and although I have since had conversations with him and officials of his department, this particular question has not even been approached. There is a possibility that no reply will be forthcoming at all at present it rather looks as if the manoeuvre had failed, though, procrastinating as the Persians are, I think it is still too early to be quite sure. Assuming, however, that we are to expect no further move from the Persian side, I find it difficult to suggest the best tactics to pursue until I am definitely informed as to the conclusions reached by His Majesty's Government (i) in the question whether Imperial Airways can claim most-favoured-nation rights with the French and Dutch services, and (ii) as to the feasibility of the Arab coast route.

8. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.



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

CHARLES DODD.





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Air Ministry reference *S-262/4/DCA*
Your reference *PZ-4652/31*
A.M. Form 541
365 *368*
11W
5914
Air Ministry,
Adastral House,
Kingsway, W.C.2.
SUBJECT: *16 September 1931*
17/9/31
16 September 1931
air route along the Persian Gulf
3
SIR,
I am commanded by the Air Council
to transmit, for your information, a copy of
letter which has been addressed to
*the Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office*
on the above subject.
ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. *739*
FROM SECRETARY, *I am, Sir,*
Your obedient servant,
17 SEP 1931
24 SEP 1931
OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT
The Under Secretary of State
C. G. Bullock
India Office
(*2504) Wt. 27055-1886 2.000 1/31 T.S. 118









In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 10461/439/30
and address—not to any person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

Keep file for an available
370

(368) 621
P. Z. M. A
5797 *(370)*
1931

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith cop 103 of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
11th September, 1931.

4572
P 595/27

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. 6 4026/18/30
of 10th August, 1931

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>10/</i> <i>Am. Representative,</i> <i>Lehran.</i> <i>no. 520 of 10th Sept.</i>	<i>Air routes over Persian</i> <i>territory.</i>



12 SEP 1931



12 SEP 1931



ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 238 17 SEP. 1931
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to *him*
co.

14-5150 (2)












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
air service. A copy of Mr. Travers' report of this survey was forwarded to you in my predecessor's despatch No. 439 of August 10th. I understand that, although the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has been informed orally that the Central Persian air route has been found to be impracticable, no formal notification to that effect has yet been made to the Persian Government. It appears desirable that such a notification should be made without delay. Since the permission for the survey was obtained through His Majesty's Legation, and since the Legation were formally notified by the Persian Government of their decision regarding the alignment of the proposed Central Persian route, it would be logical that the present notification to the Persian Government should also be made by the Legation. At the same time I realise that for tactical reasons, of which you are the best judge, it may be preferable that the proposed notification should, in this instance, be made direct by Imperial Airways. I shall be glad to receive your views on this point in a short telegram.

I am, with great truth,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

(Sd.) G. W. RENDALL









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374

via Shaller, Meshed, Isfahan, Yazd, Kerman, Bam, Iranahahr and Gwatter.


5. The report on the route in question by a representative of Imperial Airways Ltd., as the result of his survey in June last was to the effect that the route is entirely impracticable for the operation of a regular commercial air service. The route follows extremely difficult and mountainous country involving flight at 12000 to 13000 ft. with no possibility of making a forced landing for some hundreds of miles.

6. Although the impossibility of operating the route has from time to time been referred to in discussions with officers of your Department and was fully appreciated by Sir Robert Clive, the Council are unaware of any communication in that sense having been made to the Persian Government.

7. I am, therefore, to suggest that the Persian Government should be notified without delay that as a result of the survey the route suggested by them through Central Persia is entirely impracticable. "

I am, etc.,

(sd.) B. E. HOLLOWAY.





Notes.

Minute Paper.

Register No.
P.2
577⁴/₃₁

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated 19 .
Rec.

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To		
Under Secretary		
Secretary of State...		
Committee.....		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State...		

THE QUESTION OF THE AIR ROUTE IN SOUTH PERSIA.

Copy of to

FOR INFORMATION.

Please see P.Z. 5018/31 as regards the conversation of the British Charge d'Affaires with the Persian M.F.A. at the beginning of August last.

Mr. Dodd's despatch of 10 August now submitted is of interest. He reports that there seems to be a possibility that our démarche in coupling the question with that of the Duzdap Railway may produce results.

It also appears that the Persian Govt. may have some misgivings that if they renew the French and Dutch permits, H.M.G. might be able to claim m.f.n. treatment for Imperial Airways. Mr. Dodd asks that this question should be examined. The F.O.

consider/

Previous Papers :--

4475 1000 5.30



consider it impossible to say how strong a claim to
m.f.n. treatment could be advanced until the question
arises in a concrete form.

Meanwhile, it is all to the good that the
Persian Govt. appear to have qualms on the subject.

*A note on the position of the Persian Govt. air route
is being submitted separately.*

*W. A. R.
18.1.31*



INDIA DIRECT (of Sup. from London 10/8/31)
Very Confidential
B. Z.
 5774
 1931
 32

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
 No. **64320/439/34**
 and address—not to any person by name, but to—
 "The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

INDEXED

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
 compliments to *the Under-Secretary of State for India*
 and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
 transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
 10th September, 1931.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. 64066/439/34
of 12th August, 1931.

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>To</i> Air Ministry 8th Sept	<i>Serian attitude towards Imperial Airways' service to India.</i>


11 SEP 1931
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE


ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
 NO **233** 17 SEP 1931
 FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
 SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE
and by Air to India 17 SEP 1931


Similar letter sent to *Ro,*
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
14-5180 (2)














(377)
(379)

2. In view of this somewhat conflicting evidence it is, perhaps, just possible that Feroughi never really mentioned the question of most-favoured-nation treatment, and that the version of the interview which Monsieur Maugras gave to Colonel Doda was intended by the former as a ballon d'essai, designed to provoke a statement of the views of this Legation on the possibility of a British claim to such treatment. It is of course also possible that Feroughi himself was responsible for this ballon d'essai, and was actuated by a similar motive to that which I have above attributed to Monsieur Maugras. On the whole I am inclined to think that the most straightforward interpretation is the correct one: that the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the explanation which the French Minister ascribes to him, and gave it because he believed it himself. I have mentioned the other possibilities merely because it would in my opinion be unwise to draw too definite a conclusion as to the attitude of the Persian Government on this important question.

3. At the present moment there seems at least a possibility that the desire of the Persian Government for the reopening of the Dardanelles Railway may finally induce them to adopt a more reasonable standpoint in the matter of the Imperial Airways' Contract. It is, however, to be feared that they will not reach a decision for some time to come, and it is perhaps worth while, therefore, to consider the bearing of this question of most-favoured-nation treatment on the general problem which/






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which would arise if it should after all prove impossible to secure an extension of the contract. I presume that in that event the route along the Arabian shore, difficult though it may be, would be used rather than abandon the service to India altogether. The French and Dutch Governments would no doubt do their best to obtain permission to use the same route, and their impertunity might well prove embarrassing to His Majesty's Government. Their case would inevitably lose much of its point were His Majesty's Government to furnish an assurance to the effect that they would not claim most-favoured-nation treatment in the event of the French and Dutch lines securing an extension of their Persian contracts.

4. From the third paragraph of the first enclosure to Mr. Rendel's letter (E 3054/439/34) of June 18th last I understand that it is considered very doubtful by the Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned whether it would be legally possible for Imperial Airways to claim equality of treatment with the French and Dutch lines in the event of these lines securing an extension of their contracts. The Persian Government have indeed shown an unabashed and hitherto successful disregard of such of their treaty obligations as incommode them, and they might well attempt to ignore the claim of Imperial Airways even if, (as now seems probable), they considered it to be legally valid. But I am not aware of the considerations which have led the Departments of His Majesty's Government/







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

Government to regard the claim as weak from the purely legal standpoint, and since it is not impossible that I may at some future date be approached more directly in the matter by the French Minister or the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, I should be glad if I might be apprised of the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government with regard to this point.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) Charles Doda.





4320/439/34

FOREIGN OFFICE,

September, 1931.

Sir,

Mr. Dodd,

Tehran.


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
Very Confidential.

I have received your despatch No. 423 of the 10th August in which you request to be furnished with a considered opinion on the question whether, in the event of the Persian Government renewing the permission at present enjoyed by the Dutch and French air lines to fly along the Persian shore of the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Government would be able to claim a similar extension of permission on behalf of Imperial Airways on the grounds of their rights to most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia.

2. As you are aware, most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia is accorded to British subjects and their trade by Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Anglo-Persian

Treaty/





treaty of 1857, which runs as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties engage.....

"that the treatment of their respective

"subjects, and their trade, shall also, in



"every respect, be placed on the footing of the


"treatment of the subjects and commerce of the


"most-favoured-nation."

3. In order to establish the right
to claim for Imperial Airways, under this Treaty
article, permission to use a route in Persia
for a commercial air service, on the ground
that similar permission had been given to
French and Dutch air transport companies, it
will be necessary in the first place for His
Majesty's Government to show that Imperial
Airways are covered by the word "subjects".
The first question, therefore, is whether,
in this Treaty, the word "subjects" applies
to "Companies", that is, whether it includes
corporations as well as individuals. His
Majesty's Government do not usually interpret
the word "subjects" as including corporations,

ES/











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385


completely their air communications, and had reached the conclusion that it would be in Persia's best interests to grant a concession to a particular foreign company, or companies, giving them under suitable conditions the complete monopoly of operating air services across Persian territory. It is questionable whether, in that event, it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to establish a claim that, because Persia had given a concession to companies of French and Dutch nationality, she was also bound under her most-favoured-nation obligations to grant the same or a similar concession to a British company. The Persian Government might claim that most-favoured-nation rights could not be considered as applying to the grant of concessions, since a concession obviously cannot be extended to an unlimited number of concessionaires.

5./





5. For these reasons, it is not possible to state in advance, before the question has arisen in practice, and before it is known in precisely what form the question is likely to arise, how strong a claim His Majesty's Government could advance for most-favoured-nation treatment in this respect. The strength of such a claim must depend largely upon the form in which the question arises, and this in its turn depends upon the Persian Government. In practice, the Persian Government may find it difficult to adduce reasonable grounds for a refusal to grant Imperial Airways the same facilities as they grant to other foreign air lines, and this may be all that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs meant when he mentioned the question of most-favoured-nation treatment to the French Minister. At the same time it must be recognised that if the purely legal issue were taken to arbitration, it is by no means







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means certain that His Majesty's Government would win their case; and, while it may be found advisable to appeal in the last resort to most-favoured-nation rights, it would be unwise to rely on the supposition that such an argument will prove successful.


6. As regards the last sentence of paragraph 3 of your despatch, there can be no question of giving an assurance to the French and Netherlands Governments that His Majesty's Government will not, in any circumstances, claim most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia for Imperial Airways. Such an assurance would only render it more difficult to obtain for Imperial Airways an extension of the South Persian route, and would serve no useful purpose. I appreciate the fact that, if Imperial Airways operate the Arabian route, and the French and Dutch Air companies are also precluded from operating the South Persian route, these companies will also probably have to be accorded facilities


on






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on the Arabian route, provided that they are
prepared to use flying boats instead of land
planes, and to comply with such reasonable
conditions as may be considered necessary.









SECRET

(REVISED COPY)

FHB/ETP/FRB/CWP/DT.

(169 groups)

4181

DE CYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

(COPIES
CIRCULATED) From Government of India, Foreign and
Political Department, to Secretary
of State for India.

Dated Simla, 25th July, 1931.


Received 3.45 p.m., 25th July, 1931.

XXX

1851-S.

SECOND PART.

4. As we understand proposals for development of Arab route, it is intended to fly direct from Bahrain to Ras Al Khaimah, and it is consequently unnecessary at present to contemplate more than establishment and maintenance facilities at Ras Al Khaimah. Our experiences there have not been encouraging hitherto, and we are convinced that attempt to secure what is now wanted by persuasive methods in short interval during which Airways concession in Persia remains operative, is foredoomed to failure. We think if this attempt is pressed with undue insistence His Majesty's Government will find themselves compelled to have recourse to force both for inception and maintenance. We wish it to be quite clearly understood that, in that event, we could not undertake protection of the Airways establishment at Ras Al Khaimah or elsewhere on the Trucial Coast with Indian forces. Apart from the military and constitutional objections, despatch of these would provoke reaction among Indian Muslims which at present juncture we are not prepared to face. We cannot also discard the possibility that insistence by His Majesty's Government in face of the opposition of Sheikh of Ras Al Khaimah might unite Trucial Sheikhs against us, and cause them to seek protection from Ibn Saud.





SECRET

(289)
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IT/DT.

(66 groups)

4185

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

(COPIES
CIRCULATED) From Government of India, Foreign and
Political Department, to Secretary
of State for India.


Dated Simla, 25th July, 1931.

XXX

Received 8.0 p.m., 25th July, 1931.

1851-8. THIRD AND LAST PART.

Para. 5. At the same time, we do not doubt that, if right methods are used, development of Arab route in time will be achieved and we think every expedient should be adopted to prevent deadlock, which we (7 otherwise) anticipate, from arising. We consider that opposition to establishment of base on island is not likely to be so stubborn as on mainland, and, since we believe that possibilities of Bu Musa have not been examined, we suggest this should now be done.





Previous File: P. 1772/21. (392)
Next File: P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P. 2764/27 (16)
19


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
INDIAN STATES : STATES ENQUIRY (BUTLER) C'ttee. 1928-29.
Action taken on Paragraphs 75 and 76 of the Report.
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF POLITICAL OFFICERS -
STATUS OF POLITICAL SECRETARY.


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
YEAR.	
1930.	Part ✓ P. 5807 6049.
1931.	P. 215 405. 640. 809.
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